The title of this article was chosen for a reason; it is connected with such a scholar of the Epicurean school as Zeno of Sidon (150-75 BC). Who was this Zeno? We know that he was a man of considerable influence, and that it was under his patronage that Epicureanism became the leading doctrine in Rome. Even Cicero (in “De natura deorum”) called Zeno the wittiest of all Epicureans. According to Diogenes of Laertes, he wrote extensively; and Proclus speaks of one work in which Zeno attacked the validity of mathematical proofs and criticized Euclidean geometry. Sometimes he was even called “the leading Epicurean” (Latin: Coryphaeus Epicureorum), and Cicero declares that Zeno despised other philosophers and even called Socrates “an Attic jester (scurram Atticum).” So the recognition of wit, coupled with all this, paints us a man of great amusement and irony.
His own writings have not come down to us, but the surviving treatise of his pupil Philodemus is based on the lectures of Zeno, from whom some passages in the first book of Cicero’s De natura deorum are probably borrowed. Of his philosophy we may guess from the fragments of Philodemus entitled “On Revealed Criticism” and “On Anger,” from the titles of which the title of our own article is derived. We know that before Zeno the scholarch of the school was the “Garden Tyrant” Apollodorus, but why he received this nickname we can only guess. The scanty information does not allow us to conclude that Zeno created his philosophy in a struggle with his predecessor; he himself was most likely not against a return to the classical hypercriticism and acrimony of Epicurus. But we know for sure that already Polistratus, the third scholarch of the school, after Hermarchus (d. 250 BC) tried to carry out a reform in the school, which stated that since the main goal of Epicureanism is the state of “ataraxia” (equanimity, tranquility of the soul), then all polemics should disturb this state, and therefore it is worthwhile to simply merge with the crowd in everything and stop all bickering. The abrupt disappearance of the Epicureans from the radar of the public agenda of the time may indicate that this reform lasted until the appearance of Apollodorus (under whom Epicureanism begins to penetrate Rome). The fact that Zeno of Sidon had to theorize about the state of anger; and that when Cicero mentioned the Epicurean Albucius, emphasizing: «This is the kind of promiscuity that has blossomed in the Epicurean garden! You are in the habit of getting hot-tempered. Zeno even used to swear. And what to say about Albucius?» —suggests that this was indeed an important turn. And the fact that “Zenoeven scolded” speaks unequivocally of the way in which he could interpret criticism, and the anger it provoked.
If we consider the question of the opinion of Epicurus himself, as well as of his closest disciples (Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Polyen, and Colotus), they were all openly determined to criticize their rivals. So there is nothing surprising in such a turn even from the point of view of “dogmatics.” The only question arises as to how legitimate was Polystratus’ reform of anger? This is what we will discuss in our paper.
The central thesis of Epicureanism is that the goal of life is not just “the reduction of suffering” but pleasure. And although it is even interpreted as a result of the reduction of suffering, but still, if it were completely so, then the Cyrenaic philosophers would be right that such a blessed Epicurean sage would be no more alive than an ordinary stone. After all, both pleasure and suffering are some kind of movement in the soul (which should be understood by analogy with the movement of blood in vessels, but rather along nerves — see Lametri‘s theory of animal spirits). The absence of “bad” motion is not yet the cause of “good” motion; and pure rest is insensibility, and therefore not pleasure at all. Epicurus must have been aware of this criticism, since it arose in his youth, so that it was not for nothing that he himself emphasized not so much that he was delivered from suffering as that he received from life precisely that pleasure. Here it is also worth recalling that Epicurus quite considered pleasure in two kinds, as “passive” and “active”, and recognized in general both kinds, though with preference for the passive. But what is this active pleasure?
“Serenity [ataraxia] and the absence of suffering of the body are the pleasures of rest [passive pleasures], and joy and mirth are regarded as the pleasures of motion [active pleasures].”
