The title of this article was chosen for a reason; it is connected with such a scholar of the Epicurean school as Zeno of Sidon (150-75 BC). Who was this Zeno? We know that he was a man of considerable influence, and that it was under his patronage that Epicureanism became the leading doctrine in Rome. Even Cicero (in “De natura deorum”) called Zeno the wittiest of all Epicureans. According to Diogenes of Laertes, he wrote extensively; and Proclus speaks of one work in which Zeno attacked the validity of mathematical proofs and criticized Euclidean geometry. Sometimes he was even called “the leading Epicurean” (Latin: Coryphaeus Epicureorum), and Cicero declares that Zeno despised other philosophers and even called Socrates “an Attic jester (scurram Atticum).” So the recognition of wit, coupled with all this, paints us a man of great amusement and irony.
His own writings have not come down to us, but the surviving treatise of his pupil Philodemus is based on the lectures of Zeno, from whom some passages in the first book of Cicero’s De natura deorum are probably borrowed. Of his philosophy we may guess from the fragments of Philodemus entitled “On Revealed Criticism” and “On Anger,” from the titles of which the title of our own article is derived. We know that before Zeno the scholarch of the school was the “Garden Tyrant” Apollodorus, but why he received this nickname we can only guess. The scanty information does not allow us to conclude that Zeno created his philosophy in a struggle with his predecessor; he himself was most likely not against a return to the classical hypercriticism and acrimony of Epicurus. But we know for sure that already Polistratus, the third scholarch of the school, after Hermarchus (d. 250 BC) tried to carry out a reform in the school, which stated that since the main goal of Epicureanism is the state of “ataraxia” (equanimity, tranquility of the soul), then all polemics should disturb this state, and therefore it is worthwhile to simply merge with the crowd in everything and stop all bickering. The abrupt disappearance of the Epicureans from the radar of the public agenda of the time may indicate that this reform lasted until the appearance of Apollodorus (under whom Epicureanism begins to penetrate Rome). The fact that Zeno of Sidon had to theorize about the state of anger; and that when Cicero mentioned the Epicurean Albucius, emphasizing: «This is the kind of promiscuity that has blossomed in the Epicurean garden!You are in the habit of getting hot-tempered.Zeno even used to swear.And what to say about Albucius?» —suggests that this was indeed an important turn. And the fact that “Zenoeven scolded” speaks unequivocally of the way in which he could interpret criticism, and the anger it provoked.
If we consider the question of the opinion of Epicurus himself, as well as of his closest disciples (Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Polyen, and Colotus), they were all openly determined to criticize their rivals. So there is nothing surprising in such a turn even from the point of view of “dogmatics.” The only question arises as to how legitimate was Polystratus’ reform of anger? This is what we will discuss in our paper.
The central thesis of Epicureanism is that the goal of life is not just “the reduction of suffering” but pleasure. And although it is even interpreted as a result of the reduction of suffering, but still, if it were completely so, then the Cyrenaic philosophers would be right that such a blessed Epicurean sage would be no more alive than an ordinary stone. After all, both pleasure and suffering are some kind of movement in the soul (which should be understood by analogy with the movement of blood in vessels, but rather along nerves — see Lametri‘s theory of animal spirits). The absence of “bad” motion is not yet the cause of “good” motion; and pure rest is insensibility, and therefore not pleasure at all. Epicurus must have been aware of this criticism, since it arose in his youth, so that it was not for nothing that he himself emphasized not so much that he was delivered from suffering as that he received from life precisely that pleasure. Here it is also worth recalling that Epicurus quite considered pleasure in two kinds, as “passive” and “active”, and recognized in general both kinds, though with preference for the passive. But what is this active pleasure?
“Serenity [ataraxia] and the absence of suffering of the body are the pleasures of rest [passive pleasures], and joy and mirth are regarded as the pleasures of motion [active pleasures].”
So, we see — these are joy and mirth. A fairly moderate version of what might be considered active pleasures, but Epicurus in this form recognizes them too. So if anger causes a “negative” movement in the soul, how can one derive pleasure from it? This is where another of Epicurus’ theses comes partly to the rescue: ‘It is better to endure these certain sufferings in order to enjoy greater pleasures; it is useful to abstain from these certain pleasures in order not to endure greater sufferings‘.
Or more simply put, if we paraphrase it to suit our topic, «one may endure the negative aspects of anger in order to enjoy tranquility of mind afterward.Or it is useful to disturb the tranquility, so that it will not be further disturbed in the future by the unexpected discovery that you have been wrong all your life”.
Criticism of opponents allows us to realize some possible misconceptions of our own, which would inspire uncertainty in the soul, and therefore some anxiety, and therefore distance us from that very “ataraxia”. Only full knowledge of the nature of things (see our essay on Truth) is a reliable basis for peace of mind (this is the essence of the whole letter to Pythocles). It is not even the exact certainty of how a phenomenon, such as snow and hail, arises that is important, rather it is important that all “equally probable” explanations, no matter how many there are, have the same origin (the physics of atomistics). In that case, Epicurean physics will be right in its very essence, whatever the nature of the phenomena in its external manifestations actually is. A first-order truth need not establish a secondary truth; so relativity is combined with dogmatism. But the main pathos of this principled atomism was not to admit any “non-physical” explanations. By allowing the latter we open the way to superstition, and through them to all kinds of fears of the beyond, which prevents normal ataraxia (cf. — practically all Stoics except Panethius recognized astrology and the science of divination, etc.).
However, we have gotten too far off topic. The occupation with physical questions and the defense of atomistics forces one to polemize (!) with the opponents of the atomistic theory. And these questions always shift from pure physics to metaphysics and theology as well. It turns out that it is necessary to refute opponents on all fronts at once, and it means that it is necessary to possess all kinds of knowledge in order to defeat enemies comprehensively.
As one Epicurean says in Cicero — “Epicurus was not uneducated, but ignorant are those who think that even an old man should repeat as learned what a boy is ashamed not to know”. Thus, for example, Philodemus of Gadara, before denying the usefulness of the science of music (for which he could be called ignorant of music) — thoroughly goes through the work of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylonia. It is not a simple denial, but a denial already after assimilating and analyzing the views of the opponent. It was not the fault of the Epicureans that the systems of the time collapsed under the weight of their own imperfection.
In the process of covering all knowledge in all subjects, you are forced to polemicize willy-nilly against all hitherto existing schools. This is the inevitable fate of the “polymath,” of any pretender to the role of Homo Universalis. The only question is how to synthesize all this knowledge into a consistent system; otherwise, “total criticism” will end in a simple denial of the correctness of everything at all (which is what the same “polymathic” skeptics have done). But what happens if you try to combine everything? Obviously, you’ll end up with the same little-revered and internally contradictory eclecticism (which Stoicism is to some extent). But the main goal is the absence of fears and anxiety; and in order not to be afraid, one must have a firm knowledge of everything; so skeptical doubt or pseudo-scientific eclecticism will obviously not fit here. Already at the level of this attitude it becomes obvious that the Epicurean’s aim is to become smarter on the way to ataraxia. After all, the main danger to the tranquility of the soul hides in stupidity, with which even Aristippus agreed.
This is why Epicurus says that “itisbetter to be miserable with reason than to be happy without reason”.
Let’s imagine that there is both criticism and anger going on here
So, the intellectualism of Epicureanism is generally explained. Yes, the sciences are not an end in themselves, but one cannot do without them; after all, what if I am wrong, and it turns out that I am destined for the afterlife, and that this could easily be proved in my lifetime? Hence the need for polemics. But don’t other schools have the same situation, perhaps with different goals? Why is it that the same Stoicism cannot claim to be intellectualism? And why is it that, concerning our topic, polemics cannot be conducted without anger and scolding?
Answering the first question — it is enough to recall that Stoicism does not burden itself with unnecessary reflections on the nature of virtue. It is practically self-evident (and is actually drawn ready-made from society), and makes the picture of the world strictly black and white. Although to some extent this leaves the Stoic with a choice, it is not so difficult to make that choice when you already know what the obvious “evil” is. And if there is still some choice here, in general, necessity reigns over the world, and this also eliminates the need for any further reasoning. Everything that happens is right a priori. And in general, since “fate” in many respects has the features of a deity, everything is not just right, but is pre-conceived by the most perfect being (God/Reason) according to a certain plan, having assigned its goals to everything (teleology), which only need to be fulfilled in order not to violate the most perfect plan. This is how the study of physics-theology leads to the conclusion of what is “good” (yes, they do have an explanation, but it is extremely weak in its foundations). Good is everything that is necessary for God-Logos-the Whole; and he needs a priori everything that you observe. In principle, it needs even the existence of evil (see Chrysippus and Aurelius on this).
And if the society has already defined what is good and what is evil, but its members themselves constantly allow evil — then the task is simple, to try to avoid evil as much as possible. That is, to take the conditional patriarchal norms as a given, and to bring their ideas about “virtue” to the maximum limit. Of course, reasoning about the Whole and its parts requires some prudence, and of course it is still desirable to read Heraclitus and reflect on it — but in the future the Stoic will not need to burden himself with the choice. Always do the “right” thing. It would seem very simple and convenient, why not use it? But the problem is that you are just as much a member of society, a “common man”, and also constantly allowing evil, one way or another. That’s why “meditations” are so important for Stoics; you have to remind yourself of your goals every day, you have to constantly monitor yourself, etc. etc., which only proves that the Stoic himself is unable to fulfill his own requirements, and that he has a hard time putting “Stoicism” on subconscious autopilot. But that is another story altogether. For now, the central thesis is that Stoicism is “theoretically” simple, a binary opposition and primitive logic stemming from teleology.
