Блог

  • The Philosophical School of Miletus

    The Philosophical School of Miletus

    This article is a kind of bridge between the «Prephilosophy» series (the previous article in the cycle) and the «Formation of the Canon» series (the next article). In a way, it touches on both of them.

    Thales, the first empiricist

    “To begin philosophy with Thales” has long been a good tradition, and even in antiquity itself it was considered that Thales of Miletus was the first philosopher, and the first to reason about nature. But after excursions in history of the East and the analysis of poetic tradition, we already understand that everything is not so simple, in fact even in antiquity itself which has created habitual to us image of Thales as the first of philosophers, in cohort of philosophers many of his predecessors were included. We ourselves have seen that Thales was in the context of the activities of the “Nine Lyricists” and the “Seven Sages”, who are no longer classified as philosophers. And this ancient idea of Thales as a man equal to the “Seven” was in many respects justified, because from what we know about Thales — his level of thinking barely went beyond the simplest notions, which had already Solon or Pittacus (notions at the level of mother should be respected, honor should be cherished, friends should not be deceived, etc.). In cultural and world outlook Thales is an open conservative. But we have already considered the fables about Thales, and if we speak about him as a philosopher, the only thing in which he really made his mark as a unique personage was the creation of a special philosophical “school”; or rather a chain of succession of thinkers. This group of sages is now called by us after their place of residence: the “Milesian School”, or even more broadly, the “Ionian Philosophy”.

    Certainly, all it is so, only if to consider as a fiction existence of school Mochus from Phoenician Sidon (one of applicants for udrevlenie atomistic philosophy). If Mochus existed, then Thales borrowed the concept of the philosophical school from the Phoenicians. As we shall see further, the most part of views of Thales perfectly lays down in a context of occurrence of views of Phoenicians (earlier we have already told that Thales on blood was rather Phoenician, than Greek), and ancient biographers insisted that he has transferred many knowledge from Egypt. The years of Thales’ life are known presumably (c. 630-548 BC). He is about the same age as Sappho, Alcaeus, Mimnermus, Stesichorus, Solon, Pittacus, and many others. At quite a conscious age his life must have been caught even by the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus. Therefore, we should not think that the “Milesian School” opens some fundamentally new era in Greek culture, it arises synchronously with other cultural phenomena. Up to our days almost no authentic passages have survived, where the philosophy of Thales “in the first person”. Literally few passages have survived, as presented below:

    “The primary element Thales supposed to be water» (1). “The earth is held on water, like a plank or ship on the sea, surrounded on all sides by the ocean” (2). “Thales hypothesized that the soul is something that moves. Stone has a soul because it ‘moves’ iron” (3). “Thales was the first to proclaim that the nature of the soul is such that it is in perpetual motion or self-movement” (4). “According to Thales, mind is the deity of the universe, everything is animated and full of daemons” (5).

    And what is important to note here is that Thales is interested in the problem of motion; and this is a very important problem in the history of philosophy. Now we are not talking about the physics of any particular motion, but about the independent motion of the whole Universe, about motion in the broadest sense, almost about “motion as such”. From this another theme inevitably develops; that since the cause of motion is the soul (it is also the cause of the will of our body, and it is the will that pushes us to motion), then it follows that since the whole universe is in motion, the soul is not only in living beings, but absolutely everywhere. This view would later be called “hylozoism”; although it is obvious that Thales was not its discoverer; it is a pre-philosophical, primitive and ancient view, observed even among Stone Age people or in the Greek Olympic religion. The main feature of Thales in this context is that he calls Mind the world god. We do not know how this relates to the rest of Thales’ ideas, but in the next generations philosophers will deal with this very thing: the harmonization of nature and Mind. The hypothetical fragments of Thales from the collections of statements of the “sages” say more about it, and we will take them into account in the further presentation.

    The theme of “water” as a primary element, strange as it may seem, is not so interesting at all, and even trivial. Already if only because the ideas about philosophical elements existed both before Thales and during his life — and these ideas were already then more developed. Thoughts about the “water beginning” simply repeat mythology, both Greek and Eastern, where at the beginning of time there was no land on earth yet, and the whole world was “Chaos”, or more often “Ocean” (the ancient poets themselves, the same Homer, could consider them synonyms). The cosmogony of his contemporary Pherekid, which is considered much less philosophical and more mythological, is fuller and freer to operate with all the elements at once, and therefore Thales still looks somewhat weak even for his time. If we believe Aristotle, the other reasons for choosing the water element are also taken from everyday observations.

    • Dying organisms literally “dry up”;
    • plants need water to grow;
    • all food is soaked in juices;
    • and all living things need water;
    • and even the sperm of all creatures (the beginning of life) is moist.

    His very life in the main commercial and maritime center of Greece simply had to inspire him with analogies to ships, and the opinion of the great role of water in the world. Such a life may well have inspired many of the astronomical and mathematical observations, for these sciences were then of an applied nature. From all that we know about Thales, he was most likely primarily an astronomer (as can be seen from the titles of his extant books, e.g. “Marine Astronomy”, ‘On the Equinox’).

    So maybe the Neoplatonist Proclus was right when he reported that it was Thales who was the first Greek to start proving geometric theorems. Therein lies his main philosophical contribution. So, for example, Thales learned to determine the distance from the coast to the ship, for which he used the similarity of triangles. And according to one of the legends, being in Egypt, he amazed Pharaoh Amasis that he managed to establish exactly the height of the pyramid, having waited for the moment when the length of the shadow of a stick becomes equal to its height, after that he measured the length of the shadow of the pyramid and received its height. It is not accidental that even centuries after his death, in literary works the image of Thales was accompanied first of all by indications of astronomical interests, and his main attribute was a circlet. All this shows us that already in the time of Thales there were some rudiments of scientific, empirical, or practical approach to the matter. Here separately it is necessary to mention that according to Aristotle, except for a magnet Thales has found out attractive force of amber which is impossible to find out, without that to electrify amber by friction, for example about wool. Hence, Thales could conduct an experiment with electricity, and discover its magnetic properties. What conclusion Thales draws — we already know (motion = animatedness). But now we can assume that the action of the soul was directly connected with electricity. And it sounds already in spirit of modern images about Dr. Frankenstein. Certainly Thales hardly understood that deals exactly with electricity in our sense of this word, therefore his discovery had absolutely no value, neither theoretical, nor practical. But nevertheless we can say that we have before us the rudiments of the experimental method.

    Thales’ hypothetical positions on philosophy

    In the list of sayings of Thales, as a representative of the “Seven Sages”, there are philosophical lines. But they should be used very carefully, because a significant part of the heritage of the “sages” is a late antique fanfic. Here we may be interested in such statements:

    The oldest of all things is god, for he is unborn.
    The most beautiful is the cosmos, for it is God’s creation.
    The greatest of all things is space, for it contains everything.
    Fastest of all things is thought (nous), for it runs without stopping.
    Strongest of all is necessity, for it overpowers all.
    Wisest of all is time, for it reveals all.

    When asked what is difficult, Thales answered, “to know oneself.”
    To the question, what is deity — “that which has neither beginning nor end”.
    To the question whether a man can secretly commit iniquity from the gods — “not only can he do it, but he cannot even conceive of it”.

    We will assume that these statements could have belonged to Thales, and if so, we learn many new details here. It turns out that Thales thinks as a strict monotheistic philosopher, and asserts that God is not born (and probably not subject to changeability), he has neither beginning, nor end, and therefore most likely he is infinite. God clearly pervades the entire universe, and it is impossible to hide even his own thoughts from him. He has strictly determinized the world, for “necessity overpowers all.” And this world created by God is in an indeterminate state, because God seems to permeate it everywhere, but he is also its creator (hence, the world, unlike God, is created, and the existence of the world is not necessary for the existence of God himself; their identity in fact turns out to be quasi-identity). In a fragment from the “Refutation of All Heresies” of the writer Hippolytus there is a statement that, according to Thales:

    Everything is formed from water by its solidification as well as evaporation. Everything floats on water, from which earthquakes, whirlwinds, and star movements occur.

    This makes him the first author of the notion of the transformation of the elements by changing aggregate states. But the most interesting point is the recognition that space includes the concept of space, and objects are in that space. He explicitly derives this notion as a special “reservoir” for objects, and it is possible that he already implies emptiness here. This means that emptiness is also included in the definition of the nature of God. Why all this is significant, we will see next, through the example of Thales’ disciples and followers. But again, this is the most hypothetical part of his philosophical heritage, and it should be kept in mind.

    Thales as a politician

    To summarize his philosophical positions — Thales does not stand out at all from the thinking context of his epoch, he stands out only as a man who first voiced these ideas on the Greek cultural field, and with a claim to philosophy as a special kind of wisdom. All the strong points of Thales’ philosophy would be developed by his followers (including Pythagoras), and what is much more interesting in his story is that this “first philosopher” immediately shattered the notion that philosophy was incompatible with politics — i.e. practical and social activity. One of the popular fables about Thales tells how he foresaw a future harvest year, so he rented oil mills while the price was low, and then collected a huge income from the sales of olive oil. The story was meant to show that a wise man, if he wished, could easily acquire wealth that he did not need, and so wise men live in poverty of their own free will (this was a response to claims that philosophy is useless). But we also see in this an example that the image of the philosopher was easily incorporated into everyday practice. Most likely, Thales was a personal advisor to the ruler of Miletus; we even have information about two of his recommendations:

    • In the first, he advises the 12 cities of Ionia to unite into a single federation, the center of which was to be the city of Theos. But this recommendation remained in the drafts.
    • The second piece of advice concerned joining the coalition against Persia during the Lydian-Persian War. Thanks to Thales, Miletus was the only one who did not fight against the Persians, thus saving itself from destruction.

    Even the most famous story in Thales’ life, namely the prediction of a lunar eclipse in 585, had significance on the scale of the entire Lydian state, directly affecting its fate, i.e. this event links him to political history. His ties to seafaring, his story of the oil trade, and his service to a tyrant of Miletus (and tyrants led the fight against the landed aristocracy) make Thales an economic progressive. But his statements as one of the Seven Wise Men — show him as a domestic conservative. In the context of his time, it is still worth considering him as a progressive thinker, given that he made a great contribution to the establishment of philosophy and popularization of Eastern knowledge.

    In the end, it turns out that Thales is a court counselor, astronomer, and navigator who believes in mythological ideas about souls and promotes a prototype of monotheistic religion. A conservative in socio-cultural views, but a progressive thinker overall. He is of Phoenician rather than Greek descent, and his main historical achievement and contribution was the development of geometry. All of this is somewhat different from the image that has already managed to be stereotyped.

    Anaximander and his Apeiron

    A disciple of Thales named Anaximander (610-546 B.C.) was also no stranger to social and political activity. It is known, for example, that he led the eviction of people to another Black Sea colony called Apollonia (today’s Sozopol in Bulgaria). But as a philosopher he is known primarily for being one of the first to write in prose, and for creating the first known map of the world; although this is more geography and literature than philosophy. At least two of the four known titles of Anaximander’s works (On Nature, Map of the Earth, Globe, On the Fixed Stars) suggest that the basis of his work, like that of Thales, was astronomy, and it is likely that it also had applications for sea travel. It is even possible that it was the fruit of their joint labors. It is believed that Anaximander wrote his works not just in prose, but in flamboyant prose, which gave away his love of all things luxurious. Thus, for example, it is said that he aspired to theatrical posture and dressed up in pompous clothes on purpose.

    Anaximander World Map

    Anaximander (like Thales), borrowed much from the Near East, especially in matters of cosmology and the numerical calculations that depend on it. From astronomical achievements it can already be noted that Anaximander considered the Sun and the Moon larger in size than the Earth, and had a whole theory of lunar and solar eclipses, although again, some sources attribute these achievements to Thales. But it is undoubtedly Anaximander who is credited with the creation of astronomical instruments, particularly the gnomon, as well as models of the celestial sphere (i.e., the globe). And if Thales was evaluated by descendants as a “predictor of eclipses”, then Anaximander over and above this allegedly predicted an entire earthquake.

    Speaking of Anaximander’s natural philosophy in detail, he believed that «the beginning of all things is apeiron. It is neither water, nor earth, nor air. It is nothing but matter itself.» This mysterious word is translated literally as “infinite” (or “limitless”), so we can consider that Anaximander’s universe is infinite. Apeiron itself is also indestructible, eternal, not created by anyone, and, most likely, also qualityless. As Epicureans, we are attracted by the fact that such a set of characteristics makes apeiron almost a complete analog of the atomistic theory, with the only difference that apeiron was not concretized as “the smallest particle” (and can be perceived as spatially infinite “matter as such”). Perhaps this happened because Anaximander did not even imply the existence of absolute emptiness; or perhaps simply because it is extremely poorly preserved for us. At least emptiness can be easily deduced from his theory on its own, which means that it was not something impossible, especially since other parts of his philosophical system, or Thales’ possible ideas about space in the cosmos, hint at it. On the other hand, apeiron can also be considered within the framework of the continuum theory. The set of its properties is quite consistent with the ideas of God as a Whole; besides, there is a lot of evidence in favor of this version. And among the hypothetical expressions of Thales we find that God had the quality of the infinite.

    What is this magic apeiron, from which everything in the world is born? One can imagine many things, but there are only a few basic versions: (1) it is a pantheistic idea of God-Nature, who, having all the attributes of divinity, “creates from himself” our visible world; (2) or, following Aristotle’s version, it is not a qualityless prime matter, but a banal “mixture” of all elements, which would later be used by such philosophers as Empedocles and Anaxagoras; (3) or, more likely, both are true, that it is both a divine nature and a “mixture of elements” that the deity has produced “in himself.” From this may arise the notion of dualism, which was expressed in the words of Anaximander the parts change while the whole is unchanging”. The analysis of what happens in the material apeiron (in the parts) is naturphilosophy, and the analysis of what happens in the original apeiron (in the whole) is theology. At the same time, it is obvious that naturphilosophy must be subordinate to theology. One can argue about these versions, it is no longer possible to prove anything for sure. Therefore, many will insist that Anaximander is the purest materialist. However, in such a case it would be strange that his followers do not pay any attention to this and develop his ideas in a theological way (e.g. Xenophanes).