So, we see — these are joy and mirth. A fairly moderate version of what might be considered active pleasures, but Epicurus in this form recognizes them too. So if anger causes a “negative” movement in the soul, how can one derive pleasure from it? This is where another of Epicurus’ theses comes partly to the rescue: ‘It is better to endure these certain sufferings in order to enjoy greater pleasures; it is useful to abstain from these certain pleasures in order not to endure greater sufferings‘.
Or more simply put, if we paraphrase it to suit our topic, «one may endure the negative aspects of anger in order to enjoy tranquility of mind afterward. Or it is useful to disturb the tranquility, so that it will not be further disturbed in the future by the unexpected discovery that you have been wrong all your life”.
Criticism of opponents allows us to realize some possible misconceptions of our own, which would inspire uncertainty in the soul, and therefore some anxiety, and therefore distance us from that very “ataraxia”. Only full knowledge of the nature of things (see our essay on Truth) is a reliable basis for peace of mind (this is the essence of the whole letter to Pythocles). It is not even the exact certainty of how a phenomenon, such as snow and hail, arises that is important, rather it is important that all “equally probable” explanations, no matter how many there are, have the same origin (the physics of atomistics). In that case, Epicurean physics will be right in its very essence, whatever the nature of the phenomena in its external manifestations actually is. A first-order truth need not establish a secondary truth; so relativity is combined with dogmatism. But the main pathos of this principled atomism was not to admit any “non-physical” explanations. By allowing the latter we open the way to superstition, and through them to all kinds of fears of the beyond, which prevents normal ataraxia (cf. — practically all Stoics except Panethius recognized astrology and the science of divination, etc.).
However, we have gotten too far off topic. The occupation with physical questions and the defense of atomistics forces one to polemize (!) with the opponents of the atomistic theory. And these questions always shift from pure physics to metaphysics and theology as well. It turns out that it is necessary to refute opponents on all fronts at once, and it means that it is necessary to possess all kinds of knowledge in order to defeat enemies comprehensively.
As one Epicurean says in Cicero — “Epicurus was not uneducated, but ignorant are those who think that even an old man should repeat as learned what a boy is ashamed not to know”. Thus, for example, Philodemus of Gadara, before denying the usefulness of the science of music (for which he could be called ignorant of music) — thoroughly goes through the work of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylonia. It is not a simple denial, but a denial already after assimilating and analyzing the views of the opponent. It was not the fault of the Epicureans that the systems of the time collapsed under the weight of their own imperfection.
In the process of covering all knowledge in all subjects, you are forced to polemicize willy-nilly against all hitherto existing schools. This is the inevitable fate of the “polymath,” of any pretender to the role of Homo Universalis. The only question is how to synthesize all this knowledge into a consistent system; otherwise, “total criticism” will end in a simple denial of the correctness of everything at all (which is what the same “polymathic” skeptics have done). But what happens if you try to combine everything? Obviously, you’ll end up with the same little-revered and internally contradictory eclecticism (which Stoicism is to some extent). But the main goal is the absence of fears and anxiety; and in order not to be afraid, one must have a firm knowledge of everything; so skeptical doubt or pseudo-scientific eclecticism will obviously not fit here. Already at the level of this attitude it becomes obvious that the Epicurean’s aim is to become smarter on the way to ataraxia. After all, the main danger to the tranquility of the soul hides in stupidity, with which even Aristippus agreed.
This is why Epicurus says that “itisbetter to be miserable with reason than to be happy without reason”.
So, the intellectualism of Epicureanism is generally explained. Yes, the sciences are not an end in themselves, but one cannot do without them; after all, what if I am wrong, and it turns out that I am destined for the afterlife, and that this could easily be proved in my lifetime? Hence the need for polemics. But don’t other schools have the same situation, perhaps with different goals? Why is it that the same Stoicism cannot claim to be intellectualism? And why is it that, concerning our topic, polemics cannot be conducted without anger and scolding?