But Epicureanism is quite another matter! It postulates indeterminism at the level of physics to further defend free will, but now at the level of our lives; and this opens up a much greater variation of choice. In addition — Epicureanism destroys the very logic of “absolute good and ‘absolute evil’ by introducing a theory of the origin of society and the state, as well as a theory of the emergence of knowledge from ‘experience’ (to argue against the skeptics, Stoia created a more elaborate sensationalism than even Epicurus, but it had no serious consequences for the Stoic view of the world, just a tool against the skeptics). In other words, “good and evil” are either subjective or socially conditioned, which does not make these views true (cf. Helvetius), and this widens the range of our choices even further. One could argue that here, too, the binary opposition (pleasure-suffering) governs choice, defining “good” and “evil”. But unlike Stoicism, it says that not all pleasure is good, and not all suffering is evil. There is no such variation in Stoicism, for vice cannot be good and virtue evil; it cannot by definition, not even in some trivial matter. What compels the Epicurean to make the “right” choice? Only the fullness of knowledge of all the nuances, not the fullness of knowledge of one trivial truth from the Logos. These are quite different levels of intellectualism, and this difference stems precisely from the degree of complexity of the basic concepts of good and evil.
The second problem was: why can’t polemics be conducted without anger and profanity?
Of course it can. But if we recall the title of Zeno-Philodemus’s work, it sounded in full as “On frank criticism”. Here it is obvious that if we try to behave courteously, the criticism will not have all frankness, its corners will be smoothed, and thus the goal (the assertion of one’s rightness and total destruction of the opponent) will not be achieved. And then why, one might ask, should we start a polemic? Ataraxia requires conviction in one’s own rightness. It is possible that frank criticism will force your opponent to answer frankly as well, and thus better show your own weaknesses. As Epicurus said, “In philosophical discussion, the victor gains more from the debate — in the respect that he multiplies knowledge.” And then what good are the smoothed corners for your own enlightenment?
Still, even if we found justifications in the spirit of “allowing evil for the greater good,” the big question remains to what extent “criticism” and anger are permissible. But to be honest, in fact, this chain of reasoning was originally constructed incorrectly, with the expectation of philistine perceptions. Frankly speaking, anger and outright criticism are not even evil! If this is just one way of learning through polemics, then what is wrong with learning?
“In all studies the fruit with labor comes at the end of them, but in philosophy pleasure runs alongside cognition: it is not after study that there is pleasure, but at the same time there is study and pleasure.”
You gain knowledge, so why this suffering, by what? The sensation of anger? But if it is rousing, what is it not the very “activity and exhilaration,” i.e., the enjoyment of motion? Why can’t defeating your opponent and his stupidity, mixed with his own serious face and conviction of the truth of his delusions — cheer you up? As Epicurus says: “One should laugh and philosophize and at the same time engage in household chores and use all other faculties and never stop uttering the verbs of true philosophy”. What could be funnier than an opponent who is angry with you, just for breaking the conventional rules of etiquette? Who is willing to accuse you of ignorance and pigheadedness for some technicalities, while hammering away at the very heart of the matter! This was also the whole controversy of the enemies of Epicureanism about the attitude to rhetoric.
Thus Plutarch complains, “They write that we should not orate.” And Quintilian says: “I am not at all surprised,concerning Epicurus, who shuns all teaching, judging from what he has written against rhetoric.” Believing that rhetoric is “sophistic science to make speeches and create evidence”, Epicurus considered oratory as a bad art (cacotechnian), valuing in it exclusively only one property (if it was caught there) — clarity. If political speeches are admissible, then here “nature itself is what directs speeches, not any art”. Therefore, polemics can and should be crude, because substance is more important than form. Nevertheless, it was for the form that Epicurus was criticized by everyone, especially by Cicero, a lover of rhetoric.
So, it’s natural to get angry when criticized openly. And to be a frank critic is pleasant and useful at the same time. So, within the framework of philosophical discussion, anger is more than permissible, especially if it is mixed with cheerful mood and laughter. In fact, it is not even anger at all, but only a “form of anger”, only “angry words”, which may not even hide the affect itself. The opponents of Epicureanism could not (and still cannot) understand this at all. In today’s youth culture it is called “doing on a whim”; and it may well be pure pleasure! Even the Stoic Seneca, in his work On Anger (which may well refer here to our Zeno) writes:
«Heraclitus whenever he left the house and saw around him so many badly living, or rather to say badly dying people, began to cry and pity all the passers-by he met, even if they were cheerful and happy … About Democritus, on the contrary, they say that he never appeared in public without a smile: to that non-serious it seemed to him everything that seriously engaged in all around.But where is the place for anger?You either have to laugh at everything or cry.»
But what is more interesting is that Democritus was the basis of the physics of Epicurus, while Heraclitus is the basis of the physics of Stoicism! And yet Seneca opts for Democritus. But maybe Epicurus’ ethics is not entirely taken from Aristippus either? After all, Democritus was as much an advocate of “tranquility of soul” as Epicurus himself; but no one deprives him of his right to laughter and contempt, not even a respected Stoic like Seneca. Whereas the acrimonious Epicurus is censured by everyone.
So “anger” in our case is not anger at all, and even if it were negative, it would be a very minor evil in the context of all that is going on. Therefore, anger and criticism are not merely not hindrances to Epicureanism, but are one of its tools on the way to achieving ataraxia, and partly (as in the case of Democritus) even the result of ataraxia! With this attitude one can challenge one’s opponents without disturbing one’s own serenity. The question of anger and criticism is so central to Epicureanism that the entire fate of the school depended on its resolution at some point. By excluding anger, as Polistratus tried to do, he excluded at the same time the very essence of Epicureanism — the craving for knowledge, the elimination of stupidity. He deprived the school of the possibility of choice, determining everything by the pre-established traditions of society, and by doing so he deprived us of much of the pleasure, which almost doomed the school to extinction and oblivion.
Researchers of ancient culture widely know that in the Epicurean school of philosophy there is practically no «logic» section. It is replaced by a certain «Canon«, which is a set of recommendations for the proper conduct of the conversation, so that no unnecessary difficulties arise (strictly speaking, logic was developed by Epicureans, especially inductive logic in the school of Philodemus of Gadara, but this does not cancel their general negative attitude to logic, as such). Epicurus, armed with the theory of the sophist Prodicus, advised a clear definition of the meaning of all words, so that no ambivalent interpretations would arise. More precisely, he advised defining the varieties of the same word according to the different contexts; each time the meaning changed, it should be spelled out. The simplest example is the notion of pleasure, which can be bodily, mental, active, and passive; or it can have related words that differ in meaning (pleasure, bliss, joy, etc.). If such a distinction is made, there will be no room for unnecessary sophisms in arguments. Conversely, if this is not done, every other disputant will try to use the same word in different contexts, deliberately creating confusion and false problems (as Cicero, Plutarch or even Aristotle often did). Basic information about this «Canon» can be found in Diogenes of Laertes and in a letter to Herodotus:
«Canonics is an approach to the subject… usually canonics is considered together with physics: canonics is the science of criteria and beginning in their very foundations… Epicureans reject dialectics (rhetoric, logic) as a superfluous science — in physics, they say, it is enough to use words corresponding to the subjects… All subjects were called by their names, which the grammarian Aristophanes considered a reprehensible feature of his script. His clarity was such that even in his essay «On Rhetoric» he did not think it necessary to demand anything but clarity. And in his letters he addresses not «I wish to rejoice», but «I wish well-being» or «I wish for good»» (c) Laertesian.
So, first of all… it is necessary to understand what is behind the words, so that all our opinions, investigations, perplexities could be reduced to them for discussion, so that in endless explanations they would not remain unexamined and the words would not be empty. In fact, if only we want to reduce to something our researches, perplexities, opinions, it is necessary for us at each word to see its first meaning, which does not need a proof. And then we must cling to sensations in everything, cling to the present momentum of thought or any other criterion, cling to the experiences we undergo, and this will give us the means of judging what is waiting and what is unclear. And once this is settled, we must move on to the consideration of the obscure.
(c) Letter to Herodotus
At first glance, one might say that here the Epicureans are proposing the development of a new, more complex, philosophical language that would remove all ambiguity by creating new concepts for each individual subject. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, it is a question of simplifying and rather using ordinary language. Ambiguities must be resolved, not by creating new terminology (for this is absurd, making language more complicated will only create more problems of understanding), but by first grasping all possible ambiguities, to avoid incorrect syllogisms and sophisms. By the way, of all antique schools the Stoics were the most prominent in creating a new philosophical language («Newspeak»). Already from here it is almost obvious that because of the principal inter-school conflict, the Epicurean position had to be at least somehow different. And this is indirectly confirmed by the complaints of famous Roman rhetors that the language of Epicurus and his followers was crude and simple, and that in matters of rhetoric the Epicureans were in principle ignorant.
A few excerpts are appropriate here. Quintilian says (II 17, 15) that he is not at all surprised about Epicurus, «who shunned all teaching, judging from what he wrote against rhetoric». Believing that rhetoric is «the sophistic science of making speeches and creating proofs» (frg. 49 Us.), Epicurus considered oratory a bad art (cacotechnian, frg. 51 Us.), and if political speech is acceptable, then here «nature itself is what guides speech, not any art» (frg. 55 Us.). Plutarch on this point says (Adv. Col. 33) that: «they write so that we do not oratory.» Moreover, the position on the simplicity and clarity of speech was so strict that Epicurus seems to have claimed the natural origin of language. This was a very precarious position, since language (like logic and mathematics) is generally regarded among empiricists as an instrument artificially created by men to facilitate communication. In the question of the origin of state and law, Epicurus stands on just this ground, defending the theory of the Social Contract (i.e. an «artificial» agreement, although «naturally» created); but in the question of language, he suddenly takes a position close to that of religious thinkers (i.e. a fundamentally «natural» origin). Of course, he means «naturalness» as a result of human interaction with the environment, which occurs as if «by itself,» in all parts of the world in the same way, and precisely because of secondary differences in climate conditions we have differences in the languages of the peoples of the world. But it is still a noticeable dissonance, because Epicureans recognized that language is not created by contracting; and this dissonance is hardly accidental. In our opinion, this is the result of a principled position on the Canon, which required special reservations about the origin of language as well.
Everything seems clear with «Canon»; there is «good» and there is «good» (e.g., good as action and good as character, or good as wealth). But why is logic itself considered superfluous and harmful? Let’s try to figure it out.