    Speaking about such an important category as motion, Anaximander believed that it is eternal, and that motion is even more ancient than moisture (and perhaps this is another property of apeiron). After all, it is due to motion that one thing is born and another perishes. And moreover, from this chain of reasoning Anaximander comes to the conclusion that the opposites (parts) united in it are separated from the one (the whole), and that the birth of things is not due to changes within the four elements (i.e. not by solidification or evaporation), but by means of their separation from this one. Of the opposites, the most basic are warm and cold, wet and dry. They influence the undefined “matter/apeiron”, resulting in different elements, combinations of substances, etc. The pair of dry and cold forms earth, wet and cold forms water, wet and hot forms air, dry and hot forms fire. Yes, it is possible to assume that here there is also a change of aggregate states of each of the elements, but this change also occurs due to the action of some of the opposites. In general, all world processes, which can only be imagined, occur due to the eternal movement of opposites. And here we have before us a ready-made theory of dialectics, which explains the principle of “motion as such”; and at the same time we have before us also a theory of determinism:

    «From what all things derive their birth, to what they all return, following necessity. They all punish each other in due time for injustice.»

    As far as the sources allow us to judge, apeiron is in rotational motion. If this is transferred to a single solar system, we can imagine how the mass of matter, due to this vortex motion, begins to stratify, and the heaviest of the elements (earth) is in the center, and the lightest — surround it with three rings. First comes water, then air, and then, as the lightest element, fire. Somewhere between air and fire, Anaximander depicts three spheres that cover the sky like an onion. In this conception, all visible celestial objects are essentially one object, i.e., celestial fire; and the only differences are that at different locations in the different “spheres” are different sized “holes” through which this light reaches us, in case the holes from the different spheres cross each other (these representations can also be found in Eastern cosmology). In this interpretation, celestial bodies for Anaximander are not even bodies at all, but only light, and then eclipses are the result of overlapping holes.

    Geology and the theory of evolution in the system of Anaximander

    Of some value is also the way in which he justified the immobility of the Earth. As mentioned above, he proceeds from the fact that the Earth is at the center of the world, which is proved by the vortex motions observed empirically in water and air. He transfers these observed motions to the whole world, and it turns out that the heavy elements are pulled toward the center of the world, and the heaviest element of the four basic elements was the earth. In addition, this explains why objects in the heavens revolve around us. Based on this premise, one could already understand why the earth is immobile; the center of the world automatically implies immobility. But Anaximander put forward an additional argument. For this purpose, he invented the principle of «no more this than that” — a principle actively adopted in the future by the atomists Democritus and Epicurus. Located at the very center of a strictly symmetrical universe, the Earth has no reason to move in one direction or another: up or down, in one direction or another. All directions are equally preferable, and therefore it is unrealistic to make a choice; there is no basis for a verdict as to why one direction is better than another. Hence, the Earth is stationary. And as we can see, it does not move for reasons of logical order, and is naively endowed with its own reasoning.

    If we assume here that the earth is spherical, then the universe is also a sphere (and Anaximander is known as the compiler of some kind of “sphere” that was most likely a globe of the earth). The only thing that contradicts this is the vast amount of ancient evidence that Anaximander envisioned the earth as a cylinder, or drum, with two planes. In that case, the “no more this than that” argument loses its beauty. The contradiction here is on the face of it, and which interpretation is wrong, the sphere or the drum, is unknown. It may be a contradiction of Anaximander himself. But the contradictions do not end there. Despite his tendency to reason about the universe as an unchanging whole, Anaximander argued that the worlds (which for the Greeks was synonymous with the Galaxy) are many. In Augustine we find this passage:

    «And these worlds … are then destroyed and then born again, with each of them existing for the time possible for it. And Anaximander in these matters leaves nothing to the divine mind.»

    While Thales says quite differently: “mind is the deity of the universe”. Perhaps in this we can see the internal divisions of our conventional “school”, which does make Anaximander a more materialist-oriented thinker. This issue would later take center stage for the next generations of philosophers. Many will fall into confusion, and assume that the world (and on the universe) = god. Which means Anaximander is saying that gods can be born and die. Cicero and many others believed so (which is already more similar to Thales’ concept, but only allows for polytheism). But this view is opposed by writers such as Aecius, who defends Anaximander, and stands on the point of the inactivity of Anaximander’s “mind”. A perfectly reasonable assumption, especially since Cicero elsewhere tries to make almost all ancient thinkers (pan-)theists. But this does not in any way cancel the fact that Anaximander could be a pantheist within the whole universe, and consider the individual worlds as its numerous parts, which can be subject to change.

    Worst of all, if the world and the universe were one and the same (i.e. if the plurality of worlds were not allowed), then the argument about the vortex motion of apeiron would work quite well. But now it turns out that all the above arguments about elements concern only a single world. The nature of apeiron now becomes unknown, and in what relation to each other are the worlds, whether they also move in a circle relative to some center — it is impossible to understand. All these contradictions and confusions will be solved by subsequent generations of philosophers.


    And the most original development of Thales’ ideas was a completely new idea of Anaximander about the origin of life, and, in particular, the origin of man. In his account, the earth was originally completely covered with water, but the “heavenly fire” evaporated some of the moisture, lowered the sea level, and thus the earth emerged, and the vapor itself became the personification of the “element of air”, which also set in motion (air = motion = soul) the celestial objects. Here the transformations of the elements, beginning with water, come full circle. Thunder, lightning and storms were explained with the help of physics, where no mythological allegories with Zeus’ feathers were allowed, and stars were simply manifestations of a single fire. In such a scheme of spontaneous transformations, life originates somewhere on the boundary between earth and water (in a swamp). But even here Anaximander allows another contradiction, because in this case life arises only after the earth has emerged from under the water. But in separate passages he says that since originally there was no land, the first creatures were exclusively sea-dwellers, who only later had to adapt to life on land. And so even the first humans were fish. It turns out that life arises before the earth rose out of the water. So Anaximander has the first systematic ideas about the evolution of species. From the presentation of the elemental “cycle” of transformations it becomes clear to us why the philosopher represented consciousness, the human soul, in a very ordinary way, as a “water-like essence” (the element in its very essence represents movement).

    Anaximenes and meteorology

    The importance and further influence of Anaximander on posterity was enormous, far surpassing that of his teacher Thales, for two succeeding generations of philosophers drew from Anaximander. Alas, but the preservation of his works is too low, and this influence can be understood only indirectly, comparing the available passages with later authors. Still, we see that Anaximander’s system already contains all the later problematics, while he has these problematics relatively uncontradictorily united, and in his “apeiron” he was already one step away from atomism. The worse all this affects the evaluation of the subsequent representative of the “Milesian School”, who bears the name Anaximenes (approx. 585/560 — 525/502 B.C.), who already looks mediocre and weak against the background. Most likely he still caught the living Anaximander and even was directly trained by him. All sources agree that the main difference between the two is that Anaximander’s apeiron acquired qualitative certainty as the element of air. And that all further arguments almost completely duplicate Anaximander, including even the idea of cosmic spheres and the nature of stars. There is no way we can agree with this. Therefore, having depicted all the similarities, we will emphasize the more important, the differences.

    In general, Anaximenes reduced all causes to the limitless (apeiron) air. The reasons why he did this can be different. For example, speaking about the question of motion, Anaximenes directly continued the logic of his predecessors, following Anaximander he recognizes air as a kind of allegory of motion, and from him he borrows the thesis that motion is more important and older than all other origins. But if so, then motion = air, and so it is the first element, which by its property is infinite. This reasoning may directly stem from a consistent reading of Anaximander. Besides, air could have been chosen because of a more universal and convenient explanation of phenomena of a complex order, the same questions of animation of bodies, their movement (there is no need to invent how the soul and movement arose, if these are already properties of air, which is the basis of everything). It is not clear, of course, why he did not like Anaximander’s universalism, but going back to the elements, the choice of air seems a very logical step.

    «Just as our soul, being air, binds each one of us together, so breath and air encompass the whole of creation.»

    Speaking of the cosmos, here Anaximenes also has a few refinements to Anaximander’s system. For example, there is only one cosmic sphere (not three), and it is an ice wall with fire leaves attached to it (not holes drilled in it). Like our earth itself, the cosmic objects are flat like leaves, which is what allows them to float in the air. If the principle remains the same (flat circles on an invisible sphere far above), the explanation is already somewhat different. In addition, Anaximenes stated that the Sun and Moon are of a special nature; that they are burning blocks of earth that are lower than the sphere of stars (according to Anaximander it is the stars that are on a lower tier). So it can be said that Anaximenes was more accurate in his teaching. This can be suspected even in terms of the stylistics of their writings. Readers complained that, unlike the “pretentious” Anaximander, he wrote very dry prose without artistic embellishments.

    However, despite all this “scientificity”, according to Anaximenes, air is a god (Aecius, who had already defended Anaximander’s atheism before, calls to understand also under this “god” — the forces pervading the elements and bodies). The fact that air pervades the whole world and animates it, quite logically leads to the conclusion that it is God, in this we can see a clear borrowing of Thales’ ideas. As we said above, it is quite possible that apeiron was a god for Anaximander. Following his predecessors, Anaximenes considers motion as eternal; thanks to it all things turn into each other. But he entered the history of philosophy by the fact that, unlike his predecessors, the element of air is distinguished by the density or rarefaction of its essence. At rarefaction fire is born, and at densification — wind, then fog, water, earth, stone. And from this everything else already arises. From the degree of “thickening” its substance can change several times in succession, but at all stages it is the same substance. Even in the form of earth, air remains air. This is not a cycle of transformations of the four elements, but as if to postulate air as some special element standing above and including them all. It is also the first detailed expression of the idea of the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative differences.

    “Out of air, when it is condensed, fog is formed, and when still more condensed, water is formed; still more condensed, air becomes earth, and the greatest condensation turns it into stones.”

    Of course, we observe the transition of aggregate states even in Thales (not to mention Anaximander, where this view is also present). His predecessors, too, used opposites to explain such transitions. One significant difference here is that Anaximenes does not want to recognize “dry and wet” or “warm and cold” as substantively important elements from which the elements are generated. It seems absurd to him, because it should be just the opposite, such properties are consequences of material elements, not their cause (of course, if apeiron was a qualityless matter, then it also had consequences of the material substrate, but Anaximenes has already rejected pure apeiron). In this respect Anaximenes is even more materialistic than his predecessors. His pair of opposites concerns the properties of matter itself, not the effect we evaluate with the senses.

    Here we may suspect that Anaximander also knew this, for he believed that the earth is heavier than fire; Anaximenes literally explains why this is so. Therefore, either Anaximander could also have used a similar explanation, or he proceeded from trivial obviousness without offering an explanation. In the latter case, Anaximenes made a significant addition explaining the difference in the weight of the four elements. More importantly, in order for the density of matter to change, we must allow for its porosity, some semblance of “emptiness,” the displacement of which increases the density. Although it is impossible to prove this with precision, Anaximenes is at least in extreme proximity to the discovery of elementary particles and the void. Certainly such detail helps to interpret meteorological phenomena more correctly. Anaximenes himself is considered primarily a meteorologist. That is, he explained all the phenomena of nature; not only thunder, lightning and hail, but also, for example, the phenomenon of rainbows and the causes of earthquakes.

    So, speaking about the “secondary character” of Anaximenes, we cannot condemn the pupil of Thales and Anaximander for a huge number of borrowings, for he was their pupil. This is not surprising at all, especially since he introduced a number of innovations. What is surprising here is that he even needed to return to the level of Thales’ ideas, choosing one of the four elements as the central one, and talking about “divine Providence”. And yet, with that said, it is believed that it was Anaximenes who directly influenced philosophers such as Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and even the atomists. Therefore, it cannot be said that he was secondary within the Milesian school.

    The Milesian school taken as a whole

    Since we are already talking about the “Milesian” school, it is worth remembering about Hecataeus of Miletus (c. 535-476 BC), who was even scolded by Heraclitus in his time, accusing him of stupidity along with Xenophanes and Pythagoras. This Hecataeus was an active politician who participated in the Ionian revolt against the Persians, and was also almost the same age as Parmenides. The sphere of his professional activity was history and geography (he improved the map of the world created by Anaximander); and until the appearance of Herodotus’ “History”, it was Hecataeus who was considered the best of the authors on this subject. Like the rest of his contemporaries, including Heraclitus, he was most likely extremely arrogant, since the phrase: “I write this as it seems to me true, for the accounts of the Hellenes are manifold and ridiculous, as it seems to me”. That said, almost all of his writings are heavily influenced by mythology; he even engaged in a critical evaluation of mythology, attempting to “ground” that very mythology.

    If the myth says that King Egypt and 50 of his sons came to Argos, Hecateus says: “Egypt himself did not come to Argos, but only his sons, who, as Hesiod composed, were fifty, but as I think, there were not even twenty”; and when it was necessary to explain what Cerberus was, he decided that it was a snake, and also began to diminish the scale of mythological pathos: “I think that this snake was not so big and not huge, but [just] scarier than other snakes, and therefore Eurystheus ordered [to bring her], thinking that it is not possible to approach it”. Skepticism as a methodological principle is evident throughout. Not so big, not so much, etc. If someone would say that the pyramids in Egypt are huge, here too, Hecateus would probably say that they are not so huge since ordinary people were able to build them. The subject of geography, the occupation of politics, the scientific approach to business — all this we have already seen above, and it is possible that Hecateus did not pass by the philosophers of his city, and is also worthy to be considered part of the “Milesian school” of philosophy. In addition to Hecataeus, the life of Cadmus of Miletus, another historian-logographer, who, like Anaximander, was regarded as the progenitor of literary prose, was around the same time. He wrote “The Founding of Miletus and All Ionia” in 4 books, and because of his name was later considered the man who adapted the Phoenician alphabet to Greek (the mythology of a hero named Cadmus is known to speak of this). But because of the connection with the mythological character, there are reasons to doubt that Cadmus existed at all. The noble families of Miletus often painted themselves as descendants of the Phoenician Cadmus, and this character may simply be an attempt to justify that “that” Cadmus was a resident of this city.

    Besides Cadmus, one more woman can be attributed to the “Milesian” school, in connection with which there are also few convincing arguments, but nevertheless, it is worth to mention it so that the article about the “Milesian” school would be as exhaustive as possible. Cleobulina of Rhodes, daughter of the tyrant of Rhodes Cleobulus, one of the “Seven Sages”, became famous as a poetess and compiler of riddles. In some sources (Plutarch) she is considered to be a “companion” of Thales, which means that it can also be considered that she was significantly influenced by Milesian philosophy. Plutarch even wrote that Thales characterized her as a woman with the mind of a statesman. But Laertes generally claimed that she was the mother of Thales, which is not at all plausible, but at least confirms that her name was perceived as part of the story of Thales.


