Philodemus’ Treatise “On Signs” and I.A. Borichevsky’s Epicurean Logic

The Epicureans regarded the sign as a phenomenon given in sensation, on the basis of which one can infer other similar phenomena. According to Epicurus, the sources of sensations are atomic effluences that exist “either in similarity of number or in similarity of form.” The Epicureans recognized several kinds of signs, two of which are described in the surviving portion of Philodemus’ treatise “On Signs.” In this work, Philodemus set forth the principles of inductive logic, analyzed procedures of induction based on analogy, and laid the foundations of modern semiotics. The first publication of the discovered fragments of Philodemus’ work in 1865 aroused Charles Peirce’s great interest. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Russian positivist I.A. Borichevsky not only translated the works of the Epicureans and popularized Epicurus’ doctrine, but also tried to live by imitating his favorite philosopher.

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The work of the Roman Epicurean Philodemus, “On Signs” (Περὶ σημειώσεων), was discovered in Herculaneum papyrus 1065. In it, in polemic with the views of the Stoics, the foundations of Epicurean theory of knowledge, the methods of inductive logic, and the procedures for constructing inferences based on analogy were set forth. In 1865, fragments of this treatise were first published by Theodor Gomperz [Gomperz 1865^a, Gomperz 1865^b].

In 1879–1880, Charles Peirce’s student, the future creator of a project for an electromechanical logical machine, Allan Marquand, was working on his doctoral dissertation “Epicurean Logic” and included in it a substantial portion of the fragments from Philodemus’ treatise in his own translation. It is believed that thanks to Marquand, Peirce became acquainted with the publication of Philodemus’ treatise [Fisch 1986, 190]; it was from it that he borrowed the concept of “semiosis,” understood as the process by which a sign cognitively affects its interpretation, and created semiotics “as a doctrine of the essence and principal varieties of possible semiosis” [Peirce 1934, 5, 488].

In 1883, under Peirce’s editorship, a collection of works by professors of Johns Hopkins University devoted to problems of logic was published. Peirce wrote the preface, in which he declared the significance of Philodemus’ treatise for the development of inductive logic [Peirce 1883, VI]. The first article in the collection was by Marquand and was entitled “The Logic of the Epicureans.” Marquand wrote that for the Epicureans “the function of logic consists in inferring from the observed to the unobserved” [Marquand 1883, 4]. He noted that “the Epicureans regarded the sign as a phenomenon by analogy with which one can determine the features of another phenomenon, provided that the conditions of existence of both phenomena are sufficiently similar; at the same time, for them the sign was an object of sensation” [Marquand 1883, 6]. Marquand believed that the logic of Epicurus and Philodemus was very similar to the logical doctrine of J.S. Mill and, in opposition to conceptualism, sought “to place philosophy on an empirical basis”: for Epicurus, words are signs of things, not of ideas of things, as for the Stoics [Ibid., 2]. According to a contemporary historian of pragmatism, Peirce’s logic is “… closer to the empirical logic of the Epicureans than to any other logic of Greek antiquity, including the formal logic of the Stoics, which he nevertheless sought to revive” [Deledalle 2000, 83].

The Stoics, like the followers of Epicurus, based their logical theories on the notion of the sign, but their understanding of inference based on signs differed. Although both Chrysippus and Philodemus defined logic as “the science of signs and of what they signify,” the concepts of “what is signified by the sign” and “sign” were defined differently by the Stoics and the Epicureans—on the basis of their understanding of human cognitive activity and the tasks of epistemology.

At the foundation of Epicurean theory of knowledge lies atomism and, deriving from Democritus, the doctrine of subtle atomic effluences (εἴδωλα) from the surfaces of objects. They resemble objects in form, coincide with them in number, and, owing to their subtlety, are accessible to visual perception. Atomic effluences exist either “in similarity of number or in similarity of form” [Diogenes Laertius 1979, 437] and are distributed uniformly according to the principle of isonomy. Epicurus wrote about this in the books “On Images,” “On Vision,” “On Mental Images,” and in the second book of the treatise “On Nature.” It is interesting that the physicist S.I. Vavilov believed that the foundations of modern science lie in the “theory of eidola” of the atomists: the wave field propagating from an illuminated object conceals within itself a potential image that can be revealed by the corresponding optical system possessed by the eye, and in this sense “phantoms” really do fly from luminous objects. Vavilov compared Epicurus’ atomic effluences with photons that project the image of an object onto the eye, and the rapid movement of these subtle atoms through the air with film frames [Vavilov 1948, 38].

Epicurus taught that subtle atomic images emanating from objects enter the sense organs, forming images. On the basis of sensory perceptions, singular representations arise, and on their basis—prolepses (προλήψεις): “A prolepsis is a recollection of that which has often appeared from without” [Diogenes Laertius 1979, 405]. In addition to sensations and prolepses, according to Epicurus, there exists yet another criterion of truth, which Diogenes Laertius calls the “imaginative thrust of thought” (φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας), that is, intellectual intuition.