Epicurus, following the sophists, accepts the separation between «nature» and «art». Logic by its very definition is a description of the thinking process, i.e. it is an artificial construction. This thinking process itself appears before its description; this means that already on the substantive level thinking does not need «logic». Similarly, and more generally accepted, human speech does not need the rules of syntax. Converging thinking (living, real thinking) with its description on drawing paper is as silly as preferring a painted lobster to a bucket of real crayfish.
One could argue that without the creation of the science of philology, we would not have a literary language either, and then everyone would be talking at the vulgar level of the common folk. Or that the study of the laws of nature (physics/chemistry/biology) retains enormous utility, and while nature would work just as well without them, our goal is to use them non-naturally. Even more than that—we can say that these laws have always existed, just have not been discovered and described (so we go into Platonism and are already succumbing to religion). Applied to logic, this means that it can exist unnoticed by us, and in us ourselves; yes, it also retains the right to develop thinking «artificially,» the ability to go beyond its natural limits.
This all sounds good in theory. Only in practice, even after 2000 years, numerous «logicians» cannot reach a consensus on anything beyond the rules of logic themselves (but even here there is no consensus either). If everything worked as it should — people would quickly acquire an equally calibrated mind, thinking according to strict and universal rules of thought. And as a result, all human preferences and avoidances would become about the same. In practice, we do not see this, and never will (even in the separate caste of scientists). Again, in theory it all sounds so good that one can become a smart person after reading just a few textbooks on how to «think correctly. But that never happens in practice. It is an oxymoron to become intelligent by reasoning strictly according to a textbook scheme. As a rule, such schematism is considered a model of the absence of intelligence. If it were possible, the smartest creatures on earth would now be computers; but we all know that this is not the case, and that machines are devoid of intelligence.
There are only two options here:
Either logic cannot in principle be an adequate reflection of the essence of thinking (just as kinematics can never fully reflect all the nuances of motion and «merge» with real motion, and a tree drawing can never become a three-dimensional tree with bark texture), and then attempts to reshape reason by its standards = conscious dumbing down.
Either logic still hasn’t evolved enough, and when it finally does, machines (even in their current form) will quickly become the smartest creatures in the world.
In any case, modern forms of logic, as deployed, are too enormous to be used in everyday life, and the question concerns only machine consciousness. The first option promises mankind no advantages; and the second would even belittle us before our own creatures. And even with all the cumbersomeness of the modern logical apparatus, if we arm a machine with it — it (at least today) is still stupider than any human who has never held Aristotle or Frege in his hands at all. And then we either have to work with this logic, which is extremely inconvenient; or we have to work with logic in simpler, antique forms, which we are capable of using in our lives. Except that these «old logics» have invariably led, have led, and will continue to lead to empty verbiage, which in practice is still the case today.
Systematic thinking
What is offered instead? Against this easy path, which offers the hope of becoming a genius immediately after mastering a dozen basic laws and a couple of guidebooks (which should already look unreliable), is the demand for systematic thinking. For the mind, as for a parrot’s beak, it is not so important what to hone it against. To become intelligent, to think correctly, can be done in different ways. But all of them, one way or another, will require broad erudition and further systematization of the accumulated facts. The more information from different spheres of life we accumulate, the more often this information contradicts each other. The more we accumulate, the more precisely we understand which contradictions are the most absurd. This «tangle of information» to some extent «calibrates» itself. So Heraclitus was not quite right when he said that knowledge does not teach intelligence. To a certain extent, it does, although, of course, there are differences depending on the basic vector that any given philosopher arms himself with in advance, i.e. depending on his «school,» on the path chosen for further systemic formation.
«Intelligence» has always consisted in man’s being able to put together a system of views out of a «mess» of facts. As the practice of different regions of the world over thousands of years has shown, there are fewer than adozen such «systems». People invent them everywhere, just as people everywhere invent stabbing weapons and a roof over their heads. We are not surprised by the universal development of material culture, knowing that all people have the same needs and the same number of limbs. Why should we be surprised that possessors of the same tool (the brain) create the same products («systems of thought»)? A person with Heraclitus’ approach would be able to call a bearer of almost any of these thought systems «smart» (let us forget that the historical Heraclitus considered almost everyone in the world dumb). And then there is the question of the legitimacy of choosing exactly «that, and not another» system. And the main criterion of their suitability is their consistency under the pressure of more and more new facts from more and more diverse spheres of life.
Incidentally, amateur logicians themselves are also one of the «basic schools,» and they can also create their own systematic philosophy. But this does not mean that they will necessarily be less contradictory; the essence of systematic thinking is precisely that within their system — there will be fewer and fewer contradictions, regardless of the accepted basic postulates. At least this is the case in the simple, initial stages of the history of thinking; for example, in the same ancient Greece. But over time, under the pressure of new facts, all naturally educated «schools» are forced to readjust, responding to new questions. This is where all the weaknesses of each line of thought are revealed.
On Philosophy and Science
From the above, it becomes obvious that these «external» facts, which are the touchstone for philosophical systems, are themselves separate from philosophy. And then the question arises — what is philosophy itself, and what is separated from it? We share the practice developed in the course of history of distinguishing the natural sciences from philosophy (though not entirely). Positivists and Marxists usually conclude from this that only logic or dialectical logic remains in philosophy. Psychology, which is also the offspring of «mind»-has also supposedly found its own «science» (and science, as we know, is not philosophy, yep). Why, then, logic cannot become a science and thereby kill the very notion of philosophy in general is another question. Only in fact, this is a false dilemma, and the title «science» does not solve anything. At one time, communism was also called scientific, and this label can be applied to anything.
So, philosophy works with everything that does not have a strict factual explanation, as well as with the interpretation of the facts obtained. What we call science works with the facts themselves, with their extraction by means of the experimental method. Pure «theorists» within the individual sciences are, in principle, philosophers themselves, but of an extremely limited type (immersed exclusively in their scientific sphere). They are not aware of their kinship with the archetypal traditions of thought, and so they do not fully fit into the chain of professional «philosophers. They do not seek a way out of the deadlock for thought in general(and this deadlock is already in the very fact of the pluralism of systems, while the truth must be unified), but only seek a way out of the deadlocks of their individual science.
In order to get out of the crisis of the history of thought, we need to overcome pluralism, and for this purpose we need to realize it, see all schools, understand their strengths and weaknesses, take a clear position, and test it with criticism. Modern philosophical traditions either take pluralism itself as a given and do not seek any way out; or they do not recognize it at all, and call philosophy — logic and philology (the same concrete sciences as physics). At the present stage, one might even say that philosophy is in such a deep crisis that it hardly exists at all.
That philosophy is not only about reason, and that it affects the way of life, and thus the way of life itself affects reason and the way of thinking, is not the place to say here. But in brief, the basis of philosophy is ethics, the criteria of evaluation for preference and avoidance, the ways of being in society. Human character is a complex concept, and character can be changed. Determining a relatively more correct way of reasoning thus coincides with determining a relatively more correct assessment of one’s place in society and choosing the right strategy for everyday behavior. But we are talking about reasoning here, not about ethics in general, so let’s move on.
So, the most «bad» of the basic postulates create systems (of both reason and ethics) of such poor quality that they simply die under the weight of artificial crutches that have time after time saved the dead system from unsolvable contradictions. And that system is considered preferable, which at all times, in all eras, shows the best consistency with «external» phenomena. The task of correct thinking is to choose the «first among equals» system of thought, and working with it further — to strive to the status of the Universal Man to the best of one’s ability.
Homo Universalis
The question naturally arises here. What else is a «Universal Man» in an era of overabundance of information and narrow specialization in the scientific field? And with it another question — why would an epicurean with a modest goal of a happy life need all this?
The answer to this is basically one — alienation(a Marxist concept). Under conditions in which everything created by man is alienated from man, including both individual objects and concepts of thought; under conditions in which the individual man understands almost nothing of what is created by «man in general,» and when this ignorance puts the real individual man in a subordinate position relative to his own creations — no freedom, no peace of mind, no escape from fear is possible. And the main way to overcome alienation is the knowledge of the entire experience of humanity and the abolition of the strict division of labor. These tasks are partly utopian, but we shall see why only partly.
There is no need to know on which «cultural layer» of the earth Troy was found specifically from the Mycenaean era, and on which layer Troy from Roman times was found. It is enough to know that Troy existed, was described by Homer, and after that rebuilt and continued to exist. There is no need to know all the haplogroups in order to understand how paleogenetics works and why it is needed. Simply put, it is enough to have a broad erudition, even without detailed knowledge of all the minutiae, to be free of all insecurities and to earn the status of Homo Universalis. A superficial knowledge of all the sciences (it is quite achievable, to reduce each science to 2,000 page folios, and later for new generations to master it all in some 10 years) will benefit everyone. It will save all of us from professional cretinism. After all, no one demands that the modern Da Vinci is necessarily the best specialist in every field and its specialties. But to know everything in general terms is quite possible. Every person on earth (with the exception of the disabled) can know the basic principles of the bus in which you are riding, without being particularly burdened. And certainly people of science are capable of it.
And this is what Epicurus writes about in his letter to Herodotus.
Who cannot, Herodotus, carefully study all that we have written about nature and delve into our more lengthy writings, for them I have already compiled an overview of the whole subject, sufficient to keep in mind at least the most important things. I wanted it to help you on important occasions whenever you have to take up the study of nature. And those who have already succeeded in examining the whole should remember the main features of the appearance of the whole subject: the general movement of thought is often necessary to us, but the details are not so often. To these general features we have to refer constantly remembering as much as it is necessary both for the general movement of thought on the object, and for all possible accuracy of details, that is well having learnt and having remembered the most basic features. In fact, the main sign of perfect and complete knowledge is the ability to quickly use the throws of thought, [and this happens when everything] is reduced to simple foundations and words. For whoever cannot, in brief words, cover all that is studied in parts, cannot know the thickness of all that is covered. And so, since such a path is useful to all who have mastered the study of nature, I, who have devoted my constant efforts to the study of nature and achieved the world of life primarily through it, have also compiled for you the following overview, which contains the basics of all the teachings.
So the claims of the Epicureans are simple.