    All distinctions made by us between Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes can be made only on the basis of very scarce extant materials. Most likely, all philosophers of this school complement each other, and everything that Thales and Anaximander knew was also present in some form in Anaximenes (even if it is not directly in the fragments that have survived). Conversely, something of Anaximander’s ideas may have been shared by Thales. It is just that all this cannot be learned directly from the sources. If we consider the “Milesian School” taken as a whole, several common points can be traced here:

    1. Recognition of the elements as the beginning, which ideally, with maximum abstraction, reaches apeiron.
    2. The soul is the cause of motion, and it is almost the universal God Himself. Everything in the world is animated, because the whole world is in motion (and the whole world is in motion, because everything is animated).
    3. Motion (= soul?) is the result of various opposites making the transition from one to another, and this motion is eternal. Contradictions are distinguished from unity, for in reality the world in the Whole is one.
    4. In addition to the unity of opposites, Anaximander has the idea of “Whole and parts” where all changes occur in the parts. In other words, in spite of all this struggle of opposites within the universe, it still remains “as a whole” the same as it was, nothing is added to it.

    Here we see all the necessary ideas for an exhaustive understanding of the next generation of philosophers. For as it is said — “nothing arises from nothing”.

  • From Frankenstein to The Last Man: Mary Shelley’s Humanistic Ideas

    From Frankenstein to The Last Man: Mary Shelley’s Humanistic Ideas

    When we talk about English Romanticism in the 19th century, everyone thinks of Byron and his friend Percy Shelley. However, among the lesser-known authors of this period, there were masterpieces that are known to everyone today. One of the most striking examples is Frankenstein by Mary Shelley, Percy’s wife. Despite the popularity of the image of Frankenstein’s monster, Mary’s name is little known among the famous authors of the nineteenth century. Thanks to cinema, Frankenstein is perceived as a story about a monster and the triumph of science. In fact, this is a misconception, and Mary’s novel is underestimated, just as she is underestimated. The philosophical issues that run through her work raise more significant questions than the works of her famous contemporaries. In this article, we will try to recreate the true meaning of her novels and consider Shelley’s work beyond the monster story.

    Mary Shelley’s work is a transitional phenomenon that contains specific features of English Romanticism, which are determined by the peculiarities of the socio-economic situation in English society. The Industrial Revolution, and especially the introduction of steam engines, led to the rapid growth of cities and the destruction of entire sectors of the old craft economy. Such dramatic changes greatly exacerbated social problems. Thus, a real «army of the unemployed» emerged, and the overcrowding of cities created such demographic pressure that newly arrived citizens were forced to cram into small barracks in unsanitary conditions. Needless to say, this led to an increase in mortality and a growing gap between the rich and the poor. And this is not to mention the fact that, as a result of the state policy of supporting local landowners (i.e. aristocrats), England had the most expensive bread in Europe. As a result of these problems, the intellectual environment of England began a critical review of the attitude to the prospects of social development and scientific and technological progress that had been formed in the eighteenth century. This explains the moderation of the ideas of the English Enlightenment.

    In part, it was this crisis of Enlightenment ideology that gave rise to the Romantic worldview. However, the late English Romantics (at least those in Byron’s circle, including the Shelleys) remained to some extent faithful to the traditions of the previous stage in literature, which allowed them to combine past and new trends in their work.

    Mary Shelley’s most famous work was the novel Frankenstein or a Modern Prometheus (1818), which was highly praised by Byron and Walter Scott. At the same time, the works written later show that Mary Shelley’s talent developed gradually. Thus, the novel «The Last Man» (1826), numerous articles and reviews reflect the writer’s active participation in contemporary literary controversies. «Valperga» (1823) and «Perkin Warbeck» (1830), written in the genre of historical novel, very popular in the early nineteenth century, follow the traditions of Walter Scott. The novels Lodore (1835) and Faulkner (1837), created later, reflect the processes that took place in the 1830s in British literature — the movement from Romanticism to Victorianism. Mary Shelley’s works are a vivid example of the literature of this transitional period, and this partly explains their content.

    Bust of Mary Shelley, sculptor Camillo Pistrucci, 1843.

    The novel The Last Man (1826) emphasizes Mary Shelley’s transition to a new level of creative maturity. In addition, there are semantic and artistic similarities with her novel Frankenstein. Both of these works personify myths: «Frankenstein is the myth of «creation,» and The Last Man is the myth of «destruction.» Although they are different in essence, certain connections can be found in them. This concept is reminiscent of the poetry of Byron, whose poems also echo «creation» and «destruction,» namely, the poem «The Darkness» (1816), in which humanity dies by giving up the struggle, and the poem «Prometheus» (1816), in which humanity continues to struggle despite the hard struggle and high price.

    Unrelated in plot, Shelley’s novels resonate on different levels. The first novel, as we said earlier, is an interpretation of the myth of «creation.» The failure of Frankenstein’s daring attempt shows the inability of man to equal God as a creator. In The Last Man, the failure of man as a creator is transformed into the powerlessness of man in general. Thus, the myth of creation turns into a myth of destruction. If the demon created by Frankenstein can still be called a «failed Adam,» then Lionel Verneuil, the protagonist of The Last Man who survived the epidemic, wanders the devastated earth as an «Adam in reverse.» And if Byron’s pessimistic poem was followed by an optimistic poem, Mary Shelley’s novels develop the theme in the opposite order, the plot of destruction completes what was already started in the not-so-optimistic story of creation. Unlike Byron, here we see gloomy prospects in general.

    The peculiarity of these novels is Mary Shelley’s ideological and philosophical polemics with both past generations of authors and contemporaries. This is most noticeable in the novel The Last Man, which rethinks the ideas of the Enlightenment and Romanticism in an ironic way. The polemic is supported by philosophical and social motives, primarily the themes of human loneliness and the limitations of science. Thus, Frankenstein’s voluntary and selfish alienation from society is reflected in Verneuil’s story. He loves his loved ones, does his best to be useful, but just like Victor Frankenstein, he is powerless to save other people. In addition to this plot similarity, both novels open with epigraphs from John Milton’s Paradise Lost.

    In both cases, we can speak of an «open» ending that leaves room for the reader’s imagination. This allows us to interpret Frankenstein and The Last Man as part of a philosophical dilogy. It is worth talking about all these similarities, as well as differences, in more detail to see how Mary Shelley’s work refracts the entire worldview of her era.

    The image of Prometheus and the tragedy of the enlightened mind

    The full title of the novel, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus, directly refers to the myth of Prometheus, whose influence is clearly seen in Mary’s work. The image of Prometheus as the personification of the titanic struggle of man was actively used in romantic literature, and the myth of him inspired the greatest authors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the English romantics who turned to the story of Prometheus-Byron (whose poem was mentioned above), Percy and Mary Shelley-the main source of inspiration was the tragedy Prometheus Chained, attributed to Aeschylus. At the same time, there are significant differences in the interpretation of this story among the above-mentioned authors. Firstly, Percy Shelley and Byron choose the poetic form of presentation, while Mary Shelley chooses the prose form. Secondly, in Byron’s poem «Prometheus» as well as in Percy’s lyrical drama «Prometheus Unbound» the myth of the titan performs a plot-forming function; while in Mary Shelley’s novel, the image of Prometheus turns into a metaphor, and only the plot scheme remains from the myth. This scheme is difficult to recognize without the subtitle «Modern Prometheus.»

    The cover of the 1831 edition, a drawing by Theodor von Holst. It is perhaps the first image of Frankenstein’s monster.

    Mary Shelley borrowed the name «Modern Prometheus» from Anthony Shaftesbury, who used it in his works The Moralists (1709) and A Counsel to the Author (1710). It turns out that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the interpretation of the image of Prometheus was used much earlier than the Romantics. At the same time, if for Byron and Percy the images of rebellion and the struggle against enslavement are important as such, Mary Shelley uses the theme of rebellion to develop the motif of creative burning and the severe torment associated with the process of creation itself. To ensure the internal movement of the novel about Frankenstein, Mary Shelley combines the myth with the motifs of the legends of Dr. Faust, the creation of the Golem, the biblical stories of Adam and the fall of Satan, as well as with their literary treatments, primarily Milton’s epic Paradise Lost.

    The peculiarity of the philosophical atmosphere of the era was that the science-centered position was replaced by a new, romantic philosophy. All of this makes Mary Shelley’s novels quite peculiar, as they are largely related to scientific topics.

    Like other romantics, Mary criticizes the theory of the omnipotence of the human mind, which cognizes the laws of nature in order to become its master, as well as the idea of the need to rebuild the world, the ability to penetrate the secrets of the universe and rationally explain everything in it. In the novel Frankenstein, the irony of life makes the human mind turn against itself.

    Victor Frankenstein, like Prometheus, created a new life; however, the triumph of the human mind is not unquestionable. The scientist’s creation cannot find its place in human society, becomes violent and, like Cain, commits his «first» crime. The first victims of his destructive power are those who are particularly close to Frankenstein: his brother, best friend, and young wife. This is how the motif of destruction is woven into the creation myth from the very beginning.

    By lifting the veil of secrecy, romantic heroes isolate themselves from the world of people (this motif is already characteristic of the late Enlightenment, for example, the novels of William Godwin). A researcher named Walton and Victor Frankenstein are guilty of abandoning their loved ones, simple human relationships, for the sake of their discoveries. The tragedy lies in the incompatibility between the limitless possibilities of man and the requirements and rules dictated by life in the real world and society, which leads to loneliness and despair. It is not the materialization of the scientist’s idea that is destructive, but the idea itself, which has no moral basis. Thus, in the novel Frankenstein, the theme of cognition, the thirst for a holistic explanation of the world and man, turns into a philosophical problem and an open polemic with the rationalist ideology of the Enlightenment. This controversy was an integral part of Romantic philosophy; it can also be interpreted as an awareness of the contradiction between theory and real life, which goes beyond theory.

    This is not only about the image of scientists; Mary tells us that any idealistic scheme detached from life leads to tragic consequences. Therefore, on the other hand, she criticizes the idealism of her husband Percy Shelley. She believes that a person is unable to achieve an ideal, to realize a great idea in the material world and by material means. Walton cannot reach the pole because of the weakness of his sailors. Frankenstein’s creation cannot compare to God’s creation because the scientist creates it from disgusting pieces of dead matter. Consequently, the Demon’s sincere desire to win human affection also remains unreciprocated, as he is a grotesquely ugly material embodiment of a great idea. Everyone will be better off if people remain human. Mary Shelley acts as an enlightenment activist who seeks the unity of man and nature. But the question arises: what is human nature? And Shelley tries to answer this question by denying its individualistic nature. One of the main tragedies of the enlightened mind is its loneliness.

    Social motives against enlightened individualism

    The image of the Demon appears as an artistic embodiment of a whole range of philosophical ideas. In full accordance with the theories of the French Enlightenment and John Locke, the creature born as a result of Frankenstein’s experiments is a «Tabula rasa» (blank slate). Just like his creator and Robert Walton, the Demon himself strives for one thing: «cognition,» which always begins with cognition of itself. He cognizes the world through the simplest sensations (hunger, thirst, cold, loneliness) and reaches out to people, wanting to find warmth and love. However, it is not these simple sensations that define the character of the Demon, but rather a more complex sensory experience, that is, the social relations given to us in our senses. Here Mary Shelley seems to be telling us that human character is largely determined by society. It is the cruel attitude of the environment that generates hatred and a thirst for revenge in the Demon; the cause of evil lies not only in the very nature of the Demon as an individual. Thus, the theme of sinfulness and virtue turns out to be closely related to the theme of man in society and in solitude. The loneliness of the Demon in the novel is not psychological but social, in line with the philosophical tradition of William Godwin and Thomas Paine.

    The theme of loneliness is perfectly emphasized by the story of the Demon’s spiritual development, which was determined by the three books he found in the forest. The motif is akin to a «robinsonade». Thus, from The Sufferings of Young Werther he learns about the experiences available to the human soul. Plutarch’s «Lives» help the Demon to look at people in a historical and social context. «Milton’s Paradise Lost is a metaphysical reality that encompasses the human world. Familiarity with this work prompts the Demon to compare himself to both Adam and Satan.

    The motif of the unity of opposites plays a major role in understanding the relationship between Frankenstein and the Demon. Frankenstein and his creation are two sides of the same coin; they cannot exist without each other. The scientist and the creature he created are interdependent and clash in an insoluble contradiction. Initially, the Demon seems to be the personification of the dark side of Frankenstein’s soul, its symbol that has come to life. Gradually, Frankenstein identifies his creation more and more with himself, as evidenced by the fact that he takes responsibility for the deaths of his loved ones. Toward the end of the novel, the roles change: The demon begins to call himself the master of his creator. After Elizabeth’s death, the climax comes: Frankenstein finally forgets about the arrogance that put him alongside Prometheus. Like his own creation, he embarks on a path of rage and revenge. Creator and creation become inseparable, and in their common fall they are likened to Satan.

    The gloomy atmosphere of Frankenstein makes Mary Shelley’s novel similar to Byron’s romantic poems and dramas, rather than Percy Shelley’s utopia. Frankenstein can be compared to Manfred: they do not deny the importance of reason and are thinkers who, despite the catastrophe, believe in progress and the victory of humanity over the unknown. In Mary Shelley’s novel, there is a motif similar to Byron’s 1821 novel Cain: the fate of the monster created by Frankenstein, who embodies all the injustice of the existing world, which turns good into evil. At the same time, Mary Shelley polemicizes with Byron: unlike Manfred and other characters of Byron, after a long and difficult journey, Frankenstein realizes before his death that it is a human duty to feel connected to humanity.

    «The Eruption of Vesuvius» by Joseph Rebel, circa 1820.

    The motive of the disaster, science and egoism against nature

    The theme of the duality between the «natural» and the «man-made,» which Shelley emphasizes, was very important for most Romantics and for philosophy in general. This theme affects such a feature of Romantic literature as the motif of catastrophe. This motif is of great importance and manifests itself in various spheres of scientific and cultural life, which is embodied in Shelley’s novel The Last Man.

    As an example, we can consider the scientific work of Georges Cuvier, who in 1812 developed the theory of catastrophes, according to which changes in the living world occur under the influence of events that lead to the mass extinction of organisms. In the previous literary tradition, the motif of catastrophe was closely intertwined with images of nature and revolutionary change. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, European society had three main views on the relationship between nature and revolution. After the events of 1789, the revolution was likened to the renewing power of nature, and nature was perceived as a benevolent ally of the revolution, which needed a general renewal, after which a new, happy era would begin. This view was reflected in the creation of a new revolutionary calendar in France.

    Later, after the disappointment with revolutionary terror, nature began to be perceived as a safe haven in which to relax from the stormy social life (supporters of this idea were, for example, François-René de Chateaubriand and his works Atala and René, and the late poetry of William Wordsworth). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the connection between nature and revolutionary transformations became a metaphor, and pictures of social utopias gave way to apocalyptic pictures of the collapse of empires and the dying of civilizations. Nature is no longer a safe haven, but becomes hostile to humans. In the 1800s and 1820s, a number of works of literature and painting appeared, the subjects of which were disasters or natural disasters (for example, de Granville’s novel Omegar and Siderea, Byron’s poem The Darkness, Thomas Campbell’s poem The Last Man, and Thomas Hood’s poetic short story of the same title).