Epicurus acknowledged the absolute truthfulness of sensory perceptions and held that error arises from an incorrect interpretation of sensory perception. In his letter to Herodotus, he wrote:

Falsehood and error always come together with opinion. <…> …The cause of this is a movement within ourselves, accompanying the imaginative thrust of thought but distinct from it: it is because of this difference that falsehood arises. Indeed, such visions as we receive… in sleep, or from other thrusts of thought and our other instruments of judgment, could never resemble existing or true objects if there were not something reaching us; but errors could not occur in them unless we received within ourselves some other movement, though connected with the imaginative thrust of thought, yet distinct from it [Diogenes Laertius 1979, 411].

The Epicurean understanding of the relation between sign and thing was determined solely by sensory perception through the method of analogy: objects given in perception are signs, by analogy with which the nature of those objects that we cannot perceive directly is determined. Epicurus regarded induction as the most objective method of cognition, and therefore his followers—Zeno of Sidon, and after him Philodemus—considered judgments true only if they were the result of induction. Sextus Empiricus, contrasting the Epicurean and Stoic views on the criterion of truth, wrote:

…according to Epicurus, some opinions are true, others false: true are those that both receive confirmation and are not refuted by what is evident; false are those that are refuted and are not confirmed by what is evident. <…> Thus, for example, when Epicurus asserts that void exists, though this is not evident, he confirms it by means of an evident thing, motion. …If there is no void, then motion too ought not to exist, since the moving body will have no place to enter… <…> Refutation, however, is something contrary to the absence of refutation. For it will be a subversion of appearances to admit the non-evident when the Stoic says that void does not exist, since he is asserting something non-evident. But with this assumption some appearance must also be destroyed, namely motion, because if there is no void, then motion does not arise of necessity either, as we have fully explained [Sextus Empiricus 1975, 104].

The surviving portion of Philodemus’ treatise “On Signs” begins with Dionysius’ exposition of the Stoic critique of Epicurean inductive logic. Philodemus then sets out Zeno of Sidon’s arguments against the Stoics; then the Stoic critique is taken up again, and once more the Epicurean arguments proposed by Bromius are presented. The text concludes with a discussion of Demetrius of Laconia’s account of induction.

Philipp De Lacy, the English translator of Philodemus’ treatise, believed that Dionysius’ words resemble the arguments used by Plutarch in his work “On Common Conceptions: Against the Stoics” [De Lacy 1978, 214]. Generalization grounded in experience, from the Stoic point of view, provides no basis for valid conclusions. In their view, only those signs that undergo the test of refutation provide grounds for true inferences. The Stoics attempt to refute the very basis of Epicurean ontology by demonstrating an inference built on similarity: “If all bodies, according to our experience, have color, and atoms are bodies, then atoms too have color; if all bodies, according to our experience, can be destroyed, and atoms are bodies, then they too can be destroyed” [Ibid., 28]. Whether everything can be compared, what degree of similarity is relevant, whether only external resemblance matters, or whether things similar in many respects are nonetheless incomparable, whether similarity is accidental or not—these are the questions the Stoics raise in criticizing the method of analogy.

In the treatise “On Signs,” it is indicated that the Epicureans recognize the existence of two kinds of signs. First, there are general signs, existing independently of whether the signified object exists or not, while there is a resemblance between the signified thing and the sign. Second, there are particular signs, existing only if the signified thing exists. In this case, the relation between the signified thing and the sign is constituted on the basis of sequence or causality. The Stoics, according to Philodemus, divided signs into general and particular. A general sign cannot serve as the basis for inference, since it denotes objects of different classes. A true sign is a particular sign, referring only to one class of objects or to one object. The Epicureans’ opponents recognized the deductive method of cognition as the only correct one. In order to prove that induction is the only true method of cognition, Zeno of Sidon reformulated proofs by contraposition into proofs by analogy. The Epicureans held that there are two kinds of inference: first, inferences based on contraposition, relying on the deductive method (for example: “if there is no void, there is no motion; if there is void, there is motion”); and second, inferences by similarity or by analogy, based on the inductive method (for example, the principle of isonomy: “as many mortals, so many immortals”).

It is interesting that in the late 1920s and in the 1930s the Russian positivist I.A. Borichevsky turned to a new interpretation of Epicurean logic. Using the Epicurean method of analogy and the principle of imitation, Borichevsky attempted to transpose the letter and spirit of Epicurean doctrine into the life of his own time.

Epicurus lived under the rule of cruel tyrants who were accorded divine honors. In opposition to the cult of the ruler, Epicurus proposed a theory of self-control and of imitation of human conduct, whose virtues are prompted not by fear of divine punishment but by wisdom. Seneca quoted Epicurus as saying that, instead of a god who sees our deeds, one should choose a revered human being and live as though he were constantly watching us. Epicurus’ disciples said: act as if Epicurus were seeing this. Many thinkers of the Early Modern period considered themselves followers of Epicurus, but very few based their private lives on his teaching. Ivan Borichevsky was one such person.