Knowledge, reasonableness, is necessary for «ataraxia» (peace of mind), or, similarly, to overcome alienation. True knowledge is achieved by striving for universality, and in the process of accumulating knowledge, erroneous concepts will themselves be excluded from the «system. The system is based on the theory that, other things being equal, always produces the least failures; and the original set of these theories is given to us by the history of the development of human thought itself. All of these theories arise «naturally,» but only one of them will be closest to the truth. To identify erroneous concepts, «logic» is not necessary(and it is already enough to discard it). In fact, it is either useless to people, or harmful and stultifying. But here it is important to note that when we say that logic is useless, we mean that it is useless only for the use of one’s mind. Logic is more than useful in programming and engineering; it is a tool, just as any other descriptive system of signs (mathematics, languages). All of these are useful, but they are not absolute and all-encompassing. According to the principle of universality itself, all this must be studied (at least in general terms), but one should not expect any panacea for all problems and the easiest way out. The road to correct thinking cannot be too easy, and even if logic can find its complete form, if it can be reduced to a textbook of 200 pages, even such a miracle will not make anyone smart until this «somebody» has processed the same huge body of information that we are talking about.
A private conversation with the average logician is always a conversation about words. A conversation with a person who does not understand analogies, does not understand a sentence if a mistake is made somewhere or a word is mixed up. Being a pedant, he cannot grasp the logic(here it is, the obvious (!) ambiguity of the word «logic», which would already be tripped over) of his opponent’s presentation of thought. No sane person would call such a biological machine a rational being. Much more reasonable is someone who can understand that «a snowy cold box» most likely implies a freezer or refrigerator, and can quickly obtain clarification with leading questions. But intellectuals from the world of logic are not — they will simply declare that they do not understand what is being said, and will not even try to understand. It is not enough for them to say «most likely. They want absolute accuracy. So such people have only to read David Hume and abandon cognition altogether, playing with numbers for the sake of the game itself, because at least there they will get their coveted accuracy.
In the course of our ongoing polemic with the «Stoicism and Stoics» group, a crucial question was raised about the difference between philosophical systems in their very essence. After all, from the outside it may seem that we are talking about practically the same thing, but described in different words. Russian philological scientists of the 19th century were also prone to this, and we have already given an example of them in publications of our community, and this is especially perceptible in the article of V.I. Modestov. Why does this happen, and why do people try not to notice the differences? And what are these differences, we will talk about this in the article attached below.
P.S. — Probably not the final version of it, but you have to start somewhere.
I. What is ethical philosophy
Let’s start with the most important one: with which of the sophist tricks did stoicism manage to earn most of its popularity and appeal? This trick is a kind of substitution of concepts. Stoicism’s most popular «trick» has been its system of views on ascetic «practices» of self-control. In Stoicism our attention is actually drawn to the demonstrative asceticism itself, the cultivation of qualities of moderation, restraint, equanimity, equanimity, and, shall we say, spiritual strength. The main «trick» here is that all these qualities, long before Stoicism, were inherent in every (!) philosophical system in general; and even in the non-philosophical views of various traditional societies. The image of the courageous man who overcomes difficulties and achieves his goal, trying to be «the best» in everything, and especially to fulfill his role as an exemplary father of the family — it is older than philosophy itself and is common in absolutely all continents of the planet. Even the central term in this system of views, namely «arete» (or as it is more commonly translated, virtue, valor), which is regularly used by the Stoics was used in roughly the same connotations even before the battle of Thermopylae. Take at least the ancient poet Hesiod, when he says:
«Vice is attained easily, but mastering arete is difficult.»
It is no secret that Plato and Aristotle, as well as virtually all philosophers before them, including, «even,» most of the sophists, were against vice and for virtue. Therefore, we will not argue in detail these almost self-evident things, as well as the fact that every man strives «for all that is good and against all that is bad» — we will not here. The interested reader can independently search for information on Plato’s ethical views; they are publicly available.
It is better to say that «practices of self-education» are a central part of any philosophical system, precisely because philosophy has always transcended a kind of «commonplace». Philosophers themselves have dealt with questions that seldom occupy ordinary cultivators; and in order to deal with these questions (often of no practical-material utility), one must at least indoctrinate oneself in the importance of these abstract questions. And to do this, it is always necessary to re-evaluate values, to separate all the secondary from the self-evidently important virtues; and, most difficult of all, to relate one’s views on the «important and unimportant» to those of one’s own community. The philosopher has to overcome the resistance of the «crowd,» which will remind you time and again that you are doing things that are not so important, and that your views are bizarre and harmful, corrupting society (remember, for example, the execution of Socrates). Moreover, if a philosopher has gone down the road of studying the wisdoms of various peoples of the world, that in itself already implies the study of some materials, and even a lot of materials. And this in turn implies assiduity, patience, training of memory and, most likely, even systematization of this knowledge in the head. In order not to be «like the crowd» and to defend your right to a unique system of values, you need to show your superiority in practice, to earn the «crowd» a certain share of respect, to earn the right to your «eccentricity».
For example, it is possible and even necessary to epathetize the public. What philosophers do for this is to prepare themselves for hardship; for the fact that sooner or later fate will take away your relatives, deprive you of your home after the war, etc. And here, when all fellow citizens show weak character under equal conditions, the «wise man» himself demonstratively maintains his composure. Or, like Democritus in his time, you can prove to the community that you really know a great deal, and that you are even capable of applying your erudition in practice; as, for example, the sages of various regions could be useful in farming, making calendars based on astronomical observations, and thus making the choice of appropriate times of crop rotation easier.
It is possible to provoke the public in various ways, even very provocatively, as the Cynics and Christian martyrs did. The main thing is to assert one’s right to a position. But here the question arises, why actually do it, what kind of childishness is it? Among other things, this is necessary in order to better convey the very essence of one’s own position! Without philosophical «practice,» it is harder to master «theory» itself. If you want to become a sage, be kind and apply (at least at first) this «childish» behavior and attitude to the world around you. It should help, and indeed does help, to grasp wisdom more effectively already afterwards. Practices differ from philosopher to philosopher, as do the theories themselves. But they are always the same, their main essence is — you have to learn to control yourself, so you don’t get carried away by the «flow» of public morality. If there is no control, and if the system of views does not differ from the views of the «crowd,» then what is the difference between a «sage» and a «philistine» at all? In that case, you just live your life as you see fit, go with the flow, and are nothing special.
Now we have to go back to the beginning, and remind us that the «philistine» theme has long since included conventional «manliness,» all those balanced and «wise» straw man decisions, playing one’s social role and overcoming hardships. There’s even room for emotional control, if only at the level of «boys don’t cry». What, then, is the difference between the practices of philosophers? Their main difference is that these practices are more consistently linked, and that the «wise man» demands of himself a more stable fulfillment of accepted norms. The common man often falters, which is unacceptable to the sage. So it is primarily a question of the degree of control, which the sage consciously brings to greater perfection. That is, the basic «sage» may even be considered an «ideal philistine,» in the sense that he takes the generally accepted virtues to their logical limit. In this respect, the benchmark is precisely the philosophy of the Stoics; therefore, it is closer to the worldview of the rural peasant; although the peasant himself is certainly not a Stoic.
So, the philosopher and the philistine, and thus almost anyone in the world, fight for all that is good and against all that is bad, and have similar ideas about virtues and vices. The main difference is only in the degree of their consistency, in how you yourself follow these universally recognized standards of quality. And besides, as mentioned above, the philosopher differs from the philosopher in that he makes a system out of it, proving rigorously why one vice is more acceptable than another, or why one virtue is more important than another, and why a third virtue should not be considered a virtue at all anymore. And furthermore, the philosopher can apply the virtues to atypical situations, such as writing books and studying materials, for which he needs the virtues even more often than in other cases. In short, since the philosopher engages in more activities (the same intellectual work), he also has more space for the application of virtues. And since this is the case, he often has to create a large gradation of virtues, sometimes even applying one word to different situations, and with different contents (for example, one can be a virtuous poet, i.e. a good poet, or a poet who praises the «good»).
With this we have solved, but what is the «trick» of the Stoics? All philosophers, before and after the Stoics, including even the Epicureans, are engaged in self-control, and they use certain practices-meditations for this purpose. By their very nature, all these practices are similar, and the goal is the same states. This is such a general philosophical basis that most often it is left out of the equation, without constituting the specificity of the philosophical teaching, which is usually something more important. No one brags about having received a basic school education, do they? Self-control for the philosopher is that basic education. But the Stoics began to continually emphasize this basis, and due in part to the poor preservation of Hellenistic philosophy in general (which was more grounded and focused on these very practices) — the Stoic texts on meditation are the best preserved. Now the Stoics, taking advantage of this, claim that these general practices are Stoicism per se. So if you are an enemy of the Stoics, you are an enemy of self-control. And in general, if you accept this account of us, and beyond that accept this «trick» of the Stoics, it appears that there is no philosophy at all outside of Stoicism; or the pre-Stoic philosophers who practiced meditation were «Stoics before Stoics.»
Even the fact that Epicurus himself was a very virtuous man is drawn as a contradiction in the Stoics’ account! Supposedly, Epicurus himself was almost a Stoic, but out of his stupidity he left us a system that leads to evil, while he himself did not even use this system, and he disproved it not in words, but in deeds. Although if we take into account the general philosophical character of the basic practices, there is no particular mystery about Epicurus’ virtue at all, and it would be worth considering (which the Stoics cannot do) how this relates to the system of Epicureanism, because it is clearly not a coincidental «contradiction».
And here we come to an explanation of the phenomenon which brings all philosophical schools together in the public’s perception, including the Stoics and Epicureans, and makes us ask: «What’s the difference?!» Taking as a given that «being a Stoic» = maintaining equanimity and self-control; we find quotes from Epicurus on the same subject, and realize that these are very similar things. If being a Stoic is using basic philosophical practices, then all philosophers are by definition Stoics, the differences disappear. It also adds fuel to the fire that the poorly preserved Epicurus got most of his «stoic» quotations from a source («Vatican saying») that was compiled by an unknown ancient Stoic. These were quotations collected at the end of a collection of works by Stoic authors, and were clearly chosen to strengthen Stoic philosophy. Not surprisingly, with their discovery, the number of people willing to equate the two historically antagonistic systems also increased.