    In her novel The Last Man, Mary Shelley depicts the death of humanity at the end of the 21st century from a plague pandemic. As a rule, authors of the Romantic era break the previous tradition in which the death of people was a punishment for sins. For the Romantics, humanity’s movement toward death is causeless and inevitable. In Mary Shelley’s novel, the causes of the pandemic are also not specified. However, it can be assumed that there are at least two: the first (external) is the symbolic revenge of the East for the West’s desire to finally conquer it. Hadrian’s dreams of a brighter future for all people on earth are close to the enlightenment concept of universal equality, and an ironic reinterpretation of this concept is embodied in the motif of a deadly disease that equates all people in need. The second (internal) cause of the pandemic is the tragedy that occurred in Verneuil’s family. Mary Shelley used a technique common in the Romantic era: the desire to embody the inexhaustibility of an object (the universe and eternity) in a form that claimed to reproduce only its individual aspects. A misunderstanding between a young man and a young woman (Adrian and Evadne) becomes the «seed» from which a universal catastrophe grows.

    The novel The Last Man, like Frankenstein, is romantic in its essence, but it contains a critique of romanticism. Mary Shelley destroys readers’ expectations by ironically rethinking the usual romantic categories and shows how untenable they are in the face of a global catastrophe.

    Thus, the human imagination, which in Percy Shelley’s aesthetics appears as the greatest creative force, leads Mary Shelley’s characters only to deceptive illusions: throughout the novel, none of the characters’ hopes are destined to come true. Art turns out to be helpless — the characters of the books and the marble sculptures of Rome and the Vatican are unable to replace Lionel’s deceased loved ones. Nature, according to Mary Shelley, is also not kind to man. At the beginning of the novel, Cumberland’s pastoral descriptions only emphasize the wildness and ignorance of young Lionel and Loss (Lionel’s sister). With the outbreak of the pandemic, warm winters contribute to the spread of the disease, and the beauty of the landscapes, which embodies nature’s indifference to humanity, becomes an evil mockery of people.

    The results of social progress are also unsuccessful. The society of the future in Mary Shelley’s novel, according to the theories of William Godwin and Percy Shelley, has come much closer to the ideal of reason. States still exist, but the English king voluntarily abdicates, class distinctions are largely resolved, poverty and disease are systematically eradicated, and, by all indications, the Golden Age is about to arrive. In describing the pandemic, Mary Shelley uses the same technique as Daniel Defoe in Diary of a Plague Year: she sets up an experiment to show how well a developed society can cope with a universal disaster. Like Defoe, Mary Shelley tells about many human destinies, unfolding many scenes in front of Verneuil (the story of Juliet, the story of Lucy, the story of an old peasant woman, the story of an army of marauders, etc.) Just as in Diary of a Plague Year, the novel shows the best and worst manifestations of human nature in the face of disaster.

    However, unlike Defoe, Mary Shelley holds a pessimistic view of the possibilities of society, again converging with Byron’s position. The novel presents various variants of social organization: hereditary monarchy (represented by Adrian), the republican rule of Raymond, the democratic rule of Ryland, theocracy under the leadership of the false prophet, and anarchy embodied by looters from America and Ireland. In the face of the horrors of the pandemic, all forms of social organization are powerless.

    None of the novel’s characters is destined to realize the romantic concept of human personality development, according to which the hero, moving to a new stage of development, acquires power. Verneuil, after meeting Adrian, becomes an educated and civilized man, but in the novel’s finale he has to return to the skills he acquired in his youth, when he was just a poor shepherd. Raymond is a hostage to his passions, and loses first his power and then his life. Adrian is able to use his strength and wisdom only when it is too late. Once again, reason is inferior to nature, as the failure of Victor Frankenstein had previously shown.

    A spark of optimism amidst the gothic atmosphere

    Many scholars call Frankenstein a Gothic novel because it contains supernatural elements. The supernatural aspect of the plot in the «Gothic» novel is important for refuting the former enlightenment ideal of Reason and remains only a preparatory step to understanding the complex interdependence of the rational and the emotional, the cognizability and unknowability of the laws of existence. In Mary Shelley, the theme of cognition of the world and man turns into a complex philosophical problem, a new concept of the world that was not present in either the Enlightenment or the Gothic novel. According to this concept, a person does not always achieve positive results in his or her actions, even if he or she is guided by reason and belongs to the «third» state of society. He is not a toy of supernatural forces, and his misfortunes are caused by his mistakes. Thus, the fate of the world depends on the mistakes of individuals who overestimate their own strengths and capabilities. At the same time, Mary Shelley uses the aesthetics of «gothic» novels in certain episodes of her works to create a tense atmosphere and attract the reader’s attention.

    I would like to point out that Frankenstein is not based on science, but on metaphysics and the occult; Frankenstein strives not so much for scientific discovery as for alchemical immortality. Secondly, the novel shows how the human mind turns against itself in its quest to reach the heights of science and unravel the greatest mystery of nature. The power of the current is only a tool of the modern Prometheus, a way to revive the Monster, an impetus for the development of further conflict. In the novel The Last Man, the action is moved to the distant future. In this future, everything necessary for life is produced by machines, and people travel by aeronautics. However, these realities are only a background for the events taking place, and the life of the people of the imaginary twenty-first century is not particularly different from that of the contemporary writer. It follows that, although the novels contain elements of conventionality and fantastic plots, the fantastic nature of the novels is a feature of romantic aesthetics and is not so much scientific as mythological.

    Unknown woman, formerly known as Mary Shelley by Samuel John Stump, 1831

    Of course, Mary Shelley was not a specialist in the exact sciences, but she, like Percy Shelley, read a lot and had an idea of advanced ideas and the latest theories. She herself claimed that one of the sources of inspiration for Frankenstein was Shelley’s and Byron’s conversations about the achievements of Erasmus Darwin and Luigi Galvani.

    All of this makes Mary Shelley seem more pessimistic than Byron, but because of the open-ended ending in Frankenstein, readers can only guess at the fate of the Demon. The outcome of Verneuil’s efforts to find the survivors of the pandemic is also unknown. As a result, the world and human beings are understood as an unrealized possibility, something incomplete that emerges and is created continuously. Romanticism is characterized by the poetics of fragmentation and the ineffable, which may imply the presence of an open ending in a work. At the same time, Verneuil’s desire to sail to new shores (he is going to leave Europe and sail to Asia and Africa) is perceived as an attempt to unite the microcosm and macrocosm.

    At the same time, when discussing the composition of The Last Man, its end and its beginning are combined: is Verneuil truly the Last Man, if one does read about him? The story told in Verneuil’s name is only a prophecy written on the leaves found in Sibyl’s cave. The function of the «Author’s Introduction» is to simultaneously «deconstruct» and «reconstruct» the existing world. This is manifested on two levels at once. On the one hand, Mary Shelley selects a part from the pile of leaves — what she considers necessary — and deciphers the writings, speculating and creating a coherent story. On the other hand, the story of the end of civilization that the reader is introduced to does not exclude the possibility of change for the better, as the origin of the text suggests that Verneuil’s story is a parable, a warning to humanity.


    Reading Frankenstein and especially The Last Man, it is very evident that Mary Shelley is in dialogue with many writers, both past and present. Ancient myths, Homer, Aeschylus and Sophocles, the Bible, works of Renaissance and Enlightenment authors, classicists and the works of her contemporaries, especially William Wordsworth and S.T. Coleridge, and the Gothic novel itself are important to Mary Shelley, as well as to most English authors of the Romantic era. The works of William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, the poetry of Percy Shelley and Byron, as well as sources related to the natural sciences had a significant influence on her work. Thus, Mary Shelley deservedly takes her place among the most important figures of the English Romantic literary movement, not inferior to her husband and his equally famous friends. And her talent is not limited to the popular Frankenstein.

  • Against Logic

    Against Logic

    Researchers of ancient culture widely know that in the Epicurean school of philosophy there is practically no «logic» section. It is replaced by a certain «Canon«, which is a set of recommendations for the proper conduct of the conversation, so that no unnecessary difficulties arise (strictly speaking, logic was developed by Epicureans, especially inductive logic in the school of Philodemus of Gadara, but this does not cancel their general negative attitude to logic, as such). Epicurus, armed with the theory of the sophist Prodicus, advised a clear definition of the meaning of all words, so that no ambivalent interpretations would arise. More precisely, he advised defining the varieties of the same word according to the different contexts; each time the meaning changed, it should be spelled out. The simplest example is the notion of pleasure, which can be bodily, mental, active, and passive; or it can have related words that differ in meaning (pleasure, bliss, joy, etc.). If such a distinction is made, there will be no room for unnecessary sophisms in arguments. Conversely, if this is not done, every other disputant will try to use the same word in different contexts, deliberately creating confusion and false problems (as Cicero, Plutarch or even Aristotle often did). Basic information about this «Canon» can be found in Diogenes of Laertes and in a letter to Herodotus:

    «Canonics is an approach to the subject… usually canonics is considered together with physics: canonics is the science of criteria and beginning in their very foundations… Epicureans reject dialectics (rhetoric, logic) as a superfluous science — in physics, they say, it is enough to use words corresponding to the subjects… All subjects were called by their names, which the grammarian Aristophanes considered a reprehensible feature of his script. His clarity was such that even in his essay «On Rhetoric» he did not think it necessary to demand anything but clarity. And in his letters he addresses not «I wish to rejoice», but «I wish well-being» or «I wish for good»» (c) Laertesian.

    So, first of all… it is necessary to understand what is behind the words, so that all our opinions, investigations, perplexities could be reduced to them for discussion, so that in endless explanations they would not remain unexamined and the words would not be empty. In fact, if only we want to reduce to something our researches, perplexities, opinions, it is necessary for us at each word to see its first meaning, which does not need a proof. And then we must cling to sensations in everything, cling to the present momentum of thought or any other criterion, cling to the experiences we undergo, and this will give us the means of judging what is waiting and what is unclear. And once this is settled, we must move on to the consideration of the obscure.

    (c) Letter to Herodotus

    At first glance, one might say that here the Epicureans are proposing the development of a new, more complex, philosophical language that would remove all ambiguity by creating new concepts for each individual subject. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, it is a question of simplifying and rather using ordinary language. Ambiguities must be resolved, not by creating new terminology (for this is absurd, making language more complicated will only create more problems of understanding), but by first grasping all possible ambiguities, to avoid incorrect syllogisms and sophisms. By the way, of all antique schools the Stoics were the most prominent in creating a new philosophical language («Newspeak»). Already from here it is almost obvious that because of the principal inter-school conflict, the Epicurean position had to be at least somehow different. And this is indirectly confirmed by the complaints of famous Roman rhetors that the language of Epicurus and his followers was crude and simple, and that in matters of rhetoric the Epicureans were in principle ignorant.

    A few excerpts are appropriate here.
    Quintilian says (II 17, 15) that he is not at all surprised about Epicurus, «who shunned all teaching, judging from what he wrote against rhetoric». Believing that rhetoric is «the sophistic science of making speeches and creating proofs» (frg. 49 Us.), Epicurus considered oratory a bad art (cacotechnian, frg. 51 Us.), and if political speech is acceptable, then here «nature itself is what guides speech, not any art» (frg. 55 Us.). Plutarch on this point says (Adv. Col. 33) that: «they write so that we do not oratory.» Moreover, the position on the simplicity and clarity of speech was so strict that Epicurus seems to have claimed the natural origin of language. This was a very precarious position, since language (like logic and mathematics) is generally regarded among empiricists as an instrument artificially created by men to facilitate communication. In the question of the origin of state and law, Epicurus stands on just this ground, defending the theory of the Social Contract (i.e. an «artificial» agreement, although «naturally» created); but in the question of language, he suddenly takes a position close to that of religious thinkers (i.e. a fundamentally «natural» origin). Of course, he means «naturalness» as a result of human interaction with the environment, which occurs as if «by itself,» in all parts of the world in the same way, and precisely because of secondary differences in climate conditions we have differences in the languages of the peoples of the world. But it is still a noticeable dissonance, because Epicureans recognized that language is not created by contracting; and this dissonance is hardly accidental. In our opinion, this is the result of a principled position on the Canon, which required special reservations about the origin of language as well.


    Everything seems clear with «Canon»; there is «good» and there is «good» (e.g., good as action and good as character, or good as wealth). But why is logic itself considered superfluous and harmful? Let’s try to figure it out.

    Epicurus, following the sophists, accepts the separation between «nature» and «art». Logic by its very definition is a description of the thinking process, i.e. it is an artificial construction. This thinking process itself appears before its description; this means that already on the substantive level thinking does not need «logic». Similarly, and more generally accepted, human speech does not need the rules of syntax. Converging thinking (living, real thinking) with its description on drawing paper is as silly as preferring a painted lobster to a bucket of real crayfish.

    One could argue that without the creation of the science of philology, we would not have a literary language either, and then everyone would be talking at the vulgar level of the common folk. Or that the study of the laws of nature (physics/chemistry/biology) retains enormous utility, and while nature would work just as well without them, our goal is to use them non-naturally. Even more than that—we can say that these laws have always existed, just have not been discovered and described (so we go into Platonism and are already succumbing to religion). Applied to logic, this means that it can exist unnoticed by us, and in us ourselves; yes, it also retains the right to develop thinking «artificially,» the ability to go beyond its natural limits.

    This all sounds good in theory. Only in practice, even after 2000 years, numerous «logicians» cannot reach a consensus on anything beyond the rules of logic themselves (but even here there is no consensus either). If everything worked as it should — people would quickly acquire an equally calibrated mind, thinking according to strict and universal rules of thought. And as a result, all human preferences and avoidances would become about the same. In practice, we do not see this, and never will (even in the separate caste of scientists). Again, in theory it all sounds so good that one can become a smart person after reading just a few textbooks on how to «think correctly. But that never happens in practice. It is an oxymoron to become intelligent by reasoning strictly according to a textbook scheme. As a rule, such schematism is considered a model of the absence of intelligence. If it were possible, the smartest creatures on earth would now be computers; but we all know that this is not the case, and that machines are devoid of intelligence.

    There are only two options here:

    1. Either logic cannot in principle be an adequate reflection of the essence of thinking (just as kinematics can never fully reflect all the nuances of motion and «merge» with real motion, and a tree drawing can never become a three-dimensional tree with bark texture), and then attempts to reshape reason by its standards = conscious dumbing down.
    2. Either logic still hasn’t evolved enough, and when it finally does, machines (even in their current form) will quickly become the smartest creatures in the world.