His works of the 1920s were striking for the combination of the conservative academic erudition of a classical philologist and a naïve faith in the approaching age of the triumph of human reason. Beginning in 1925, he worked on a book about Epicurus and on a dissertation on Epicurean logic [Shakhnovich 2013; Borichevsky 2013]. He kept a diary in which, among other things, he sought to reflect “responses to the sharply altered worldview of the age; a new illumination of the age-old themes of the history of philosophy; new connections between philosophy and science and life” [OR RNB 93, 13, 1].

In his diary, Borichevsky writes about how he “lives in Epicurus,” how he dreams of “…presenting Epicurus as the embodied sum of Hellenic knowledge. And then… showing that the same Epicurus is the embodied anticipation of later Hellenistic-Roman knowledge. Thus, for the first time, the genius will truly be studied. And—the first true human being on earth. Curiously, the line of living life stands out even more clearly, alongside the line of cognizing thought. This fully corresponds to my new assessment of my own life. Someday I shall write about this separately” [OR RNB 93, 9, 45, 1]. Borichevsky writes that “ancient thoughts turned out to be necessary for living modernity. Everyday life itself—new everyday life—brings these themes to the fore. Both the old and the new illuminate one another” [OR RNB 93, 12, 61, 15].

Working on the book about Epicurus and on translations (including Philodemus’ treatise “On Signs”) brings him extraordinary joy; it seems to him that the ancient philosopher “foresaw the future and saw across the centuries.” Borichevsky organizes Epicurean gatherings in the spirit of the traditional meetings of Epicurus’ students and followers on the twentieth day of each month—“the twentieths,” where philosophical problems were discussed over a meal. He writes: “The Garden of Epicurus and we! Once again difficult reality imposes this comparison” [OR RNB 93, 15, 69, 20].

On 20 June 1940, before a portrait of Epicurus, Borichevsky swears that, despite all the hardships of life, he will live it to the end, since Epicurus did not approve of suicide. But he has a little more than a year left to live.

Sources and Translations

• OR RNB 93, 13 – Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library, Fond 93, no. 13. On the diary of I.A. Borichevsky. Author’s note.
• OR RNB 93, 9, 45 – Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library, Fond 93, no. 9, notebook 45. Diary of I.A. Borichevsky.
• OR RNB 93, 12, 61 – Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library, Fond 93, no. 12, notebook 61. Diary of I.A. Borichevsky.
• OR RNB 93, 15, 69 – Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library, Fond 93, no. 15, notebook 69. Diary of I.A. Borichevsky.
• Diogenes Laertius 1979 – Diogenes Laertius. Lives, Teachings, and Sayings of Eminent Philosophers. Trans. M.L. Gasparov. Moscow: Mysl, 1979.
• Sextus Empiricus 1975 – Sextus Empiricus. Works: in 2 vols. Vol. 1. Introductory article and trans. A.F. Losev. Moscow: Mysl, 1975.
• De Lacy 1978 – Philodemus. On the Methods of Inference. Ed. with transl. and comm. by P.H. De Lacy and E.A. De Lacy. Revised ed. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1978.
• Gomperz 1865a – Gomperz T. Die herculanischen Rollen. I, II // Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien. 16. Hefte. 1865. S. 717–726, S. 815–828.
• Gomperz 1865b – Gomperz T. Philodem über Induktionsschlüsse. Leipzig: Teubner, 1865. (Herkulanische Studien. Bd. I).
• Marquand 1883 – Marquand A. The Logic of the Epicureans // Studies in Logic, by Members of The Johns Hopkins University. Ed. Charles S. Peirce. Boston: Little Brown, 1883. P. 1–11.
• Peirce 1883 – Peirce Ch.S. Preface // Studies in Logic, by Members of The Johns Hopkins University. Ed. Charles S. Peirce. Boston: Little Brown, 1883. P. III–VI.
• Peirce 1934 – Peirce Ch.S. Collected Papers in 6 vols. Vol. 5. Ed. Ch. Hartshorne and Р. Weiss. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934.

References

• We also recommend our piece: “Against Logic” (2021)
• Borichevsky 2013 – Borichevsky I.A. Philodemus’ Papyrus // Voprosy filosofii. 2013. No. 3. P. 122–132.
• Vavilov 1948 – Vavilov S.I. The Physics of Lucretius / Lucretius. On the Nature of Things. Vol. II. Moscow; Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1947. P. 9–39.
• Shakhnovich 2013 – Shakhnovich M.M. I.A. Borichevsky (1892–1941) and His Doctoral Dissertation on Epicurean Logic // Voprosy filosofii. 2013. No. 3. P. 114–121.
• Deledalle 2000 – Deledalle G. Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000.
• Fisch 1986 – Fisch M.H. Peirce’s Arisbe. The Greek influence on his later philosophy // Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 1971. Vol. 7 (4). P. 187–210.