As we have already discussed, general philosophical practices are indeed common to all philosophers; for this reason they are common. The Stoics usurped them, making them synonymous with their own philosophy. If, however, we take these practices back out of the brackets in order to better see precisely the specificity of each of the teachings, differences will obviously have to appear here. This is what we should turn to now.
II. Key Differences
In addition to the practices themselves, the Stoics and Epicureans have a certain similarity even in terminology, which is due to the context in which these philosophical schools emerged. After all, they emerged at the same time, and used approximately the same philosophical jargon, which was formed before their own emergence. At the same time, initially they even had a common enemy, the school of skeptics, from whom some of the definitions were borrowed.
Ataraxia and apathy
Behind these general definitions are the main differences; the first thing they have in common is the main goal — eudemonia, which can be translated into Russian as «well-being,» «prosperity,» «good life,» or «happiness. A goal that has really stood since at least the time of Democritus (where the term occurs); although it is clear from the etymology that this goal has existed since Paleolithic times. This notion is directly related to some permanent state of the sage, which in our schools has somewhat different names. For the Epicureans it is the state of «ataraxia,» and for the Stoics it is the state of «apathy» (though they too sometimes use the term «ataraxia,» which was first used generally by the skeptics).
Ataraxia (ἀταραξία) of the Epicureans, which from the ancient Greek translates as equanimity or serenity, implies the absence of mental and physical pain. It is a life without fears, and especially without fears of the supernatural. This is why the naturalistic physics of atomism was so important to the Epicureans, ruling out the possibility of divine Providence, life after death, ghosts and curses, and all kinds of non-contact magic and conspiracies. No witch doctor can curse you, no god can decide your fate at his whim. No mistake in choosing a religion will lead to eternal afterlife, etc. One gains responsibility for one’s life and peace of mind from knowing that only a real, physical, or social force can affect that life. No fears, there is the self-control of the philosopher = no heartache = ataraxia achieved. In the presence of fears, even self-control does not solve the main problem, for although mental pain will be suppressed, it will still be felt. Otherwise, the principle is really simple. Every time you should roughly calculate (the so-called «hedonistic calculation») whether a pleasure you’ve had will be followed by mental or physical pain. This is already a reason to think about giving up such pleasure. But more importantly, will the pain outweigh the pleasure? If so, then giving up such pleasure is beyond question. This is how the state of ataraxia is maintained by the Epicureans. Avoid all suffering, and, if possible, find some moderate pleasure that is not fraught with serious consequences.
Stoic apathy, opposed on the opposite side, is translated from ancient Greek as «impassivity,» «equanimity,» and «indifference. The term came into Stoicism from the philosophy of the Cynics and the Megarics, where it was a much stricter requirement almost to «be as stone. But while the Megarics and probably the Skeptics interpreted apathy as almost complete «insensibility,» the Stoics already interpreted it as a positive ability to overcome affects (above all the four main «passions»: sadness, fear, lust and pleasure) arising from a mistaken assessment of «external» things. It is broadly similar to ataraxia, but with a number of differences. Both of these states are attained by ascesis, exercises in philosophy, and exercises in virtue; both allow one to «look from the outside» at various external phenomena, and at the internal phenomena of the soul.
Nevertheless, the interpretation «in the spirit of the Megarics» has always left its mark on Stoicism as well, despite the constant desire of the Stoics to emphasize their humanity. Seneca, for example, thought it correct to translate the Greek word «apathy» as «a soul inaccessible to all suffering,» and in this respect it would seem almost synonymous with ataraxia; and even more so, for Epicureanism allows suffering for future pleasures (for example, suffering from studying the sciences so as not to work as a loader afterwards). The difference is that the Epicurean considers suffering, if it is already here and now, objective and inevitable. You can work with it, you can suppress it, you can overcome it, but it already exists as a fact, and you cannot argue with it. This is why suffering should be avoided. Stoics, on the other hand, take their apathy to the point where they proudly proclaim the absence of suffering in any case; that is, there is no point in avoiding working as a loader, studying science and going to university — a true Stoic will not suffer behind a chair or at a construction site. The absence of suffering is not a motivation; a stoic supposedly never feels anything of the kind anyway. This is the difference; «apathy» is more ultimative, taking the idea of self-control to an extreme and grotesque level. And although the Stoics insist that it is more of an «even emotional background,» which is only necessary to avoid going to extremes in affect—that very even background, if you look closely, is the demand for insensibility, in the crudest sense of the word. Stoicism leaves room for two interpretations, and constantly mixes them together.
But in a moderate interpretation, the stoic sage certainly experiences emotions, he is a man after all; but he does not experience too strong emotions (i.e., affects).
If we talk about the already announced goal of «ataraxia,» that is, the absence of fear of the supernatural in the sense that we abolish the supernatural altogether; then Stoic «apathy» does not lead to such freedom for man at all. The Stoics fully recognize the Gods/God as the real creative force in the world; and all the problems and uncertainties associated with such views (something the Epicureans feared) — the Stoics neutralize by postulating their own nothingness. If God willed it, who am I to go against it? If the general commanded it, who am I to arise? Especially since in the strictly deterministic world of the Stoics, the very order of the general was predetermined by divine will, which means that any «earthly» problem was sent by God to trial, and to oppose fate is to blaspheme; one can read about this especially abundantly in Marcus Aurelius. It is «apathy» in the worst sense of the word that should have helped the Stoic to treat everything with indifference. Whole nations dying? They always have. Did your child die in the war? Everyone dies sooner or later, it’s inevitable, there’s nothing to be sad about. Have you become someone’s slave? Well, we’re all slaves to fate. What’s all our wailing worth against the backdrop of an infinite universe? We are nothing, nothing, and against the backdrop of eternal time, our life is even shorter than a moment. Life, in fact, loses all value in itself. And all this is not an epicurean fiction, but an almost literal retelling of stoic maxims. For example, the famous legend of the stoic Epictetus, who was a slave:
One day, when the master in anger began to beat the slave, Epictetus nonchalantly said: «You will break my leg,» and when he did break his leg, he added coolly: «Didn’t I say you would?» Epaphroditus was surprised at the patience of his slave and ashamed of his cruelty, and Epictetus was left lame for life. (Orig., Contra Celsum, VII, 53).
One can debate at length whether it is good to be moderate and belittle oneself by being actually better than one says one is. Whether this is also a virtue, etc., but the fact is that this approach of constant self-deprecation leads to a transition from the «good» version of stoic apathy (which exists in fact only for excuses), to the worst and most utterly insensitive of its variations. One is brought up in the framework of the stoic ethic as a nobody, and this cannot but affect him.
Virtue and Pleasure
But ataraxia and apathy are only the means to the chief key to the good life. For the Epicureans it is pleasure and prudence, but for the Stoics it is virtue («arete»).
As Epicurus says in a letter to Menekei, «Prudence is dearer even than philosophy. From prudence came all the other virtues». In fact, it puts pleasure in relation to virtue itself, and vice versa. But it would be better to talk about what is more in the ear, and what in fact is the «final goal,» i.e. the principle of pleasure. For the Epicureans, it has an essential systemic function; human sensations, as practice shows, except in rare pathologies, are objective, at least as far as the most basic things are concerned. For example, almost anyone can be pricked with a needle and feel the pain of the prick. The epicurean theory of cognition itself is based on sensualism(there is nothing in the mind that is not given by the senses); where by the senses is meant the study of the world by sight, hearing, taste, smell and tactility.
The funny thing is that sensualism is also a Stoic theory of knowledge, and Stoic sensationalism itself has come down to us in a much more systematic account. But while for Epicureanism it is the foundation of all philosophy, for the Stoics sensationalism played the role of a pure tool for arguing with the skeptics when it became important for the Stoics to prove the reality of the existing world.
So, it turns out that without sensations one cannot know the world, and without them the mind cannot arise. This means that at birth a human being deals only with sensations. Initially an infant cannot yet be considered reasonable, it does not possess meaningful ideas. And what do all the «five senses» bring us, again at the most fundamental level? They bring sensations of pleasure and suffering. Heat can be pleasant, or it can leave burns, etc. Therefore, from birth it is the sensual feelings that are the most fundamental things for humans; in particular, their pleasantness or unpleasantness, which make us treat different things with caution, or, on the contrary, seek them out for ourselves. This is also what sentient animals do; but the fact remains that the principle of pleasure is a fundamental principle of human nature. It makes no sense to come to an infant and read to him Letters to Lucilius in order to make him a perfect sage. Even further on, when reason already gradually emerges (as a derivative of sensual cognition), does sensual experience lose its importance among adults? Isn’t the principle for prioritizing among them still the same pleasure and suffering? Suppose not for the wise man; but is the «philistine» deprived of reason, and not a human being? This is why Epicurus says that: «pleasure is both the beginning and the end of blissful life; we have known it as the first good akin to us, with it we begin all preference and avoidance, and to it we return, using undergoing as the measure of all good.»
Ultimately epicureanism states that virtues of the highest order, whether risking one’s life or sacrificing for eternal glory, or martyrdom to spread one’s religion, or exploits in war to defend one’s homeland, are also done for pleasure, just that these pleasures are different, called different words (such as self satisfaction, happiness, etc.), but the point remains the same. If a person didn’t think of his sacrifice as an admirable act, he wouldn’t have done it. People try to be ascetic only because they take pleasure in the fact that they can do things unavailable to others. They are content to conform to their ideals; and for the sake of that contentment they do things. In other words, as Epicurus says: «The beginning of all these things and the greatest of the goods is reason; it is more precious than even philosophy itself, and from it came all the other virtues. It teaches that one cannot live sweetly without living reasonably, well and righteously, and [one cannot live reasonably, well and righteously] without living sweetly: for all virtues are akin to the sweet life, and the sweet life is inseparable from them».