    In any case, modern forms of logic, as deployed, are too enormous to be used in everyday life, and the question concerns only machine consciousness. The first option promises mankind no advantages; and the second would even belittle us before our own creatures. And even with all the cumbersomeness of the modern logical apparatus, if we arm a machine with it — it (at least today) is still stupider than any human who has never held Aristotle or Frege in his hands at all. And then we either have to work with this logic, which is extremely inconvenient; or we have to work with logic in simpler, antique forms, which we are capable of using in our lives. Except that these «old logics» have invariably led, have led, and will continue to lead to empty verbiage, which in practice is still the case today.

    Systematic thinking

    What is offered instead? Against this easy path, which offers the hope of becoming a genius immediately after mastering a dozen basic laws and a couple of guidebooks (which should already look unreliable), is the demand for systematic thinking. For the mind, as for a parrot’s beak, it is not so important what to hone it against. To become intelligent, to think correctly, can be done in different ways. But all of them, one way or another, will require broad erudition and further systematization of the accumulated facts. The more information from different spheres of life we accumulate, the more often this information contradicts each other. The more we accumulate, the more precisely we understand which contradictions are the most absurd. This «tangle of information» to some extent «calibrates» itself. So Heraclitus was not quite right when he said that knowledge does not teach intelligence. To a certain extent, it does, although, of course, there are differences depending on the basic vector that any given philosopher arms himself with in advance, i.e. depending on his «school,» on the path chosen for further systemic formation.

    «Intelligence» has always consisted in man’s being able to put together a system of views out of a «mess» of facts. As the practice of different regions of the world over thousands of years has shown, there are fewer than a dozen such «systems». People invent them everywhere, just as people everywhere invent stabbing weapons and a roof over their heads. We are not surprised by the universal development of material culture, knowing that all people have the same needs and the same number of limbs. Why should we be surprised that possessors of the same tool (the brain) create the same products («systems of thought»)? A person with Heraclitus’ approach would be able to call a bearer of almost any of these thought systems «smart» (let us forget that the historical Heraclitus considered almost everyone in the world dumb). And then there is the question of the legitimacy of choosing exactly «that, and not another» system. And the main criterion of their suitability is their consistency under the pressure of more and more new facts from more and more diverse spheres of life.

    Incidentally, amateur logicians themselves are also one of the «basic schools,» and they can also create their own systematic philosophy. But this does not mean that they will necessarily be less contradictory; the essence of systematic thinking is precisely that within their system — there will be fewer and fewer contradictions, regardless of the accepted basic postulates. At least this is the case in the simple, initial stages of the history of thinking; for example, in the same ancient Greece. But over time, under the pressure of new facts, all naturally educated «schools» are forced to readjust, responding to new questions. This is where all the weaknesses of each line of thought are revealed.

    On Philosophy and Science

    From the above, it becomes obvious that these «external» facts, which are the touchstone for philosophical systems, are themselves separate from philosophy. And then the question arises — what is philosophy itself, and what is separated from it? We share the practice developed in the course of history of distinguishing the natural sciences from philosophy (though not entirely). Positivists and Marxists usually conclude from this that only logic or dialectical logic remains in philosophy. Psychology, which is also the offspring of «mind»-has also supposedly found its own «science» (and science, as we know, is not philosophy, yep). Why, then, logic cannot become a science and thereby kill the very notion of philosophy in general is another question. Only in fact, this is a false dilemma, and the title «science» does not solve anything. At one time, communism was also called scientific, and this label can be applied to anything.

    So, philosophy works with everything that does not have a strict factual explanation, as well as with the interpretation of the facts obtained. What we call science works with the facts themselves, with their extraction by means of the experimental method. Pure «theorists» within the individual sciences are, in principle, philosophers themselves, but of an extremely limited type (immersed exclusively in their scientific sphere). They are not aware of their kinship with the archetypal traditions of thought, and so they do not fully fit into the chain of professional «philosophers. They do not seek a way out of the deadlock for thought in general (and this deadlock is already in the very fact of the pluralism of systems, while the truth must be unified), but only seek a way out of the deadlocks of their individual science.

    In order to get out of the crisis of the history of thought, we need to overcome pluralism, and for this purpose we need to realize it, see all schools, understand their strengths and weaknesses, take a clear position, and test it with criticism. Modern philosophical traditions either take pluralism itself as a given and do not seek any way out; or they do not recognize it at all, and call philosophy — logic and philology (the same concrete sciences as physics). At the present stage, one might even say that philosophy is in such a deep crisis that it hardly exists at all.

    That philosophy is not only about reason, and that it affects the way of life, and thus the way of life itself affects reason and the way of thinking, is not the place to say here. But in brief, the basis of philosophy is ethics, the criteria of evaluation for preference and avoidance, the ways of being in society. Human character is a complex concept, and character can be changed. Determining a relatively more correct way of reasoning thus coincides with determining a relatively more correct assessment of one’s place in society and choosing the right strategy for everyday behavior. But we are talking about reasoning here, not about ethics in general, so let’s move on.

    So, the most «bad» of the basic postulates create systems (of both reason and ethics) of such poor quality that they simply die under the weight of artificial crutches that have time after time saved the dead system from unsolvable contradictions. And that system is considered preferable, which at all times, in all eras, shows the best consistency with «external» phenomena. The task of correct thinking is to choose the «first among equals» system of thought, and working with it further — to strive to the status of the Universal Man to the best of one’s ability.

    Homo Universalis

    The question naturally arises here. What else is a «Universal Man» in an era of overabundance of information and narrow specialization in the scientific field? And with it another question — why would an epicurean with a modest goal of a happy life need all this?

    The answer to this is basically one — alienation (a Marxist concept). Under conditions in which everything created by man is alienated from man, including both individual objects and concepts of thought; under conditions in which the individual man understands almost nothing of what is created by «man in general,» and when this ignorance puts the real individual man in a subordinate position relative to his own creations — no freedom, no peace of mind, no escape from fear is possible. And the main way to overcome alienation is the knowledge of the entire experience of humanity and the abolition of the strict division of labor. These tasks are partly utopian, but we shall see why only partly.

    There is no need to know on which «cultural layer» of the earth Troy was found specifically from the Mycenaean era, and on which layer Troy from Roman times was found. It is enough to know that Troy existed, was described by Homer, and after that rebuilt and continued to exist. There is no need to know all the haplogroups in order to understand how paleogenetics works and why it is needed. Simply put, it is enough to have a broad erudition, even without detailed knowledge of all the minutiae, to be free of all insecurities and to earn the status of Homo Universalis. A superficial knowledge of all the sciences (it is quite achievable, to reduce each science to 2,000 page folios, and later for new generations to master it all in some 10 years) will benefit everyone. It will save all of us from professional cretinism. After all, no one demands that the modern Da Vinci is necessarily the best specialist in every field and its specialties. But to know everything in general terms is quite possible. Every person on earth (with the exception of the disabled) can know the basic principles of the bus in which you are riding, without being particularly burdened. And certainly people of science are capable of it.

    And this is what Epicurus writes about in his letter to Herodotus.

    Who cannot, Herodotus, carefully study all that we have written about nature and delve into our more lengthy writings, for them I have already compiled an overview of the whole subject, sufficient to keep in mind at least the most important things. I wanted it to help you on important occasions whenever you have to take up the study of nature. And those who have already succeeded in examining the whole should remember the main features of the appearance of the whole subject: the general movement of thought is often necessary to us, but the details are not so often. To these general features we have to refer constantly remembering as much as it is necessary both for the general movement of thought on the object, and for all possible accuracy of details, that is well having learnt and having remembered the most basic features. In fact, the main sign of perfect and complete knowledge is the ability to quickly use the throws of thought, [and this happens when everything] is reduced to simple foundations and words. For whoever cannot, in brief words, cover all that is studied in parts, cannot know the thickness of all that is covered. And so, since such a path is useful to all who have mastered the study of nature, I, who have devoted my constant efforts to the study of nature and achieved the world of life primarily through it, have also compiled for you the following overview, which contains the basics of all the teachings.

    So the claims of the Epicureans are simple.

    Knowledge, reasonableness, is necessary for «ataraxia» (peace of mind), or, similarly, to overcome alienation. True knowledge is achieved by striving for universality, and in the process of accumulating knowledge, erroneous concepts will themselves be excluded from the «system. The system is based on the theory that, other things being equal, always produces the least failures; and the original set of these theories is given to us by the history of the development of human thought itself. All of these theories arise «naturally,» but only one of them will be closest to the truth. To identify erroneous concepts, «logic» is not necessary (and it is already enough to discard it). In fact, it is either useless to people, or harmful and stultifying. But here it is important to note that when we say that logic is useless, we mean that it is useless only for the use of one’s mind. Logic is more than useful in programming and engineering; it is a tool, just as any other descriptive system of signs (mathematics, languages). All of these are useful, but they are not absolute and all-encompassing. According to the principle of universality itself, all this must be studied (at least in general terms), but one should not expect any panacea for all problems and the easiest way out. The road to correct thinking cannot be too easy, and even if logic can find its complete form, if it can be reduced to a textbook of 200 pages, even such a miracle will not make anyone smart until this «somebody» has processed the same huge body of information that we are talking about.


    A private conversation with the average logician is always a conversation about words. A conversation with a person who does not understand analogies, does not understand a sentence if a mistake is made somewhere or a word is mixed up. Being a pedant, he cannot grasp the logic (here it is, the obvious (!) ambiguity of the word «logic», which would already be tripped over) of his opponent’s presentation of thought. No sane person would call such a biological machine a rational being. Much more reasonable is someone who can understand that «a snowy cold box» most likely implies a freezer or refrigerator, and can quickly obtain clarification with leading questions. But intellectuals from the world of logic are not — they will simply declare that they do not understand what is being said, and will not even try to understand. It is not enough for them to say «most likely. They want absolute accuracy. So such people have only to read David Hume and abandon cognition altogether, playing with numbers for the sake of the game itself, because at least there they will get their coveted accuracy.

  • On the Differences in Epicurean and Stoic Ethics

    On the Differences in Epicurean and Stoic Ethics

    In the course of our ongoing polemic with the «Stoicism and Stoics» group, a crucial question was raised about the difference between philosophical systems in their very essence. After all, from the outside it may seem that we are talking about practically the same thing, but described in different words. Russian philological scientists of the 19th century were also prone to this, and we have already given an example of them in publications of our community, and this is especially perceptible in the article of V.I. Modestov. Why does this happen, and why do people try not to notice the differences? And what are these differences, we will talk about this in the article attached below.

    P.S. — Probably not the final version of it, but you have to start somewhere.

    I. What is ethical philosophy

    Let’s start with the most important one: with which of the sophist tricks did stoicism manage to earn most of its popularity and appeal? This trick is a kind of substitution of concepts. Stoicism’s most popular «trick» has been its system of views on ascetic «practices» of self-control. In Stoicism our attention is actually drawn to the demonstrative asceticism itself, the cultivation of qualities of moderation, restraint, equanimity, equanimity, and, shall we say, spiritual strength. The main «trick» here is that all these qualities, long before Stoicism, were inherent in every (!) philosophical system in general; and even in the non-philosophical views of various traditional societies. The image of the courageous man who overcomes difficulties and achieves his goal, trying to be «the best» in everything, and especially to fulfill his role as an exemplary father of the family — it is older than philosophy itself and is common in absolutely all continents of the planet. Even the central term in this system of views, namely «arete» (or as it is more commonly translated, virtue, valor), which is regularly used by the Stoics was used in roughly the same connotations even before the battle of Thermopylae. Take at least the ancient poet Hesiod, when he says:

    «Vice is attained easily, but mastering arete is difficult.»

    It is no secret that Plato and Aristotle, as well as virtually all philosophers before them, including, «even,» most of the sophists, were against vice and for virtue. Therefore, we will not argue in detail these almost self-evident things, as well as the fact that every man strives «for all that is good and against all that is bad» — we will not here. The interested reader can independently search for information on Plato’s ethical views; they are publicly available.

    It is better to say that «practices of self-education» are a central part of any philosophical system, precisely because philosophy has always transcended a kind of «commonplace». Philosophers themselves have dealt with questions that seldom occupy ordinary cultivators; and in order to deal with these questions (often of no practical-material utility), one must at least indoctrinate oneself in the importance of these abstract questions. And to do this, it is always necessary to re-evaluate values, to separate all the secondary from the self-evidently important virtues; and, most difficult of all, to relate one’s views on the «important and unimportant» to those of one’s own community. The philosopher has to overcome the resistance of the «crowd,» which will remind you time and again that you are doing things that are not so important, and that your views are bizarre and harmful, corrupting society (remember, for example, the execution of Socrates). Moreover, if a philosopher has gone down the road of studying the wisdoms of various peoples of the world, that in itself already implies the study of some materials, and even a lot of materials. And this in turn implies assiduity, patience, training of memory and, most likely, even systematization of this knowledge in the head. In order not to be «like the crowd» and to defend your right to a unique system of values, you need to show your superiority in practice, to earn the «crowd» a certain share of respect, to earn the right to your «eccentricity».

    For example, it is possible and even necessary to epathetize the public. What philosophers do for this is to prepare themselves for hardship; for the fact that sooner or later fate will take away your relatives, deprive you of your home after the war, etc. And here, when all fellow citizens show weak character under equal conditions, the «wise man» himself demonstratively maintains his composure. Or, like Democritus in his time, you can prove to the community that you really know a great deal, and that you are even capable of applying your erudition in practice; as, for example, the sages of various regions could be useful in farming, making calendars based on astronomical observations, and thus making the choice of appropriate times of crop rotation easier.

    It is possible to provoke the public in various ways, even very provocatively, as the Cynics and Christian martyrs did. The main thing is to assert one’s right to a position. But here the question arises, why actually do it, what kind of childishness is it? Among other things, this is necessary in order to better convey the very essence of one’s own position! Without philosophical «practice,» it is harder to master «theory» itself. If you want to become a sage, be kind and apply (at least at first) this «childish» behavior and attitude to the world around you. It should help, and indeed does help, to grasp wisdom more effectively already afterwards. Practices differ from philosopher to philosopher, as do the theories themselves. But they are always the same, their main essence is — you have to learn to control yourself, so you don’t get carried away by the «flow» of public morality. If there is no control, and if the system of views does not differ from the views of the «crowd,» then what is the difference between a «sage» and a «philistine» at all? In that case, you just live your life as you see fit, go with the flow, and are nothing special.