Answering the first question — it is enough to recall that Stoicism does not burden itself with unnecessary reflections on the nature of virtue. It is practically self-evident (and is actually drawn ready-made from society), and makes the picture of the world strictly black and white. Although to some extent this leaves the Stoic with a choice, it is not so difficult to make that choice when you already know what the obvious “evil” is. And if there is still some choice here, in general, necessity reigns over the world, and this also eliminates the need for any further reasoning. Everything that happens is right a priori. And in general, since “fate” in many respects has the features of a deity, everything is not just right, but is pre-conceived by the most perfect being (God/Reason) according to a certain plan, having assigned its goals to everything (teleology), which only need to be fulfilled in order not to violate the most perfect plan. This is how the study of physics-theology leads to the conclusion of what is “good” (yes, they do have an explanation, but it is extremely weak in its foundations). Good is everything that is necessary for God-Logos-the Whole; and he needs a priori everything that you observe. In principle, it needs even the existence of evil (see Chrysippus and Aurelius on this).
And if the society has already defined what is good and what is evil, but its members themselves constantly allow evil — then the task is simple, to try to avoid evil as much as possible. That is, to take the conditional patriarchal norms as a given, and to bring their ideas about “virtue” to the maximum limit. Of course, reasoning about the Whole and its parts requires some prudence, and of course it is still desirable to read Heraclitus and reflect on it — but in the future the Stoic will not need to burden himself with the choice. Always do the “right” thing. It would seem very simple and convenient, why not use it? But the problem is that you are just as much a member of society, a “common man”, and also constantly allowing evil, one way or another. That’s why “meditations” are so important for Stoics; you have to remind yourself of your goals every day, you have to constantly monitor yourself, etc. etc., which only proves that the Stoic himself is unable to fulfill his own requirements, and that he has a hard time putting “Stoicism” on subconscious autopilot. But that is another story altogether. For now, the central thesis is that Stoicism is “theoretically” simple, a binary opposition and primitive logic stemming from teleology.
But Epicureanism is quite another matter! It postulates indeterminism at the level of physics to further defend free will, but now at the level of our lives; and this opens up a much greater variation of choice. In addition — Epicureanism destroys the very logic of “absolute good and ‘absolute evil’ by introducing a theory of the origin of society and the state, as well as a theory of the emergence of knowledge from ‘experience’ (to argue against the skeptics, Stoia created a more elaborate sensationalism than even Epicurus, but it had no serious consequences for the Stoic view of the world, just a tool against the skeptics). In other words, “good and evil” are either subjective or socially conditioned, which does not make these views true (cf. Helvetius), and this widens the range of our choices even further. One could argue that here, too, the binary opposition (pleasure-suffering) governs choice, defining “good” and “evil”. But unlike Stoicism, it says that not all pleasure is good, and not all suffering is evil. There is no such variation in Stoicism, for vice cannot be good and virtue evil; it cannot by definition, not even in some trivial matter. What compels the Epicurean to make the “right” choice? Only the fullness of knowledge of all the nuances, not the fullness of knowledge of one trivial truth from the Logos. These are quite different levels of intellectualism, and this difference stems precisely from the degree of complexity of the basic concepts of good and evil.
The second problem was: why can’t polemics be conducted without anger and profanity?
Of course it can. But if we recall the title of Zeno-Philodemus’s work, it sounded in full as “On frank criticism”. Here it is obvious that if we try to behave courteously, the criticism will not have all frankness, its corners will be smoothed, and thus the goal (the assertion of one’s rightness and total destruction of the opponent) will not be achieved. And then why, one might ask, should we start a polemic? Ataraxia requires conviction in one’s own rightness. It is possible that frank criticism will force your opponent to answer frankly as well, and thus better show your own weaknesses. As Epicurus said, “In philosophical discussion, the victor gains more from the debate — in the respect that he multiplies knowledge.” And then what good are the smoothed corners for your own enlightenment?