Epicureanism thus simply postulates the importance of pleasure as a statement of fact. That it is the ultimate goal means only that it is the most fundamental principle explaining all ethics; a comparison with atomistics is appropriate in this respect, where «atoms» are the smallest particles of matter, to which all the diversity of things are ultimately reduced. This does not mean that all things are equally preferable, that there is no difference between water from a spring and water from a puddle, since they are equally composed of atoms. Similarly, stating that pleasure is fundamental to living beings does not mean that the goal of an Epicurean’s life is to chase pleasure. All criticism of Epicureanism comes not only from a lack of understanding, but also from an unwillingness to understand; from a reverent fear mixed with disgust at the vicious term «pleasure».
This is all about pleasure. As for the other key to the blessed life, i.e., «virtue,» Epicureanism considers it secondary and derived from pleasure, just as knowledge is derived from sensual experience. But the Stoics do not consider it necessary to examine where the concept of «virtue» comes from; they do not answer to the end whether it is already innate in children (although they try to prove this) or is acquired through experience. They simply state the fact that «in my community this is the way it is, and therefore virtuous». In part they find «virtue» in the abstract analysis of morality. Having already acquired reason (unknown from where, but rather innate), the Stoic creates a strict division of all phenomena into «good» and «bad,» and demands that in all things one always act «well. Where does this moral assessment come from? According to the Stoic, from pure reason; but, in fact, from the customs of a particular community. Stoicism simply ignores the arguments of the Sophists and Epicureans that notions of morality vary from people to people; that the very categories of «good» and «evil» can change places depending on the particular situation, and that sometimes there really can be a lie for good. The Stoic will not divide the kinds of «pleasures,» for him all pleasures are pleasures in one way or another. And all bad words are in one way or another «bad. Hence, concludes the Stoic, pleasure is bad and reason is good. Nothing else interests him. The Stoic paints a caricatured black-and-white world for ease of perception.
And they are not even interested in the fact that if Fate has determined you to be an immoral «animal,» then obeying Fate and qualitatively following this role is already virtuous according to their own definition! After all, how else can stoicism justify the necessity of evil? Only by saying that from the point of view of God-Logos, evil does not exist, and that extremes are necessary for motion within the Whole-Logos, and motion is necessary for its life, just as blood circulation is necessary for preserving human life. If we disrupt the movement within the Logos, i.e. try to fix Destiny and create a utopia without bad people and without wars, the Logos will die, and with it all of us, the cells of its organism. In fact, of course, it will be possible to declare postfactum that the construction of utopia was also the Logos’ goal, otherwise it would not have materialized in a deterministic world. But the very reasoning of the Stoics to justify an evil that is already here and now sounds like this. There is no point in resenting evil because it is good for the Logos; and in resenting good for him, you are acting unkindly. So the classic Stoic argument is framed in such a way that it must recognize the necessity of the existence of a «virtuous corrupter,» which is necessary so that «virtuous sages» can arise in his background (incidentally, also a thought from Marcus Aurelius about the fundamental necessity of evil).
Here another problem is revealed. A stoic might say that one cannot consider an «animal» person virtuous because he had the inner freedom to become a better person. This is an important point for Stoicism, for if Destiny decides everything, then what is the coolness of the fact that you have become a stoic sage? Partly because of this natural vanity, and partly to spread their philosophy, the Stoics decided to grant free will to the mind, so that all your achievements on the path of virtue would not seem like nonsense. But in doing so, the Stoics completely destroy the entire logic of justifying evil in the world; they ruin the very basis for their «apathy,» which is supported precisely by the idea of the necessity of evil for the Logos, and the relativity of that evil. Why do the Stoics challenge the status quo granted them by the Logos from above? Why lead people out of their delusions and into the path of wisdom? Why do they care about it? Won’t the corrupters continue to exist from ages past? Why then write treatises against pleasure? Such contradictions in Stoicism number in the dozens.
But we have strayed too far from the subject. So how do the Stoics themselves see the situation, and why is it that «virtue» is the ultimate goal of life, and thus the thing to pursue? The most obvious one is because, by doing good deeds, we are happy (for our goal is «eudemonia,» as we remember from the beginning). Thus, Stoicism simply takes Epicurus’ position, and merges with him on this question without his noticing it. Where does virtue come from? It comes from the understanding that one must be «for all that is good, against all that is bad.» And what is good and bad, where did their understanding come from? As we’ve seen, it’s complicated there. But more simply, the Stoics simply give in to valiant images from their own culture, wherever they were born. The funny thing is that even a universal ethic of «goodness in general» can only be built on an epicurean basis, allowing for the principle of empathy, and representing the pain of others. It turns out that killing is fundamentally bad and is «evil» because all living beings fear pain and do not want to be killed. The golden rule of ethics — «Do not do to others what you would not want done to you» — is actually based on Epicurean ethics, and is built on individualism. The Stoics have a problem even here. For the Logos, everything is good, individual murders are good; the whole (society, the state) is more important than the parts (individuals), so one cannot rebel against state tyranny; but suddenly one can (!) if power is immoral, and tyranny is such by definition of types of power, and as a rule, historical tyrannies were anti-aristocratic regimes.
Determinism and Freedom
The problem and conflict between the two schools, which we have already partly discussed earlier, lies in the relationship to freedom and determinism. Stoicism tries in a specific way to defend free will (to become Stoic), while generally recognizing the world as strictly deterministic. This stems in part from the quite theological division of the essence of man, and indeed of the whole world, into the soul and the body. Although in strictly canonical Stoic dogma, as in Epicurean dogma, everything in the world is corporeal, including souls and Gods, the Stoics regularly incorporated the typical notion of the immaterial soul. And over time, especially during the so-called «Middle Stoic» era and among the Roman Stoics, the materialistic version of Stoicism weakened and weakened with each generation until Stoicism finally merged with the Neoplatonists. There was no other way out of the situation, for in the name of classical «materialism» as understood by the New Age, one would have had to sacrifice free will. And this would have led, but from a very different entrance, into the same building of individualist nihilism. For, immediately, we would have to state that since everything is determinedly deterministic, we should not consider criminals as criminals, and we should give man the freedom of his «natural» impulses, of his «natural» qualities. And there it is very close to hedonistic motives, which cannot be condemned a priori if they do no harm to society as a whole. This option was by no means allowed by the Stoics, so the contradiction could only be resolved by recognizing classical «dualism» and eliminating the Stoic version of materialism. It was necessary to drag into the theory a special soul, free from the mortal shell of the body.
But at the same time Stoicism itself would be eliminated (which happened in practice), since strict determinism was one of the school’s most «trademarks. With the recognition of dualism in the name of justification of free will, thanks to mystical notions about the properties of the soul, Stoicism dissolved into Platonic-Christian doctrines. But in Stoicism itself, the sequence of finding happiness through the notion of determinism looks something like this: (1) gaining reason, (2) recognizing patterns in the world and determinism, (3) finding one’s place in the world, virtue, (4) happiness.
Epicureanism, where the postulation of the free will of man, while simultaneously denying strict determinism, is a very different matter. And, most importantly, this free will was not based on «dualism,» this theory did not require any metaphysical entities at all (unless we count atoms themselves as such).
But it is better to give the floor to Epicurus at this point, for he says: «Who do you think is higher than a man […] who laughs at fate, which is called by someone the ruler of everything, [and instead claims that other things happen by inevitability,] other things by chance, and other things depend on us — for it is clear that inevitability is irresponsible, chance is wrong, and that which depends on us is not subject to anything else and is therefore subject to both censure and praise. Indeed, it is better to believe in fables about the gods than to submit to a fate invented by physicists; fables give hope to propitiate the gods by reverence, while fate contains inexorable inevitability. In the same way, chance is to him neither a god nor a crowd, because the actions of a god are not disorderly; nor an unreasonable cause, because he does not think that chance gives man the good and evil that determine his blissful life, but that chance only brings forth the beginnings of greater goods or evils. That is why the wise man thinks that it is better to be unhappy with reason than to be happy without reason: it is always better that a well conceived thing should not owe its success to chance».
In his exposition, «inevitability» is allowed, just as causality is allowed (the Stoics often claim it is not), but it is not fundamental. At the most basic level, Epicurus endowed his atoms with the property of deviating from a straight line, which does not at all invalidate causality, if only at the level of macroobjects. But not everything in the world is strictly inevitable, and this causality cannot be taken down to the very first principles, because at this level we find just randomness. But then we see that the sage of Epicurus must not rely on chance, which does not suit him just as well as determinism. Everything must rely on reason, which is what gives people true freedom of choice. And even «it is better to be miserable with reason than to be happy without reason,» he says. So Epicurus correlates free will with cause and effect, defending it without the assumption of supernatural entities. This is how he differs from the Christians, and from the Stoics. The scheme goes like this: (1) acquiring reason, (2) freedom (both from fears and freedom of choice), (3) right choice, virtue, (4) pleasure.
It looks extremely similar; it all begins with reason and ends with happiness. The only difference is the attitude to freedom, but even here we can say that the Stoics (like the Marxists, they are eerily similar in everything) postulate «freedom as a deliberate necessity. The Epicureans, on the other hand, postulate simply «conscious freedom. Both schools believe that reason liberates them, but only one of them does not limit action to a contrived scheme. He who believes that he knows his Destiny in advance restricts himself a priori to following the «right role,» and in this case there is little freedom to speak of.
The difference in approach
All this mess in Stoic philosophy is created only because the Stoics took a complex concept («virtue«) as the foundation of their doctrine; they took a product of the long development of human culture, which itself often changes in the course of the development of societies. In their system of views, «virtue» and «reason» are magic words and wands. But the concrete application of virtue depends on a mass of factors. As for the Epicureans, their ethics are built on a more fundamental basis, given to us by nature, and very simple and self-evident in its essence («pleasure«); which does not even need to be conceptualized, and which is directly felt by almost everyone. Is there room in the Epicurean system for all the stoic virtues? Yes, there is, but the Epicurean simply does not delude himself about the nature of these virtues. Here is the key difference! Yes, a «cynical» attitude toward what society considers to be good deeds does make it less likely that those deeds are actually done, makes it less likely that one wants to do all those things gratuitously, etc. But for Epicureanism, the most important thing has always been that very «prudence«; or, to put it another way, «sanity,» which in the words of Epicurus is «dearer even than philosophy.» It can also be called «free-thinking,» as the Early Modern Epicureans did, implying the same struggle with various «chimeras,» along the lines of the afterlife and divine providence, coupled with a belief in fortune-tellers, which the Stoics of all generations loved so much. The Epicureans always preferred freedom in all its manifestations, and always put it in direct connection with the acquisition of reason. So even Stoics’ favorite «reason» also finds a place in Epicureanism, and what a place! «It is better to be miserable with reason than to be happy without reason» — this is Epicurus’ view.