    Now we have to go back to the beginning, and remind us that the «philistine» theme has long since included conventional «manliness,» all those balanced and «wise» straw man decisions, playing one’s social role and overcoming hardships. There’s even room for emotional control, if only at the level of «boys don’t cry». What, then, is the difference between the practices of philosophers? Their main difference is that these practices are more consistently linked, and that the «wise man» demands of himself a more stable fulfillment of accepted norms. The common man often falters, which is unacceptable to the sage. So it is primarily a question of the degree of control, which the sage consciously brings to greater perfection. That is, the basic «sage» may even be considered an «ideal philistine,» in the sense that he takes the generally accepted virtues to their logical limit. In this respect, the benchmark is precisely the philosophy of the Stoics; therefore, it is closer to the worldview of the rural peasant; although the peasant himself is certainly not a Stoic.

    So, the philosopher and the philistine, and thus almost anyone in the world, fight for all that is good and against all that is bad, and have similar ideas about virtues and vices. The main difference is only in the degree of their consistency, in how you yourself follow these universally recognized standards of quality. And besides, as mentioned above, the philosopher differs from the philosopher in that he makes a system out of it, proving rigorously why one vice is more acceptable than another, or why one virtue is more important than another, and why a third virtue should not be considered a virtue at all anymore. And furthermore, the philosopher can apply the virtues to atypical situations, such as writing books and studying materials, for which he needs the virtues even more often than in other cases. In short, since the philosopher engages in more activities (the same intellectual work), he also has more space for the application of virtues. And since this is the case, he often has to create a large gradation of virtues, sometimes even applying one word to different situations, and with different contents (for example, one can be a virtuous poet, i.e. a good poet, or a poet who praises the «good»).


    With this we have solved, but what is the «trick» of the Stoics? All philosophers, before and after the Stoics, including even the Epicureans, are engaged in self-control, and they use certain practices-meditations for this purpose. By their very nature, all these practices are similar, and the goal is the same states. This is such a general philosophical basis that most often it is left out of the equation, without constituting the specificity of the philosophical teaching, which is usually something more important. No one brags about having received a basic school education, do they? Self-control for the philosopher is that basic education. But the Stoics began to continually emphasize this basis, and due in part to the poor preservation of Hellenistic philosophy in general (which was more grounded and focused on these very practices) — the Stoic texts on meditation are the best preserved. Now the Stoics, taking advantage of this, claim that these general practices are Stoicism per se. So if you are an enemy of the Stoics, you are an enemy of self-control. And in general, if you accept this account of us, and beyond that accept this «trick» of the Stoics, it appears that there is no philosophy at all outside of Stoicism; or the pre-Stoic philosophers who practiced meditation were «Stoics before Stoics.»

    Even the fact that Epicurus himself was a very virtuous man is drawn as a contradiction in the Stoics’ account! Supposedly, Epicurus himself was almost a Stoic, but out of his stupidity he left us a system that leads to evil, while he himself did not even use this system, and he disproved it not in words, but in deeds. Although if we take into account the general philosophical character of the basic practices, there is no particular mystery about Epicurus’ virtue at all, and it would be worth considering (which the Stoics cannot do) how this relates to the system of Epicureanism, because it is clearly not a coincidental «contradiction».

    And here we come to an explanation of the phenomenon which brings all philosophical schools together in the public’s perception, including the Stoics and Epicureans, and makes us ask: «What’s the difference?!» Taking as a given that «being a Stoic» = maintaining equanimity and self-control; we find quotes from Epicurus on the same subject, and realize that these are very similar things. If being a Stoic is using basic philosophical practices, then all philosophers are by definition Stoics, the differences disappear. It also adds fuel to the fire that the poorly preserved Epicurus got most of his «stoic» quotations from a source («Vatican saying») that was compiled by an unknown ancient Stoic. These were quotations collected at the end of a collection of works by Stoic authors, and were clearly chosen to strengthen Stoic philosophy. Not surprisingly, with their discovery, the number of people willing to equate the two historically antagonistic systems also increased.

    As we have already discussed, general philosophical practices are indeed common to all philosophers; for this reason they are common. The Stoics usurped them, making them synonymous with their own philosophy. If, however, we take these practices back out of the brackets in order to better see precisely the specificity of each of the teachings, differences will obviously have to appear here. This is what we should turn to now.

    II. Key Differences

    In addition to the practices themselves, the Stoics and Epicureans have a certain similarity even in terminology, which is due to the context in which these philosophical schools emerged. After all, they emerged at the same time, and used approximately the same philosophical jargon, which was formed before their own emergence. At the same time, initially they even had a common enemy, the school of skeptics, from whom some of the definitions were borrowed.

    Ataraxia and apathy

    Behind these general definitions are the main differences; the first thing they have in common is the main goal — eudemonia, which can be translated into Russian as «well-being,» «prosperity,» «good life,» or «happiness. A goal that has really stood since at least the time of Democritus (where the term occurs); although it is clear from the etymology that this goal has existed since Paleolithic times. This notion is directly related to some permanent state of the sage, which in our schools has somewhat different names. For the Epicureans it is the state of «ataraxia,» and for the Stoics it is the state of «apathy» (though they too sometimes use the term «ataraxia,» which was first used generally by the skeptics).

    Ataraxia (ἀταραξία) of the Epicureans, which from the ancient Greek translates as equanimity or serenity, implies the absence of mental and physical pain. It is a life without fears, and especially without fears of the supernatural. This is why the naturalistic physics of atomism was so important to the Epicureans, ruling out the possibility of divine Providence, life after death, ghosts and curses, and all kinds of non-contact magic and conspiracies. No witch doctor can curse you, no god can decide your fate at his whim. No mistake in choosing a religion will lead to eternal afterlife, etc. One gains responsibility for one’s life and peace of mind from knowing that only a real, physical, or social force can affect that life. No fears, there is the self-control of the philosopher = no heartache = ataraxia achieved. In the presence of fears, even self-control does not solve the main problem, for although mental pain will be suppressed, it will still be felt. Otherwise, the principle is really simple. Every time you should roughly calculate (the so-called «hedonistic calculation») whether a pleasure you’ve had will be followed by mental or physical pain. This is already a reason to think about giving up such pleasure. But more importantly, will the pain outweigh the pleasure? If so, then giving up such pleasure is beyond question. This is how the state of ataraxia is maintained by the Epicureans. Avoid all suffering, and, if possible, find some moderate pleasure that is not fraught with serious consequences.

    Stoic apathy, opposed on the opposite side, is translated from ancient Greek as «impassivity,» «equanimity,» and «indifference. The term came into Stoicism from the philosophy of the Cynics and the Megarics, where it was a much stricter requirement almost to «be as stone. But while the Megarics and probably the Skeptics interpreted apathy as almost complete «insensibility,» the Stoics already interpreted it as a positive ability to overcome affects (above all the four main «passions»: sadness, fear, lust and pleasure) arising from a mistaken assessment of «external» things. It is broadly similar to ataraxia, but with a number of differences. Both of these states are attained by ascesis, exercises in philosophy, and exercises in virtue; both allow one to «look from the outside» at various external phenomena, and at the internal phenomena of the soul.

    Nevertheless, the interpretation «in the spirit of the Megarics» has always left its mark on Stoicism as well, despite the constant desire of the Stoics to emphasize their humanity. Seneca, for example, thought it correct to translate the Greek word «apathy» as «a soul inaccessible to all suffering,» and in this respect it would seem almost synonymous with ataraxia; and even more so, for Epicureanism allows suffering for future pleasures (for example, suffering from studying the sciences so as not to work as a loader afterwards). The difference is that the Epicurean considers suffering, if it is already here and now, objective and inevitable. You can work with it, you can suppress it, you can overcome it, but it already exists as a fact, and you cannot argue with it. This is why suffering should be avoided. Stoics, on the other hand, take their apathy to the point where they proudly proclaim the absence of suffering in any case; that is, there is no point in avoiding working as a loader, studying science and going to university — a true Stoic will not suffer behind a chair or at a construction site. The absence of suffering is not a motivation; a stoic supposedly never feels anything of the kind anyway. This is the difference; «apathy» is more ultimative, taking the idea of self-control to an extreme and grotesque level. And although the Stoics insist that it is more of an «even emotional background,» which is only necessary to avoid going to extremes in affect—that very even background, if you look closely, is the demand for insensibility, in the crudest sense of the word. Stoicism leaves room for two interpretations, and constantly mixes them together.

    But in a moderate interpretation, the stoic sage certainly experiences emotions, he is a man after all; but he does not experience too strong emotions (i.e., affects).

    If we talk about the already announced goal of «ataraxia,» that is, the absence of fear of the supernatural in the sense that we abolish the supernatural altogether; then Stoic «apathy» does not lead to such freedom for man at all. The Stoics fully recognize the Gods/God as the real creative force in the world; and all the problems and uncertainties associated with such views (something the Epicureans feared) — the Stoics neutralize by postulating their own nothingness. If God willed it, who am I to go against it? If the general commanded it, who am I to arise? Especially since in the strictly deterministic world of the Stoics, the very order of the general was predetermined by divine will, which means that any «earthly» problem was sent by God to trial, and to oppose fate is to blaspheme; one can read about this especially abundantly in Marcus Aurelius. It is «apathy» in the worst sense of the word that should have helped the Stoic to treat everything with indifference. Whole nations dying? They always have. Did your child die in the war? Everyone dies sooner or later, it’s inevitable, there’s nothing to be sad about. Have you become someone’s slave? Well, we’re all slaves to fate. What’s all our wailing worth against the backdrop of an infinite universe? We are nothing, nothing, and against the backdrop of eternal time, our life is even shorter than a moment. Life, in fact, loses all value in itself. And all this is not an epicurean fiction, but an almost literal retelling of stoic maxims. For example, the famous legend of the stoic Epictetus, who was a slave:

    One day, when the master in anger began to beat the slave, Epictetus nonchalantly said: «You will break my leg,» and when he did break his leg, he added coolly: «Didn’t I say you would?» Epaphroditus was surprised at the patience of his slave and ashamed of his cruelty, and Epictetus was left lame for life. (Orig., Contra Celsum, VII, 53).

    One can debate at length whether it is good to be moderate and belittle oneself by being actually better than one says one is. Whether this is also a virtue, etc., but the fact is that this approach of constant self-deprecation leads to a transition from the «good» version of stoic apathy (which exists in fact only for excuses), to the worst and most utterly insensitive of its variations. One is brought up in the framework of the stoic ethic as a nobody, and this cannot but affect him.

    Virtue and Pleasure

    But ataraxia and apathy are only the means to the chief key to the good life. For the Epicureans it is pleasure and prudence, but for the Stoics it is virtue («arete»).

    As Epicurus says in a letter to Menekei, «Prudence is dearer even than philosophy. From prudence came all the other virtues». In fact, it puts pleasure in relation to virtue itself, and vice versa. But it would be better to talk about what is more in the ear, and what in fact is the «final goal,» i.e. the principle of pleasure. For the Epicureans, it has an essential systemic function; human sensations, as practice shows, except in rare pathologies, are objective, at least as far as the most basic things are concerned. For example, almost anyone can be pricked with a needle and feel the pain of the prick. The epicurean theory of cognition itself is based on sensualism (there is nothing in the mind that is not given by the senses); where by the senses is meant the study of the world by sight, hearing, taste, smell and tactility.

    The funny thing is that sensualism is also a Stoic theory of knowledge, and Stoic sensationalism itself has come down to us in a much more systematic account. But while for Epicureanism it is the foundation of all philosophy, for the Stoics sensationalism played the role of a pure tool for arguing with the skeptics when it became important for the Stoics to prove the reality of the existing world.

    So, it turns out that without sensations one cannot know the world, and without them the mind cannot arise. This means that at birth a human being deals only with sensations. Initially an infant cannot yet be considered reasonable, it does not possess meaningful ideas. And what do all the «five senses» bring us, again at the most fundamental level? They bring sensations of pleasure and suffering. Heat can be pleasant, or it can leave burns, etc. Therefore, from birth it is the sensual feelings that are the most fundamental things for humans; in particular, their pleasantness or unpleasantness, which make us treat different things with caution, or, on the contrary, seek them out for ourselves. This is also what sentient animals do; but the fact remains that the principle of pleasure is a fundamental principle of human nature. It makes no sense to come to an infant and read to him Letters to Lucilius in order to make him a perfect sage. Even further on, when reason already gradually emerges (as a derivative of sensual cognition), does sensual experience lose its importance among adults? Isn’t the principle for prioritizing among them still the same pleasure and suffering? Suppose not for the wise man; but is the «philistine» deprived of reason, and not a human being? This is why Epicurus says that: «pleasure is both the beginning and the end of blissful life; we have known it as the first good akin to us, with it we begin all preference and avoidance, and to it we return, using undergoing as the measure of all good.»

    Ultimately epicureanism states that virtues of the highest order, whether risking one’s life or sacrificing for eternal glory, or martyrdom to spread one’s religion, or exploits in war to defend one’s homeland, are also done for pleasure, just that these pleasures are different, called different words (such as self satisfaction, happiness, etc.), but the point remains the same. If a person didn’t think of his sacrifice as an admirable act, he wouldn’t have done it. People try to be ascetic only because they take pleasure in the fact that they can do things unavailable to others. They are content to conform to their ideals; and for the sake of that contentment they do things. In other words, as Epicurus says: «The beginning of all these things and the greatest of the goods is reason; it is more precious than even philosophy itself, and from it came all the other virtues. It teaches that one cannot live sweetly without living reasonably, well and righteously, and [one cannot live reasonably, well and righteously] without living sweetly: for all virtues are akin to the sweet life, and the sweet life is inseparable from them».

    Epicureanism thus simply postulates the importance of pleasure as a statement of fact. That it is the ultimate goal means only that it is the most fundamental principle explaining all ethics; a comparison with atomistics is appropriate in this respect, where «atoms» are the smallest particles of matter, to which all the diversity of things are ultimately reduced. This does not mean that all things are equally preferable, that there is no difference between water from a spring and water from a puddle, since they are equally composed of atoms. Similarly, stating that pleasure is fundamental to living beings does not mean that the goal of an Epicurean’s life is to chase pleasure. All criticism of Epicureanism comes not only from a lack of understanding, but also from an unwillingness to understand; from a reverent fear mixed with disgust at the vicious term «pleasure».


    This is all about pleasure. As for the other key to the blessed life, i.e., «virtue,» Epicureanism considers it secondary and derived from pleasure, just as knowledge is derived from sensual experience. But the Stoics do not consider it necessary to examine where the concept of «virtue» comes from; they do not answer to the end whether it is already innate in children (although they try to prove this) or is acquired through experience. They simply state the fact that «in my community this is the way it is, and therefore virtuous». In part they find «virtue» in the abstract analysis of morality. Having already acquired reason (unknown from where, but rather innate), the Stoic creates a strict division of all phenomena into «good» and «bad,» and demands that in all things one always act «well. Where does this moral assessment come from? According to the Stoic, from pure reason; but, in fact, from the customs of a particular community. Stoicism simply ignores the arguments of the Sophists and Epicureans that notions of morality vary from people to people; that the very categories of «good» and «evil» can change places depending on the particular situation, and that sometimes there really can be a lie for good. The Stoic will not divide the kinds of «pleasures,» for him all pleasures are pleasures in one way or another. And all bad words are in one way or another «bad. Hence, concludes the Stoic, pleasure is bad and reason is good. Nothing else interests him. The Stoic paints a caricatured black-and-white world for ease of perception.