Still, even if we found justifications in the spirit of “allowing evil for the greater good,” the big question remains to what extent “criticism” and anger are permissible. But to be honest, in fact, this chain of reasoning was originally constructed incorrectly, with the expectation of philistine perceptions. Frankly speaking, anger and outright criticism are not even evil! If this is just one way of learning through polemics, then what is wrong with learning?
“In all studies the fruit with labor comes at the end of them, but in philosophy pleasure runs alongside cognition: it is not after study that there is pleasure, but at the same time there is study and pleasure.”
You gain knowledge, so why this suffering, by what? The sensation of anger? But if it is rousing, what is it not the very “activity and exhilaration,” i.e., the enjoyment of motion? Why can’t defeating your opponent and his stupidity, mixed with his own serious face and conviction of the truth of his delusions — cheer you up? As Epicurus says: “One should laugh and philosophize and at the same time engage in household chores and use all other faculties and never stop uttering the verbs of true philosophy”. What could be funnier than an opponent who is angry with you, just for breaking the conventional rules of etiquette? Who is willing to accuse you of ignorance and pigheadedness for some technicalities, while hammering away at the very heart of the matter! This was also the whole controversy of the enemies of Epicureanism about the attitude to rhetoric.
Thus Plutarch complains, “They write that we should not orate.” And Quintilian says: “I am not at all surprised, concerning Epicurus, who shuns all teaching, judging from what he has written against rhetoric.” Believing that rhetoric is “sophistic science to make speeches and create evidence”, Epicurus considered oratory as a bad art (cacotechnian), valuing in it exclusively only one property (if it was caught there) — clarity. If political speeches are admissible, then here “nature itself is what directs speeches, not any art”. Therefore, polemics can and should be crude, because substance is more important than form. Nevertheless, it was for the form that Epicurus was criticized by everyone, especially by Cicero, a lover of rhetoric.
So, it’s natural to get angry when criticized openly. And to be a frank critic is pleasant and useful at the same time. So, within the framework of philosophical discussion, anger is more than permissible, especially if it is mixed with cheerful mood and laughter. In fact, it is not even anger at all, but only a “form of anger”, only “angry words”, which may not even hide the affect itself. The opponents of Epicureanism could not (and still cannot) understand this at all. In today’s youth culture it is called “doing on a whim”; and it may well be pure pleasure! Even the Stoic Seneca, in his work On Anger (which may well refer here to our Zeno) writes:
«Heraclitus whenever he left the house and saw around him so many badly living, or rather to say badly dying people, began to cry and pity all the passers-by he met, even if they were cheerful and happy … About Democritus, on the contrary, they say that he never appeared in public without a smile: to that non-serious it seemed to him everything that seriously engaged in all around. But where is the place for anger? You either have to laugh at everything or cry.»
But what is more interesting is that Democritus was the basis of the physics of Epicurus, while Heraclitus is the basis of the physics of Stoicism! And yet Seneca opts for Democritus. But maybe Epicurus’ ethics is not entirely taken from Aristippus either? After all, Democritus was as much an advocate of “tranquility of soul” as Epicurus himself; but no one deprives him of his right to laughter and contempt, not even a respected Stoic like Seneca. Whereas the acrimonious Epicurus is censured by everyone.
So “anger” in our case is not anger at all, and even if it were negative, it would be a very minor evil in the context of all that is going on. Therefore, anger and criticism are not merely not hindrances to Epicureanism, but are one of its tools on the way to achieving ataraxia, and partly (as in the case of Democritus) even the result of ataraxia! With this attitude one can challenge one’s opponents without disturbing one’s own serenity. The question of anger and criticism is so central to Epicureanism that the entire fate of the school depended on its resolution at some point. By excluding anger, as Polistratus tried to do, he excluded at the same time the very essence of Epicureanism — the craving for knowledge, the elimination of stupidity. He deprived the school of the possibility of choice, determining everything by the pre-established traditions of society, and by doing so he deprived us of much of the pleasure, which almost doomed the school to extinction and oblivion.