Someone deceives himself (a Stoic) and creates «chimeras» out of those words that are considered «good,» he tries in awe to banish from decent society all «bad» words. And while composing a system of views out of «all that is good» and against «all that is bad,» in reality he creates not the ideal system he is looking for, but a poorly working eclecticism, the whole essence of which consists in the words: «try, endure and achieve the best you can». It is no coincidence that Stoicism in the twenty-first century has entered into a strong alliance with literature for motivation and success in business. In our age, and in our society, the image of the rich man in a suit with «principles and strong character» is considered the best. Therefore, in our age, and in our society — stoicism creates literature to deify this image. Well, someone (the Epicurean) does not base his views on chimeras, does not treat words with such strict seriousness, is not afraid of «bad» words, and does not fall on his knees before «good» words, but treats it with genuine sublimity, as if from the outside. And in analyzing different societies in different eras, such a person will not be able to praise the ideals of his society as the best for all time.
Being Epicurean implies a certain measure of intelligence; whereas being Stoic implies only praising the good word «reason» (which the Stoic himself barely possesses) by drawing a black and white world time and again. In such a person’s mind, if the Epicurean does not praise reason, but extols sensationalism as a basic principle, then the Epicurean has no reason. After all, it is important to keep saying the magic spell so that it begins to work on you. In other words, Stoicism, like all other kinds of moralizing saintly philosophy, is a specific «kargo-cult».
III. Secondary differences
After dealing with the similarities in all the philosophical schools and the basic differences in their ethics, which concern mainly the critical (Epicureans) and uncritical (Stoics) attitude to the place in which you live; to the belief in everything supernatural that the Stoics have and the Epicureans do not, and to the critical (Epicureans) and uncritical (Stoics) attitude to mere words (although, ridiculous even, the Stoics were famous philologists, and invented from scratch many new philosophical terms) — let us move on to the secondary but more striking differences in ethical systems.
Since the Stoic worldview, by its very nature, is extremely conservative and quite primitive, it is clear from this that the external behavior of a Stoic will in fact be very vulnerable to «sarcastic» words; very deliberately noble in behavior (well, in ideas about the «nobility» of the aristocracy of past centuries); and emphatically reserved and contemptuous toward «bad» interlocutors, or business-like neutral toward «good». At least, philosophy itself will incline him to this, while human nature (which no Stoic can defeat) will still make Stoics more human than they themselves would like. This is the first, still «intelligent» version of the Stoic. The second version, rarer but a little closer to the original doctrine, is the rough warrior who is ready to smash the enemies of the state and hone his character on the battlefield, or as a prominent politician. Such a man will extol the lives of his ancestors, who lived under harsher conditions, tell stories of Spartan boys, praise hard work on the land, which ennobles, etc., he will teach respect for elders, and demand of the younger generation good physical fitness and the other outward attributes of a «real man«. Previously, this second version was more characteristic of Stoicism, but thanks to the epochal changes of the 20th and 21st centuries, we now live in a time of peace, with a great number of technical innovations greatly changing all walks of life; so we can see only the «intellectual» version of Stoics (ordinary men, though they look like Stoics, are not aware of themselves as such, and therefore are not systematic philosophers, and thus are not Stoic philosophers).
On the contrary, the Epicurean worldview borders on nihilism in its denial of the foundations of society. Although this is not entirely true, and it is unlikely that the Epicurean can be considered even slightly dangerous to the state, but, as in the case of sophists or skeptics, a certain correlation is nevertheless to be found here. People with this attitude are usually more protestant, they do not like pretentious intellectualism, and so can afford vulgar speech (see the whining about this from Cicero, on Titus Albutius). They are disgusted by the decrepit values and coarseness of the «real man,» so Epicureanism can be called even more «pampered» and «squishy,» at least such very people are more likely to embrace Epicurean philosophy. Epicureanism is therefore almost by definition «intelligent«; only in this milieu can it be taken seriously. The «plebeian version» of Epicureanism is hedonistic; one might even say that intelligent Epicureans are always «nihilists in theory,» but in practice are ordinary neutral philosophers; whereas hedonistic Epicureans are more often «nihilists in practice,» and the philosophical part interests them only as a screen, a beautiful justification for their «practice,» and in everything else that does not concern justification of their hedonism, their theoretical outlook may be quite ordinary.
But usually a hedonist does not look for philosophical grounds for his behavior, just as a «real man» from the village, who went through the army and became the head of a family, will intuitively resemble a Stoic, but will not look for any grounds in Stoicism, because for this you still need to be interested in reading ancient literature, which is not particularly common in a non-intellectual environment. There are rare exceptions to this; for example, the situation was quite different during the mass popularity of philosophy, as it was in ancient Rome. At that time, «bourgeois stoics» and «bourgeois Epicureans» could appear, with their inherent radical militarism and hedonism. Even now, they appear, but already within the narrower limits of «popular philosophy». But if we limit ourselves to the «elitist versions» in both currents, the Epicurean and the Stoic would both be philosophers from an intellectual milieu. Only the Epicurean is a learned merrymaker and trickster; whereas the Stoic is a learned snob-elitist, who, purely for the sake of form, will make himself look good by pretending to deny his exclusivity. He will even humiliate himself before True Wisdom, who is supposedly beyond his reach, in order to show his meekness, and thereby try, on the contrary, to exalt himself as much as possible.
In addition to all this, to better understand the differences, we can also keep in mind the generational conflict of fathers and children, where obviously the «fathers» are the Stoics, who have realized with age that their grandfathers did everything right; and the Epicureans are «children» who disagree with their fathers. While this analogy is unprofitable, it is obviously only an analogy, and Stoics and Epicureans are people of the same age category; but an Epicurean will never mutter in the kitchen that «it used to be better,» and therein lies their considerable difference.
Whereas the Stoics will try their best to squeeze out all the masculinity of which they are capable; the Epicureans, on the other hand, let their feelings and everything «human» run wild, accepting it all as their nature. In this perspective, we can identify another unprofitable, and already gendered, analogy in which the Stoics are «manly,» while the Epicureans are «feminine».
This is why the very conflict of schools is inexhaustible; this is why Hellenistic philosophy is eternally relevant. These philosophical schools first set forth «eternal» human types at the level of a systematized philosophical ethic. So as long as types exist, they will find «their» philosophy in one of these ancient archetypes. And as long as these worldview archetypes exist, there will be a conflict of philosophical schools of Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, Cynics, and Platonists. Even if Stoicism gets rid of its internal contradictions, it will still struggle with Epicurus, because no «real man» would want the society in which he lives to suddenly become «feminine. Without sugarcoating it, this is the most fundamental difference between the schools.
But like everything in the world, aesthetics and ethics have an objective («true») gradation of quality. We still do not have an objective theory of aesthetics, we still do not have an objective theory of ethics. But in a perfect world, only one of all types will get the full victory (of course, layering on the best of the losers, but we are interested in the basis). Why do Epicureans consciously choose philosophy for nihilists, hiljals, children, and women? In the black-and-white world of philistines (and elite philistines, i.e., Stoics) it seems kind of crazy to choose the «bad» from the two extremes in every case, and even consciously. But it is the study of the history of philosophy, and of history in general, that, other things being equal, at all times the philosophy of Epicurus created the conditions for the progress of human society by advocating freedom of thought. And this cannot fail to appeal to all truly intelligent philosophers. Of all the ancients, only Epicurus looks like a man of the present day who happened to be in the past. Only he, and his followers, today can genuinely empathize if your primary value is not «courage» but indeed «reason. This is why Epicureans have always been, are and will always emerge, and they will always rebel against «all that is good» as it is understood by primitive lovers of brute force or corporate conformist bureaucrats.
Results
In this essay we have shown that Stoicism has brazenly usurped what does not belong exclusively to it; namely, general philosophical practices for self-control and «self-education». We have shown that Stoicism is a refinement of commonplace conceptions of «virtue» to its ultimate perfection. That Stoicism as a whole does not at all understand the principles of Epicureanism, and is even quite within Epicurean discourse itself, both in theory and in practice. Discovered that Epicureanism itself is no stranger to the «virtues,» it simply does not engage in further additional idealization of them; Epicurus cynically declares that the source of virtues and vices is one and the same. It is genuine reasonableness that enables us to become virtuous, whereas in the Stoics’ reverential reverence and fear of terminology and higher powers, reasonableness is not to be found. It is genuine freedom that allows us to make the right choice, not the complex system of «awareness» determinism, which leaves the chance to realize our depraved fate and should, in a good way, make Stoicism an openly elitist philosophy for a select few.
We should not think that only stupidity and the inability to read are the main distinctive qualities of Stoicism. As we have already pointed out, the most fundamental reason for the conflict of schools is the very human «types» who find for themselves the corresponding ideology and philosophy. In this respect, if we take the two schools and draw character dualities here, Stoicism wins on the outside, for Stoics did nothing but cultivate generally accepted-good qualities. The Stoics turn out to be honest citizens, strong and courageous fathers of the family; while the Epicureans turn out to be nihilistic tricksters, bodily very weak, and still «children» and «women» by nature. But the next time you complain about the negative aspects of patriarchal society, the next time you resent street «cattle,» the next time you regret another war that has broken out; talk to the Stoics about real male values! And you will immediately become convinced that stoicism, for all its external «beauty,» often leads to incredibly harmful consequences that epicureism, even in its caricatured «theoretical» version from the Stoics, has yet to reach.