    And they are not even interested in the fact that if Fate has determined you to be an immoral «animal,» then obeying Fate and qualitatively following this role is already virtuous according to their own definition! After all, how else can stoicism justify the necessity of evil? Only by saying that from the point of view of God-Logos, evil does not exist, and that extremes are necessary for motion within the Whole-Logos, and motion is necessary for its life, just as blood circulation is necessary for preserving human life. If we disrupt the movement within the Logos, i.e. try to fix Destiny and create a utopia without bad people and without wars, the Logos will die, and with it all of us, the cells of its organism. In fact, of course, it will be possible to declare postfactum that the construction of utopia was also the Logos’ goal, otherwise it would not have materialized in a deterministic world. But the very reasoning of the Stoics to justify an evil that is already here and now sounds like this. There is no point in resenting evil because it is good for the Logos; and in resenting good for him, you are acting unkindly. So the classic Stoic argument is framed in such a way that it must recognize the necessity of the existence of a «virtuous corrupter,» which is necessary so that «virtuous sages» can arise in his background (incidentally, also a thought from Marcus Aurelius about the fundamental necessity of evil).

    Here another problem is revealed. A stoic might say that one cannot consider an «animal» person virtuous because he had the inner freedom to become a better person. This is an important point for Stoicism, for if Destiny decides everything, then what is the coolness of the fact that you have become a stoic sage? Partly because of this natural vanity, and partly to spread their philosophy, the Stoics decided to grant free will to the mind, so that all your achievements on the path of virtue would not seem like nonsense. But in doing so, the Stoics completely destroy the entire logic of justifying evil in the world; they ruin the very basis for their «apathy,» which is supported precisely by the idea of the necessity of evil for the Logos, and the relativity of that evil. Why do the Stoics challenge the status quo granted them by the Logos from above? Why lead people out of their delusions and into the path of wisdom? Why do they care about it? Won’t the corrupters continue to exist from ages past? Why then write treatises against pleasure? Such contradictions in Stoicism number in the dozens.


    But we have strayed too far from the subject. So how do the Stoics themselves see the situation, and why is it that «virtue» is the ultimate goal of life, and thus the thing to pursue? The most obvious one is because, by doing good deeds, we are happy (for our goal is «eudemonia,» as we remember from the beginning). Thus, Stoicism simply takes Epicurus’ position, and merges with him on this question without his noticing it. Where does virtue come from? It comes from the understanding that one must be «for all that is good, against all that is bad.» And what is good and bad, where did their understanding come from? As we’ve seen, it’s complicated there. But more simply, the Stoics simply give in to valiant images from their own culture, wherever they were born. The funny thing is that even a universal ethic of «goodness in general» can only be built on an epicurean basis, allowing for the principle of empathy, and representing the pain of others. It turns out that killing is fundamentally bad and is «evil» because all living beings fear pain and do not want to be killed. The golden rule of ethics — «Do not do to others what you would not want done to you» — is actually based on Epicurean ethics, and is built on individualism. The Stoics have a problem even here. For the Logos, everything is good, individual murders are good; the whole (society, the state) is more important than the parts (individuals), so one cannot rebel against state tyranny; but suddenly one can (!) if power is immoral, and tyranny is such by definition of types of power, and as a rule, historical tyrannies were anti-aristocratic regimes.

    Determinism and Freedom

    The problem and conflict between the two schools, which we have already partly discussed earlier, lies in the relationship to freedom and determinism. Stoicism tries in a specific way to defend free will (to become Stoic), while generally recognizing the world as strictly deterministic. This stems in part from the quite theological division of the essence of man, and indeed of the whole world, into the soul and the body. Although in strictly canonical Stoic dogma, as in Epicurean dogma, everything in the world is corporeal, including souls and Gods, the Stoics regularly incorporated the typical notion of the immaterial soul. And over time, especially during the so-called «Middle Stoic» era and among the Roman Stoics, the materialistic version of Stoicism weakened and weakened with each generation until Stoicism finally merged with the Neoplatonists. There was no other way out of the situation, for in the name of classical «materialism» as understood by the New Age, one would have had to sacrifice free will. And this would have led, but from a very different entrance, into the same building of individualist nihilism. For, immediately, we would have to state that since everything is determinedly deterministic, we should not consider criminals as criminals, and we should give man the freedom of his «natural» impulses, of his «natural» qualities. And there it is very close to hedonistic motives, which cannot be condemned a priori if they do no harm to society as a whole. This option was by no means allowed by the Stoics, so the contradiction could only be resolved by recognizing classical «dualism» and eliminating the Stoic version of materialism. It was necessary to drag into the theory a special soul, free from the mortal shell of the body.

    But at the same time Stoicism itself would be eliminated (which happened in practice), since strict determinism was one of the school’s most «trademarks. With the recognition of dualism in the name of justification of free will, thanks to mystical notions about the properties of the soul, Stoicism dissolved into Platonic-Christian doctrines. But in Stoicism itself, the sequence of finding happiness through the notion of determinism looks something like this: (1) gaining reason, (2) recognizing patterns in the world and determinism, (3) finding one’s place in the world, virtue, (4) happiness.


    Epicureanism, where the postulation of the free will of man, while simultaneously denying strict determinism, is a very different matter. And, most importantly, this free will was not based on «dualism,» this theory did not require any metaphysical entities at all (unless we count atoms themselves as such).

    But it is better to give the floor to Epicurus at this point, for he says:
    «Who do you think is higher than a man […] who laughs at fate, which is called by someone the ruler of everything, [and instead claims that other things happen by inevitability,] other things by chance, and other things depend on us — for it is clear that inevitability is irresponsible, chance is wrong, and that which depends on us is not subject to anything else and is therefore subject to both censure and praise. Indeed, it is better to believe in fables about the gods than to submit to a fate invented by physicists; fables give hope to propitiate the gods by reverence, while fate contains inexorable inevitability. In the same way, chance is to him neither a god nor a crowd, because the actions of a god are not disorderly; nor an unreasonable cause, because he does not think that chance gives man the good and evil that determine his blissful life, but that chance only brings forth the beginnings of greater goods or evils. That is why the wise man thinks that it is better to be unhappy with reason than to be happy without reason: it is always better that a well conceived thing should not owe its success to chance».

    In his exposition, «inevitability» is allowed, just as causality is allowed (the Stoics often claim it is not), but it is not fundamental. At the most basic level, Epicurus endowed his atoms with the property of deviating from a straight line, which does not at all invalidate causality, if only at the level of macroobjects. But not everything in the world is strictly inevitable, and this causality cannot be taken down to the very first principles, because at this level we find just randomness. But then we see that the sage of Epicurus must not rely on chance, which does not suit him just as well as determinism. Everything must rely on reason, which is what gives people true freedom of choice. And even «it is better to be miserable with reason than to be happy without reason,» he says. So Epicurus correlates free will with cause and effect, defending it without the assumption of supernatural entities. This is how he differs from the Christians, and from the Stoics. The scheme goes like this: (1) acquiring reason, (2) freedom (both from fears and freedom of choice), (3) right choice, virtue, (4) pleasure.

    It looks extremely similar; it all begins with reason and ends with happiness. The only difference is the attitude to freedom, but even here we can say that the Stoics (like the Marxists, they are eerily similar in everything) postulate «freedom as a deliberate necessity. The Epicureans, on the other hand, postulate simply «conscious freedom. Both schools believe that reason liberates them, but only one of them does not limit action to a contrived scheme. He who believes that he knows his Destiny in advance restricts himself a priori to following the «right role,» and in this case there is little freedom to speak of.

    The difference in approach

    All this mess in Stoic philosophy is created only because the Stoics took a complex concept («virtue«) as the foundation of their doctrine; they took a product of the long development of human culture, which itself often changes in the course of the development of societies. In their system of views, «virtue» and «reason» are magic words and wands. But the concrete application of virtue depends on a mass of factors. As for the Epicureans, their ethics are built on a more fundamental basis, given to us by nature, and very simple and self-evident in its essence («pleasure«); which does not even need to be conceptualized, and which is directly felt by almost everyone. Is there room in the Epicurean system for all the stoic virtues? Yes, there is, but the Epicurean simply does not delude himself about the nature of these virtues. Here is the key difference! Yes, a «cynical» attitude toward what society considers to be good deeds does make it less likely that those deeds are actually done, makes it less likely that one wants to do all those things gratuitously, etc. But for Epicureanism, the most important thing has always been that very «prudence«; or, to put it another way, «sanity,» which in the words of Epicurus is «dearer even than philosophy.» It can also be called «free-thinking,» as the Early Modern Epicureans did, implying the same struggle with various «chimeras,» along the lines of the afterlife and divine providence, coupled with a belief in fortune-tellers, which the Stoics of all generations loved so much. The Epicureans always preferred freedom in all its manifestations, and always put it in direct connection with the acquisition of reason. So even Stoics’ favorite «reason» also finds a place in Epicureanism, and what a place! «It is better to be miserable with reason than to be happy without reason» — this is Epicurus’ view.

    Someone deceives himself (a Stoic) and creates «chimeras» out of those words that are considered «good,» he tries in awe to banish from decent society all «bad» words. And while composing a system of views out of «all that is good» and against «all that is bad,» in reality he creates not the ideal system he is looking for, but a poorly working eclecticism, the whole essence of which consists in the words: «try, endure and achieve the best you can». It is no coincidence that Stoicism in the twenty-first century has entered into a strong alliance with literature for motivation and success in business. In our age, and in our society, the image of the rich man in a suit with «principles and strong character» is considered the best. Therefore, in our age, and in our society — stoicism creates literature to deify this image. Well, someone (the Epicurean) does not base his views on chimeras, does not treat words with such strict seriousness, is not afraid of «bad» words, and does not fall on his knees before «good» words, but treats it with genuine sublimity, as if from the outside. And in analyzing different societies in different eras, such a person will not be able to praise the ideals of his society as the best for all time.

    Being Epicurean implies a certain measure of intelligence; whereas being Stoic implies only praising the good word «reason» (which the Stoic himself barely possesses) by drawing a black and white world time and again. In such a person’s mind, if the Epicurean does not praise reason, but extols sensationalism as a basic principle, then the Epicurean has no reason. After all, it is important to keep saying the magic spell so that it begins to work on you. In other words, Stoicism, like all other kinds of moralizing saintly philosophy, is a specific «kargo-cult».

    III. Secondary differences

    After dealing with the similarities in all the philosophical schools and the basic differences in their ethics, which concern mainly the critical (Epicureans) and uncritical (Stoics) attitude to the place in which you live; to the belief in everything supernatural that the Stoics have and the Epicureans do not, and to the critical (Epicureans) and uncritical (Stoics) attitude to mere words (although, ridiculous even, the Stoics were famous philologists, and invented from scratch many new philosophical terms) — let us move on to the secondary but more striking differences in ethical systems.

    Since the Stoic worldview, by its very nature, is extremely conservative and quite primitive, it is clear from this that the external behavior of a Stoic will in fact be very vulnerable to «sarcastic» words; very deliberately noble in behavior (well, in ideas about the «nobility» of the aristocracy of past centuries); and emphatically reserved and contemptuous toward «bad» interlocutors, or business-like neutral toward «good». At least, philosophy itself will incline him to this, while human nature (which no Stoic can defeat) will still make Stoics more human than they themselves would like. This is the first, still «intelligent» version of the Stoic. The second version, rarer but a little closer to the original doctrine, is the rough warrior who is ready to smash the enemies of the state and hone his character on the battlefield, or as a prominent politician. Such a man will extol the lives of his ancestors, who lived under harsher conditions, tell stories of Spartan boys, praise hard work on the land, which ennobles, etc., he will teach respect for elders, and demand of the younger generation good physical fitness and the other outward attributes of a «real man«. Previously, this second version was more characteristic of Stoicism, but thanks to the epochal changes of the 20th and 21st centuries, we now live in a time of peace, with a great number of technical innovations greatly changing all walks of life; so we can see only the «intellectual» version of Stoics (ordinary men, though they look like Stoics, are not aware of themselves as such, and therefore are not systematic philosophers, and thus are not Stoic philosophers).

    On the contrary, the Epicurean worldview borders on nihilism in its denial of the foundations of society. Although this is not entirely true, and it is unlikely that the Epicurean can be considered even slightly dangerous to the state, but, as in the case of sophists or skeptics, a certain correlation is nevertheless to be found here. People with this attitude are usually more protestant, they do not like pretentious intellectualism, and so can afford vulgar speech (see the whining about this from Cicero, on Titus Albutius). They are disgusted by the decrepit values and coarseness of the «real man,» so Epicureanism can be called even more «pampered» and «squishy,» at least such very people are more likely to embrace Epicurean philosophy. Epicureanism is therefore almost by definition «intelligent«; only in this milieu can it be taken seriously. The «plebeian version» of Epicureanism is hedonistic; one might even say that intelligent Epicureans are always «nihilists in theory,» but in practice are ordinary neutral philosophers; whereas hedonistic Epicureans are more often «nihilists in practice,» and the philosophical part interests them only as a screen, a beautiful justification for their «practice,» and in everything else that does not concern justification of their hedonism, their theoretical outlook may be quite ordinary.

    But usually a hedonist does not look for philosophical grounds for his behavior, just as a «real man» from the village, who went through the army and became the head of a family, will intuitively resemble a Stoic, but will not look for any grounds in Stoicism, because for this you still need to be interested in reading ancient literature, which is not particularly common in a non-intellectual environment. There are rare exceptions to this; for example, the situation was quite different during the mass popularity of philosophy, as it was in ancient Rome. At that time, «bourgeois stoics» and «bourgeois Epicureans» could appear, with their inherent radical militarism and hedonism. Even now, they appear, but already within the narrower limits of «popular philosophy». But if we limit ourselves to the «elitist versions» in both currents, the Epicurean and the Stoic would both be philosophers from an intellectual milieu. Only the Epicurean is a learned merrymaker and trickster; whereas the Stoic is a learned snob-elitist, who, purely for the sake of form, will make himself look good by pretending to deny his exclusivity. He will even humiliate himself before True Wisdom, who is supposedly beyond his reach, in order to show his meekness, and thereby try, on the contrary, to exalt himself as much as possible.