Not everything of ancient literature has survived, it is a well-known fact; and even the little that has survived has not always been preserved in its complete form. We know a great many names of ancient authors from whom we have not a single line; but even of those authors whose works have survived and are considered “classics” today, in most cases not everything has survived. Thus, of the numerous poets in the genre of Greek tragedy known to us today by name, only three of the most prominent — Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides — have survived as complete works; at the same time, only 7 (or 7.8%) of the 90 plays of Aeschylus have survived in full, 7 (or 5.7%) of the 123 dramas of Sophocles, and 19 (or 20.7%) of the 92 works of Euripides. In total, out of 305 plays by only three authors, albeit extremely talented, only 33 works, or 10.8%, have survived. And this is with such prominent names! One can only imagine how many thousands of plays were written by their lifetime contemporaries alone.
The same applies to the comedy genre. Of the 40 works of the famous comedian Aristophanes only 11 plays (or 27.5%) have survived. This is a very large index of preservation, against the background of tragedians, but the fact is that Aristophanes is the only comediographer in general anyhow preserved, while by name we know at least two more of his contemporaries, which later Alexandrian criticism put on a par with Aristophanes, and sometimes even higher. But even the recognition of the critics left no chance of preservation for them.
Already here it would be worth suspecting that if the famous people have reached our times in such a bad condition, it means that the “average situation in the ward” was much worse. According to approximate calculations, we know the names of about 2000 authors who wrote in Greek before 500 AD (before the conditional fall of the Western Roman Empire). And these are only the known ones! At least in some form, the texts of 253 of them (or 12.7%) have been preserved, and those, for the most part, are fragmentary, in quotations or extracts. So often there is not even a page of text. Similarly, we know the names of 772 Latin-speaking authors who lived before 500, but the texts of only 144 of them (18.7%) have survived. Taken as a whole (397 out of 2772 authors), this is only 14.3% of the potential for ancient literature. It should be borne in mind that this calculation is based on the names of authors; and as we have just seen, on the example of the four largest authors, even they were preserved by about 10-15%, what to speak of secondary authors, from which there are only a few passages or nothing at all?
Let’s assume for example, although it is not true, that 10% of their written heritage would have survived from each author; even this extremely insignificant value would have amounted to 3.6% of the total amount of literature that could have reached us. And that is only if all the authors had been preserved with the same zeal with which Sophocles was preserved. But, since the minor authors were preserved so poorly that simply nothing has survived from them, it is safe to assume that only of the known names of authors and the titles of their works, +/- about 1% of the entire heritage has survived from antiquity to our time; and how many authors remained completely unknown even by name — we can only guess.
More striking examples: Menander — the most famous comedy writer of antiquity during the so-called “Hellenistic” period, an incredibly popular author even in late Rome — but by the end of the 19th century he was already considered completely lost. Even after the incredible discoveries of the 20th century, only 7 of his 108 comedies have survived, of which most have survived about half, and only one comedy, “The Misanthrope” has survived in its entirety. Just one comedy out of 108 works! And this is the most popular author in antiquity. No less popular in his time philosopher Epicurus — wrote about 300 works, and from them only 3 letters and a hundred small excerpts have survived. Chrysippus — a Stoic philosopher, of whose 705 works not a single one has survived (although the excerpts will accumulate to 2-3 books in the format of ancient sizes). The same Democritus, whose collection of works existed in the first centuries of the Empire, a century after the last mention completely disappears. And similar situations can be counted in dozens! Only a small part of the list is available, for example, on Wikipedia.
Antique Libraries
The number of libraries in antiquity was also quite large. The largest in the ancient world was the well-known Library of Alexandria, which included, according to various estimates, from 400,000 to 700,000 scrolls, mostly in Greek. Some modern scholars believe this number is overestimated and give another estimate — from 10 to 50 thousand scrolls. But even this figure looks quite impressive. The needs of intellectuals for books led to the transcription of at least 1100 scrolls a year (which means 50 years of work to reproduce the scale of the Library of Alexandria alone, and that is underestimated).
The volume of Latin literature was apparently comparable to the scale of the Greek world. In Rome, closer to the 3rd century AD there were large state public libraries supported by the emperors. There were 28 such libraries in all; each had two sections, Latin and Greek. And that’s not counting the numerous private libraries. One of the last mentions of public imperial libraries can be found in the edict of Emperor Valentus from 372 “On Antiquaries and Keepers of the Library of Constantinople”. The edict appointed four Greek and three Latin specialists in the restoration and copying of ancient books. In the capital of the eastern part of the empire, i.e. Constantinople, even in the fifth century, on the eve of the collapse of the west and the invasion of Atilla, the imperial library included 120,000 books. But the problems began after the so-called “Crisis of the 3rd century”. The decline of interest in scholarship and libraries in 4th century Rome was witnessed by Ammianus Marcellinus, who stated that “libraries are like cemeteries”. The civil wars of the late Empire and the barbarian invasions of 410 and 455 seriously damaged Roman libraries. According to a single mention by Sidonius Apollinaris, bishop of Gaul (Ep., IX, 16), one of the Roman imperial libraries was still functioning in the 470s, the last years of the Western Roman Empire. As a result of this desolation and the cessation of interest in the sciences, by the sixth century — by the time of Cassiodorus’ work — books had already become rare in Italy.
It is a little more difficult to determine the scale of private libraries, since tradition has preserved only occasional names of owners of large book collections. The size of these collections was sometimes exceptionally large, and could be compared to the libraries of the capital: a certain grammarian Epaphroditus (mentioned in the “Judgment”) compiled a library of 30,000 scrolls. The collection of Tirannion (Strabo’s teacher) was about the same size. At the beginning of the 3rd century AD, the physician Serenus Sammonicus collected 62,000 scrolls, and his son gave them to the younger Gordianus. Such libraries are quite comparable to the legendary libraries at Pergamum and Alexandria. But only one single integral library has survived to our days — in a villa in Herculaneum; and it stored, according to different calculations, from 800 to 1800 scrolls, mostly Greek and related to the philosophy of Epicureanism.
I.e. in the 3 private libraries mentioned above alone there was about 100 times more material than in the extant Herculaneum (about the same 1% preservation rate), which even so is considered an incredibly valuable find, with many fundamentally new sources. And how many other private libraries existed that we don’t realize existed? And how many more of the 28 public imperial libraries kept? Of course, the same editions must have been frequently repeated there, and yet the scale of the loss is quite estimable.
Materials and Causes of Disappearance
As can be seen from what we have said above, the centuries-long literary production of antiquity was very large, and the works that have survived to us in their entirety constitute a tiny part of it. The decisive role in this process played not only a simple historical accident. An ancient book could not lie for centuries due to the fact that the writing material was Egyptian papyrus, starting from the VII century BC. In the climatic conditions of Europe, papyrus scrolls wore out rather quickly: already in antiquity it was considered that a book-scroll older than 200 years was a great rarity. By the II-I century B.C., animal skin parchment began to compete with papyrus; but the parchment book (the so-called “codex” in the familiar book form) displaced the papyrus scroll only during the transition to the Middle Ages. In its bulk, the composition of the surviving monuments is the result of successive selections made (both in antiquity itself and at the beginning of the Middle Ages) by a number of generations who preserved from the literary heritage of the past only that which continued to arouse interest. An antique text written on papyrus could be preserved only if it was copied from time to time. And what is characteristic, monuments of ancient pagan culture were transcribed on papyrus scrolls, and new — Christian books were written on parchment codices. This created additional conditions for pagan knowledge to gradually disappear, even without any barbaric burnings. This point is also interesting because we can overestimate the negative influence of Christianity in the times of IV-VII centuries, when papyri, which had already decayed by the time of the Renaissance, could still be in circulation.
According to Italian finds, codices were not yet widespread until the 3rd century A.D., when the crisis came. But somewhere from the year 400, the codex became the only form of book, and up to the year 800, there was a gradual increase in the number of books produced. Just in the period from 400 to 800 most of the manuscripts had religious content; and in the sixth and seventh centuries secular works were probably not copied at all. The originals had decayed, and as a result, when interest in ancient literature began to return in Christian Europe, it was already hard to find. A study of Codices Latini Antiquiores conducted in the 20th century found, among other things, that not a single complete Latin manuscript created before the middle of the 4th century has survived. Only fragments, mostly papyrus, found as a result of archaeological excavations have survived. Works unpopular in the fourth to fifth centuries (including Christian works) have been largely lost.
In some cases, works that were lost in antiquity may have survived by chance; finds of this kind have begun to appear since the 19th century in connection with the discovery of papyri in Egypt(Aristotle’s «Politics of Athens» was discovered in this way). In the last 50 years, a large number of papyrus fragments from the Hellenistic and Roman eras have been discovered here; most are documents, letters, etc., but some contain literary material. Although there are very few scrolls with complete works among these papyri, and they are usually insignificant scraps, the papyrus finds are every year enriching our knowledge of ancient literature, especially in those areas that suffered from Late Antique selection. But what is particularly characteristic is that the increment of material delivered by the papyri relates almost exclusively to Greek texts; works of Roman literature rarely reached southern Egypt. And this illustrates once again the fundamental nature of the Latin-Greek division of the Empire itself.
With regard to fiction, the selection made in late antiquity was based mainly on the needs of the school, which taught literary language and stylistic art. The school for its own purposes selected the most outstanding writers of the past, and preserved their works, but usually not in the form of a complete collection of works, but only individual works, the best examples. In this “selection” from the classics of literature, certain branches and even whole epochs could fall out of the sphere of school interests, and this circumstance strongly affected the composition of the extant monuments. Greek lyrics, the literature of the Hellenistic period, and early Roman literature suffered particularly.
The amount of what was lost increased with the centuries, especially due to the sharp decline in the cultural level during the demise of ancient society. Meanwhile, it was this era, when papyrus scrolls were transcribed onto parchment, more durable in European conditions, that was crucial to the continued preservation of the monuments of ancient literature. The antique texts that survived in the first centuries of the Middle Ages have overwhelmingly survived to our time, as interest in them began to grow considerably from the 9th century AD. But even here, however, not all is well. For example, the “Library” of Patriarch Photius (IX century) contained abstracts of 279 works, but almost half of them have not reached our days. Therefore, let us repeat our conclusion once again: we can safely consider that only of the known names and titles of the works of antiquity have reached us +/- about 1% of the entire heritage; and how many authors remained completely unknown even by name — remains only a guess.