    In addition to all this, to better understand the differences, we can also keep in mind the generational conflict of fathers and children, where obviously the «fathers» are the Stoics, who have realized with age that their grandfathers did everything right; and the Epicureans are «children» who disagree with their fathers. While this analogy is unprofitable, it is obviously only an analogy, and Stoics and Epicureans are people of the same age category; but an Epicurean will never mutter in the kitchen that «it used to be better,» and therein lies their considerable difference.

    Whereas the Stoics will try their best to squeeze out all the masculinity of which they are capable; the Epicureans, on the other hand, let their feelings and everything «human» run wild, accepting it all as their nature. In this perspective, we can identify another unprofitable, and already gendered, analogy in which the Stoics are «manly,» while the Epicureans are «feminine».


    This is why the very conflict of schools is inexhaustible; this is why Hellenistic philosophy is eternally relevant. These philosophical schools first set forth «eternal» human types at the level of a systematized philosophical ethic. So as long as types exist, they will find «their» philosophy in one of these ancient archetypes. And as long as these worldview archetypes exist, there will be a conflict of philosophical schools of Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, Cynics, and Platonists. Even if Stoicism gets rid of its internal contradictions, it will still struggle with Epicurus, because no «real man» would want the society in which he lives to suddenly become «feminine. Without sugarcoating it, this is the most fundamental difference between the schools.

    But like everything in the world, aesthetics and ethics have an objective («true») gradation of quality. We still do not have an objective theory of aesthetics, we still do not have an objective theory of ethics. But in a perfect world, only one of all types will get the full victory (of course, layering on the best of the losers, but we are interested in the basis). Why do Epicureans consciously choose philosophy for nihilists, hiljals, children, and women? In the black-and-white world of philistines (and elite philistines, i.e., Stoics) it seems kind of crazy to choose the «bad» from the two extremes in every case, and even consciously. But it is the study of the history of philosophy, and of history in general, that, other things being equal, at all times the philosophy of Epicurus created the conditions for the progress of human society by advocating freedom of thought. And this cannot fail to appeal to all truly intelligent philosophers. Of all the ancients, only Epicurus looks like a man of the present day who happened to be in the past. Only he, and his followers, today can genuinely empathize if your primary value is not «courage» but indeed «reason. This is why Epicureans have always been, are and will always emerge, and they will always rebel against «all that is good» as it is understood by primitive lovers of brute force or corporate conformist bureaucrats.

    Results

    In this essay we have shown that Stoicism has brazenly usurped what does not belong exclusively to it; namely, general philosophical practices for self-control and «self-education». We have shown that Stoicism is a refinement of commonplace conceptions of «virtue» to its ultimate perfection. That Stoicism as a whole does not at all understand the principles of Epicureanism, and is even quite within Epicurean discourse itself, both in theory and in practice. Discovered that Epicureanism itself is no stranger to the «virtues,» it simply does not engage in further additional idealization of them; Epicurus cynically declares that the source of virtues and vices is one and the same. It is genuine reasonableness that enables us to become virtuous, whereas in the Stoics’ reverential reverence and fear of terminology and higher powers, reasonableness is not to be found. It is genuine freedom that allows us to make the right choice, not the complex system of «awareness» determinism, which leaves the chance to realize our depraved fate and should, in a good way, make Stoicism an openly elitist philosophy for a select few.

    We should not think that only stupidity and the inability to read are the main distinctive qualities of Stoicism. As we have already pointed out, the most fundamental reason for the conflict of schools is the very human «types» who find for themselves the corresponding ideology and philosophy. In this respect, if we take the two schools and draw character dualities here, Stoicism wins on the outside, for Stoics did nothing but cultivate generally accepted-good qualities. The Stoics turn out to be honest citizens, strong and courageous fathers of the family; while the Epicureans turn out to be nihilistic tricksters, bodily very weak, and still «children» and «women» by nature. But the next time you complain about the negative aspects of patriarchal society, the next time you resent street «cattle,» the next time you regret another war that has broken out; talk to the Stoics about real male values! And you will immediately become convinced that stoicism, for all its external «beauty,» often leads to incredibly harmful consequences that epicureism, even in its caricatured «theoretical» version from the Stoics, has yet to reach.

    Author of the article: Friedrich Hohenstaufen

    2021.

  • The scale of the catastrophe for ancient literature

    The scale of the catastrophe for ancient literature

    Author of the text: Friedrich Hohenstaufen
    Written in 2018

    Russian and Ukrainian versions

    Not everything of ancient literature has survived, it is a well-known fact; and even the little that has survived has not always been preserved in its complete form. We know a great many names of ancient authors from whom we have not a single line; but even of those authors whose works have survived and are considered “classics” today, in most cases not everything has survived. Thus, of the numerous poets in the genre of Greek tragedy known to us today by name, only three of the most prominent — Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides — have survived as complete works; at the same time, only 7 (or 7.8%) of the 90 plays of Aeschylus have survived in full, 7 (or 5.7%) of the 123 dramas of Sophocles, and 19 (or 20.7%) of the 92 works of Euripides. In total, out of 305 plays by only three authors, albeit extremely talented, only 33 works, or 10.8%, have survived. And this is with such prominent names! One can only imagine how many thousands of plays were written by their lifetime contemporaries alone.

    The same applies to the comedy genre. Of the 40 works of the famous comedian Aristophanes only 11 plays (or 27.5%) have survived. This is a very large index of preservation, against the background of tragedians, but the fact is that Aristophanes is the only comediographer in general anyhow preserved, while by name we know at least two more of his contemporaries, which later Alexandrian criticism put on a par with Aristophanes, and sometimes even higher. But even the recognition of the critics left no chance of preservation for them.


    Already here it would be worth suspecting that if the famous people have reached our times in such a bad condition, it means that the “average situation in the ward” was much worse. According to approximate calculations, we know the names of about 2000 authors who wrote in Greek before 500 AD (before the conditional fall of the Western Roman Empire). And these are only the known ones! At least in some form, the texts of 253 of them (or 12.7%) have been preserved, and those, for the most part, are fragmentary, in quotations or extracts. So often there is not even a page of text. Similarly, we know the names of 772 Latin-speaking authors who lived before 500, but the texts of only 144 of them (18.7%) have survived. Taken as a whole (397 out of 2772 authors), this is only 14.3% of the potential for ancient literature. It should be borne in mind that this calculation is based on the names of authors; and as we have just seen, on the example of the four largest authors, even they were preserved by about 10-15%, what to speak of secondary authors, from which there are only a few passages or nothing at all?

    Let’s assume for example, although it is not true, that 10% of their written heritage would have survived from each author; even this extremely insignificant value would have amounted to 3.6% of the total amount of literature that could have reached us. And that is only if all the authors had been preserved with the same zeal with which Sophocles was preserved. But, since the minor authors were preserved so poorly that simply nothing has survived from them, it is safe to assume that only of the known names of authors and the titles of their works, +/- about 1% of the entire heritage has survived from antiquity to our time; and how many authors remained completely unknown even by name — we can only guess.

    More striking examples: Menander — the most famous comedy writer of antiquity during the so-called “Hellenistic” period, an incredibly popular author even in late Rome — but by the end of the 19th century he was already considered completely lost. Even after the incredible discoveries of the 20th century, only 7 of his 108 comedies have survived, of which most have survived about half, and only one comedy, “The Misanthrope” has survived in its entirety. Just one comedy out of 108 works! And this is the most popular author in antiquity. No less popular in his time philosopher Epicurus — wrote about 300 works, and from them only 3 letters and a hundred small excerpts have survived. Chrysippus — a Stoic philosopher, of whose 705 works not a single one has survived (although the excerpts will accumulate to 2-3 books in the format of ancient sizes). The same Democritus, whose collection of works existed in the first centuries of the Empire, a century after the last mention completely disappears. And similar situations can be counted in dozens! Only a small part of the list is available, for example, on Wikipedia.

    Antique Libraries

    The number of libraries in antiquity was also quite large. The largest in the ancient world was the well-known Library of Alexandria, which included, according to various estimates, from 400,000 to 700,000 scrolls, mostly in Greek. Some modern scholars believe this number is overestimated and give another estimate — from 10 to 50 thousand scrolls. But even this figure looks quite impressive. The needs of intellectuals for books led to the transcription of at least 1100 scrolls a year (which means 50 years of work to reproduce the scale of the Library of Alexandria alone, and that is underestimated).

    The volume of Latin literature was apparently comparable to the scale of the Greek world. In Rome, closer to the 3rd century AD there were large state public libraries supported by the emperors. There were 28 such libraries in all; each had two sections, Latin and Greek. And that’s not counting the numerous private libraries. One of the last mentions of public imperial libraries can be found in the edict of Emperor Valentus from 372 “On Antiquaries and Keepers of the Library of Constantinople”. The edict appointed four Greek and three Latin specialists in the restoration and copying of ancient books. In the capital of the eastern part of the empire, i.e. Constantinople, even in the fifth century, on the eve of the collapse of the west and the invasion of Atilla, the imperial library included 120,000 books. But the problems began after the so-called “Crisis of the 3rd century”. The decline of interest in scholarship and libraries in 4th century Rome was witnessed by Ammianus Marcellinus, who stated that “libraries are like cemeteries”. The civil wars of the late Empire and the barbarian invasions of 410 and 455 seriously damaged Roman libraries. According to a single mention by Sidonius Apollinaris, bishop of Gaul (Ep., IX, 16), one of the Roman imperial libraries was still functioning in the 470s, the last years of the Western Roman Empire. As a result of this desolation and the cessation of interest in the sciences, by the sixth century — by the time of Cassiodorus’ work — books had already become rare in Italy.


    It is a little more difficult to determine the scale of private libraries, since tradition has preserved only occasional names of owners of large book collections. The size of these collections was sometimes exceptionally large, and could be compared to the libraries of the capital: a certain grammarian Epaphroditus (mentioned in the “Judgment”) compiled a library of 30,000 scrolls. The collection of Tirannion (Strabo’s teacher) was about the same size. At the beginning of the 3rd century AD, the physician Serenus Sammonicus collected 62,000 scrolls, and his son gave them to the younger Gordianus. Such libraries are quite comparable to the legendary libraries at Pergamum and Alexandria. But only one single integral library has survived to our days — in a villa in Herculaneum; and it stored, according to different calculations, from 800 to 1800 scrolls, mostly Greek and related to the philosophy of Epicureanism.

    I.e. in the 3 private libraries mentioned above alone there was about 100 times more material than in the extant Herculaneum (about the same 1% preservation rate), which even so is considered an incredibly valuable find, with many fundamentally new sources. And how many other private libraries existed that we don’t realize existed? And how many more of the 28 public imperial libraries kept? Of course, the same editions must have been frequently repeated there, and yet the scale of the loss is quite estimable.

    Materials and Causes of Disappearance

    As can be seen from what we have said above, the centuries-long literary production of antiquity was very large, and the works that have survived to us in their entirety constitute a tiny part of it. The decisive role in this process played not only a simple historical accident. An ancient book could not lie for centuries due to the fact that the writing material was Egyptian papyrus, starting from the VII century BC. In the climatic conditions of Europe, papyrus scrolls wore out rather quickly: already in antiquity it was considered that a book-scroll older than 200 years was a great rarity. By the II-I century B.C., animal skin parchment began to compete with papyrus; but the parchment book (the so-called “codex” in the familiar book form) displaced the papyrus scroll only during the transition to the Middle Ages. In its bulk, the composition of the surviving monuments is the result of successive selections made (both in antiquity itself and at the beginning of the Middle Ages) by a number of generations who preserved from the literary heritage of the past only that which continued to arouse interest. An antique text written on papyrus could be preserved only if it was copied from time to time. And what is characteristic, monuments of ancient pagan culture were transcribed on papyrus scrolls, and new — Christian books were written on parchment codices. This created additional conditions for pagan knowledge to gradually disappear, even without any barbaric burnings. This point is also interesting because we can overestimate the negative influence of Christianity in the times of IV-VII centuries, when papyri, which had already decayed by the time of the Renaissance, could still be in circulation.

    According to Italian finds, codices were not yet widespread until the 3rd century A.D., when the crisis came. But somewhere from the year 400, the codex became the only form of book, and up to the year 800, there was a gradual increase in the number of books produced. Just in the period from 400 to 800 most of the manuscripts had religious content; and in the sixth and seventh centuries secular works were probably not copied at all. The originals had decayed, and as a result, when interest in ancient literature began to return in Christian Europe, it was already hard to find. A study of Codices Latini Antiquiores conducted in the 20th century found, among other things, that not a single complete Latin manuscript created before the middle of the 4th century has survived. Only fragments, mostly papyrus, found as a result of archaeological excavations have survived. Works unpopular in the fourth to fifth centuries (including Christian works) have been largely lost.

    In some cases, works that were lost in antiquity may have survived by chance; finds of this kind have begun to appear since the 19th century in connection with the discovery of papyri in Egypt (Aristotle’s «Politics of Athens» was discovered in this way). In the last 50 years, a large number of papyrus fragments from the Hellenistic and Roman eras have been discovered here; most are documents, letters, etc., but some contain literary material. Although there are very few scrolls with complete works among these papyri, and they are usually insignificant scraps, the papyrus finds are every year enriching our knowledge of ancient literature, especially in those areas that suffered from Late Antique selection. But what is particularly characteristic is that the increment of material delivered by the papyri relates almost exclusively to Greek texts; works of Roman literature rarely reached southern Egypt. And this illustrates once again the fundamental nature of the Latin-Greek division of the Empire itself.


    With regard to fiction, the selection made in late antiquity was based mainly on the needs of the school, which taught literary language and stylistic art. The school for its own purposes selected the most outstanding writers of the past, and preserved their works, but usually not in the form of a complete collection of works, but only individual works, the best examples. In this “selection” from the classics of literature, certain branches and even whole epochs could fall out of the sphere of school interests, and this circumstance strongly affected the composition of the extant monuments. Greek lyrics, the literature of the Hellenistic period, and early Roman literature suffered particularly.

    The amount of what was lost increased with the centuries, especially due to the sharp decline in the cultural level during the demise of ancient society. Meanwhile, it was this era, when papyrus scrolls were transcribed onto parchment, more durable in European conditions, that was crucial to the continued preservation of the monuments of ancient literature. The antique texts that survived in the first centuries of the Middle Ages have overwhelmingly survived to our time, as interest in them began to grow considerably from the 9th century AD. But even here, however, not all is well. For example, the “Library” of Patriarch Photius (IX century) contained abstracts of 279 works, but almost half of them have not reached our days. Therefore, let us repeat our conclusion once again: we can safely consider that only of the known names and titles of the works of antiquity have reached us +/- about 1% of the entire heritage; and how many authors remained completely unknown even by name — remains only a guess.